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Abstract 
New Zealand’s public sector financial management system: financial 
resource erosion in government departments  
New Zealand's public sector reforms have been hailed as a model of theoretical 
consistency and coherence. The associated financial management reforms, known 
internationally as new public financial management (NPFM), were world-leading 
although they are no longer unique. The underlying nature and intent of public 
sector reforms have been the subject of considerable debate internationally. Early 
public sector reforms openly sought privatisation, often on ideological grounds. 
However, in the face of gathering public opposition, public discussion of 
privatisation softened. NPM and NPFM have been promoted instead —  mainly 
on more pragmatic grounds such as improving public sector performance.  
In New Zealand, the Public Finance Act 1989 is the key legislation 
underpinning the financial management reforms. The Act delegates regulatory 
powers to the Treasury and, over time, a considerable body of secondary 
regulation, including accounting rules, has been developed. However, this 
secondary regulation, and its contribution to the success or otherwise of the public 
sector reforms, has not been examined in detail to date.  
In 1999, New Zealand’s Controller and Auditor-General suggested that the 
financial management system erodes government departments’ resources and that 
somehow this resource erosion escapes parliamentary scrutiny. The Treasury, on 
the other hand, defended the foundations of the financial management system as 
solid, arguing that retention of the existing framework would allow further and 
faster progress towards improved performance and value-for-money than would 
be achieved by a new set of reforms. This debate prompts questions whether and, 
if so, how and why a financial management system, ostensibly implemented to 
improve the performance and accountability of the public sector, could be linked 
to such effects, and whether parliamentary scrutiny is indeed avoided. This thesis 
examines the secondary regulation and explains the development of the financial 
management system with the intention of answering those questions.  
The analysis undertaken in this thesis suggests that New Zealand's public 
sector financial management system fabricates the conditions under which 
privatisation initiatives might be accepted for pragmatic reasons. The erosion of 
departments’ financial resources is an essential mechanism in that fabrication 
process. As this system has developed, the time available for parliamentary 
scrutiny has reduced and the Controller and Auditor-General’s controller function 
has been eroded, while the control and discretion exercised within the Treasury 
has increased. Arguably, these developments have helped to conceal the system’s 
privatising intent. The thesis identifies features of the financial management 
system used to rationalise the financial resource-eroding processes. It also notes 
that if New Zealand's financial management system is no longer unique, then 
other NPFM systems may contain a similar combination of features. 

   
 
1 Introduction 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the relatively large size of the public sector in 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) was viewed as one cause of the reduced growth 
experienced by those countries. Privatisation, defined by Savas (2000, p. 3) as 
"reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the other institutions of 
society in producing goods and services and in owning property", gained 
increasing popularity as a remedy intended to help promote economic growth. 
From the late 1970s, public attitudes increasingly reflected antipathy to 
government involvement in essentially business activities; market resource 
allocation mechanisms were preferred over government intervention, and 
individual and corporate freedom were considered crucial to economic and social 
progress (Mascarenhas, 1990). This early enthusiasm for privatisation, however, 
eventually gave way to controversy and increasing opposition (Savas, 2000). 
The privatisation movement originated in the United States, reflecting the 
aggregative, individualistic ideas commonly associated with that country  
(Buchanan, 1997; Savas, 2000, p. xiv). According to Savas, it was broadly 
consistent with, although not derived from, the anti-government, free market 
theories of new political economics (NPE). It is also associated with the new 
public management (NPM) style of public sector reforms which have become 
increasingly common and which, typically, are justified as necessary to improve 
government performance (see for example, World Bank, 1995). These reforms 
contain initiatives designed to reduce state intervention and increase the role of 
markets, with privatisation advocated and justified on the basis of improved 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability that will result (March and Olsen, 
1989; Mascarenhas, 1990; Hood, 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Feigenbaum et al, 1998; 
Savas, 2000; Barzelay, 2001). According to Savas (2000, p. 318-319): 
Public-administration reforms are underway in many countries, and they have 
common characteristics. 'New Public Management' is the label applied to this set of 
innovative reforms, whose defining feature is the infusion of market principles into the 
political world. Specifically, this means (1) striving for efficiency in the face of 
unresponsive bureaucracies; (2) utilizing economic market models for political and 
administrative relationships: public choice, negotiated contracts, transaction costs, and 
principal-agent theory; and (3) applying the concepts of competition, performance-
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based contracting, service delivery, customer satisfaction, market incentives and 
deregulation. Privatization is in the mainstream of the New Public Management, 
exhibiting all these characteristics.  
Financial management reform is fundamental to NPM and known separately as 
new public financial management (NPFM) (Olson et al, 1998a). NPFM consists 
of a range of accounting techniques derived from private sector techniques, which 
shift the emphasis of parliamentary scrutiny and control of government 
expenditure away from the traditional focus on inputs towards a focus on outputs 
and assessment of results. The order of NPFM implementation differs from 
country to country, but the toolbox nature of the techniques eventually results in 
similar reformed public sector financial management systems (Humphrey et al, 
1993; Olson et al, 1998a; Hughes and O'Neill, 2001; Scott, 2001). The NPFM 
system integrates management, budgeting and financial reporting systems, using 
the audited financial information produced to determine the costs and appropriate 
prices of public services, and for performance measurement (Hood, 1995; Olson 
et al, 1998a; Guthrie et al, 1999).  
New Zealand's NPM-style public sector reforms received international 
attention for their scope, consistency and speed, as well as for adoption of a 
world-leading NPFM system (Hood, 1991). This NPFM system has provided a 
model for other financial management system reformers, although the wisdom of 
using that system as a model has been questioned (Schick, 1996; Pallot, 1998; 
Scott, 2001). According to Schick (1996), the system contains bugs. One of those 
bugs is the restrictive nature of the financial management practices which form 
part of an incentives structure Schick thought likely, over time, to reduce 
departmental resources below effective levels of capitalisation. Recent 
observations that government departments are losing their capability to perform 
core functions, at least partly because they cannot reinvest in staff and systems 
(State Services Commission, 1998; Controller and Auditor General, 1999) lend 
some support to Schick’s view, raising questions whether those bugs are the 
relatively minor matters implied by the term, or whether they represent 
fundamental flaws. This thesis aims to explain in detail the development of New 
Zealand's financial management system in an attempt to understand whether and, 
if so, how and why that system reduces departments’ financial resources to the 
point that they lose capability to perform core functions. The remainder of this 
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chapter consists of two major sections. The first considers the wider context of 
international trade liberalisation and legitimisation of public sector reforms in 
order to understand some of the interests involved. The second section briefly 
outlines events prior to and during New Zealand's public sector reforms, before 
giving more specific consideration to the concerns expressed about the operation 
of New Zealand's government departments today.  
Wider context: international trade liberalisation 
For many countries, including New Zealand, a neoclassical/neoliberal set of 
interests seeking to develop an institutional environment supportive of 
international trade liberalisation in goods and services provides the wider context 
for NPM-style reforms (Henisz, 1999; Hood, 2000, p. 3-4). The institutional 
environment sought by this trade liberalisation movement includes security of 
private property rights, protection and enforcement of contracts between freely 
contracting parties, and removal of international trade barriers. In most countries, 
at least some of the services included in trade liberalisation proposals, such as 
education, health, and energy are, or were, governmental services (Buchanan, 
1997, p. 39). Whereas state controls previously imposed on such services may 
have been imposed for social purposes, those controls are now subject to 
challenge as barriers to competition (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992). Public sector 
reform, particularly the privatisation of services provided by the public sector, is 
important to the international trade liberalisation movement because it offers 
major trading opportunities. 
The Washington consensus 
A group of key international agencies based in Washington, such as the OECD, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and its allied agencies, as 
well as credit rating agencies, support and help to legitimise both the international 
trade liberalisation movement and the NPM-style public sector reforms (Kelsey, 
1995, p. 17). In what is known by commentators as the Washington consensus, 
these agencies advocate structural adjustment programmes intended to promote 
trade liberalisation and reform programmes to improve the operation of 
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governments (Williamson, 1994; Kelsey, 1995; Rhodes, 1997, p. 50; Henisz, 
1999).  
Williamson (1994), who represents part of this Washington consensus, listed 
its ten key elements. The trade liberalisation elements include tax reform to 
broaden the tax base while reducing marginal tax rates; removal of barriers to 
foreign investment so that foreign and domestic firms may compete on equal 
terms; financial liberalisation leading to market-determined interest rates; 
exchange rates at levels to encourage export industries; replacement of quota-
based trade restrictions with tariffs, and reductions in the tariffs to a uniform level, 
preferably ten per cent; abolition of regulations impeding market entry and 
competition; and ensuring security of property rights (Williamson, 1994, p. 28; 
Kelsey, 1995). The public sector reform elements consist of: fiscal discipline such 
that governments do not run deficits greater than approximately 2 per cent of GDP 
after debt servicing; in the context of that fiscal discipline, reprioritisation of 
government expenditure to favour more economically productive causes and 
improved income distribution, although the criteria for what is meant by improved 
are not clear; and privatisation of government operations and assets (Williamson, 
1994, p. 28; Kelsey, 1995). The public sector reform elements of the Washington 
consensus, which emphasise privatisation and reduced government operations, 
complement the trade liberalisation elements because trade liberalisation relates to 
the private sector. The expected outcome of these reforms is a smaller government 
with a residual role in which the government may "help design and implement 
appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is" (Rhodes, 1997, 
p. 50). 
Before public sector reforms can commence, the government must be brought 
to a stage of readiness for reform (Williamson, 1994; World Bank, 1995). Few 
governments are considered likely voluntarily to implement reforms intended to 
reduce both their size and power (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). A key feature of 
the readying process is the prior placement within key government agencies of 
econocrats who are insulated from politics, and the involvement of those 
econocrats in the planning, the archaeology, and the oversight of the reforms 
(Williamson, J., 1994; Williamson, O., 1996). Public acceptance that the reforms 
are both desirable and necessary is also required. Public perceptions of desirability 
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may be enhanced by the advocacy efforts of influential parties who will benefit 
from the reforms, while public recognition of necessity may be achieved if a 
financial crisis, deliberately provoked if necessary, helps to close off alternatives 
to those reforms (Williamson, 1994, p. 20; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). 
According to Williamson and Haggard (1994, p. 565), crises have “often played a 
critical role in stimulating reform . . . These worst of times give rise to the best of 
opportunities for those who understand the need for fundamental economic 
reform”.  
The public sector reform elements of the Washington consensus allow for 
some flexibility in implementation, and this flexibility is apparent in the two 
distinct but complementary approaches the World Bank (1995) advocates for 
public sector reforms (figure 1.1). The first approach, the private sector 
development approach, involves the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and encouragement for the private sector to develop in order to take over 
previously governmental roles.1 The expected result of this approach is a 
reduction in the relative size of the public sector and the enhancement of 
economic efficiency. The second approach, the corporatisation approach, uses 
management incentives and the imposition of budget constraints to improve the 
financial performance of any remaining government operations (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, 1994, p. 1). As is evident from figure 1.1 which is taken from World 
Bank (1995), within the two broad approaches, various detailed options are 
available and privatisation, rather than efficiency is the over-riding concern.  
                                                 
1 The World Bank defines SOEs as government entities that derive most of their revenue from selling goods 
and services. 
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Figure 1.1 A decision tree for state-owned enterprise reform (from World Bank, 1995) 
      Introduce competition in markets 
       Ensure transparency and competitive bidding 
     yes  Other implementation details in text 
 
       Management contracts preferable  
    Is divestiture possible?  yes where technology and taste do not  
   yes     change rapidly 
         - auction the contract 
         - use performance-based fees 
         - provide commitment mechanisms 
     no  
  Are SOEs potentially   Are contractual arrangements 
 yes competitive?    with the private sector possible? 
    no 
 
 
 
Is country ready  no Are natural monopolies no 
For SOE reform?  to be divested?   Unbundle large firms, increase 
        competition in markets 
       Restrict soft credit, and subsidies  
       and transfers 
       Ensure managerial autonomy to 
       respond to competition  
 no    yes   Use performance contracts 
        selectively 
 
  Enhance readiness  Ensure adequate regulations are in place 
  For SOE reform  - unbundle large firms 
  - implement other reforms  - auction the franchise 
  - reduce worker opposition  - establish appropriate pricing regimes 
  - improve reputation, boost  - provide commitment mechanisms 
     credibility 
Foundations of NPM and NPFM 
The trade liberalisation movement and the support given to that movement by 
the World Bank and its related agencies provides the wider context of New 
Zealand's NPM-style public sector reforms. NPM and NPFM emerged from a 
spectrum of related theoretical and practical ideas which underpin public sector 
reform generally, and which the World Bank has, evidently, taken up. At the 
theoretical end of this spectrum are the various strands of New Political 
Economics (NPE) theories, while the ideas at the more practical end came later 
(Savas, 2000). These ideas are represented by populist literature about 
privatisation and reform which proposes particular ideas and techniques for 
achieving reforms (for example, Savas, 1982; 1987; 2000; Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Osborne and Plaistrik, 1997; Williams, 2000). The theoretical support of 
NPE clearly is important to this emergence of NPM and NPFM (Savas, 2000), but 
"the impetus and ideas came from practitioners, economists, management 
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consultants and New Right think-tanks" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 175; see also, Demsetz, 
1993; Olsen et al, 1998) (figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 Wider context of public sector reform in New Zealand 
International trade liberalisation 
╔════ Opening markets in goods and services═══╗ 
Theoretical approaches Practical ideas 
Various strands of NPE Populist literature 
╚══════   Public sector reform ═══════════╝ 
NPM and NPFM 
The spectrum of ideas from which NPM and NPFM emerged is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
The development of New Zealand's public sector reforms 
New Zealand was a late starter in the trend of economic and public sector 
reforms (Hood, 1995) but when it did start, it was an “extreme and rapid mover” 
(Ferlie et al., 1996, p. 16). Prior to and during the time of New Zealand's reforms, 
key members of central government agencies, some of whom had been sponsored 
to study NPE theories in the United States, built up a small policy network 
seeking to put into practice some of the theories studied (Kelsey, 1995, 1999). 
Treasury staff members, and former staff members, were especially prominent in 
this network (Goldfinch, 1998b). 
The reforms commenced shortly after a snap election in 1984 which resulted in 
a change of government. The new Labour government almost immediately was 
faced with a currency crisis and the need to devalue the dollar by 20 percent 
(Scott, 1996).2 The high level of debt caused concern within the country over the 
manner in which the debt had grown. As Longdin-Prisk (1986) explained, 
parliamentary control over the executive had, over time, been eroded, leaving the 
Minister of Finance holding the delegated power to raise loans without 
Parliamentary scrutiny. She proposed the re-establishment of scrutiny and controls 
but this proposal was not seen as a suitable alternative to reform because the 
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country's "slow economic growth rate, very high fiscal deficits, high debt, and … 
highly sheltered private sector" meant that a broader set of initiatives was 
necessary (McCulloch and Ball, 1992, p. 7). The Treasury had already prepared a 
reform plan which the previous government, in which Prime Minister Muldoon 
was also the Minister of Finance had rejected. The new government viewed the 
currency crisis and the manner in which it was handled as increasing both the 
acceptability and the persuasiveness of the Treasury's plan (James, 1992; Scott, 
1996). 
New Zealand's reforms were dominated by a few Cabinet members who 
received their advice from a small group of people in the Treasury, the Reserve 
Bank and the Business Roundtable (Goldfinch, 1998b). The reforms were 
extreme, and were implemented at an "exhilarating and frightening speed", with 
important aspects receiving little or no debate (James, 1992, p. 152; see also 
Hood, 1995; Goldfinch, 2000). The early stages were similar to the trade-
liberalising reforms identified by Williamson (1994) as part of the Washington 
consensus. Expected to achieve "sustainable medium-term growth with a more 
market-oriented economy", these reforms included "lower protection of local 
industry, the removal of price and wage controls and deregulation of the finance 
and other service sectors of the economy", as well as adoption of market-
determined interest rates, a floating exchange rate, and the introduction of a retail 
sales tax which broadened the tax base and allowed significant reductions in 
marginal income tax rates (McCulloch and Ball, 1992, p. 7; see also Scott and 
Gorringe, 1989; James, 1992). 
According to Henisz (1999) New Zealand’s early reforms were not considered 
credible because subsequent governments could reverse their effect. The reforms 
were, therefore, reinforced by legislation intended to provide the required 
credibility (Henisz, 1999). The Reserve Bank Act 1989 gave the Reserve Bank 
some independence from the government of the day and restricted the bank's 
primary role to the control of inflation, thus putting "monetary policy beyond 
                                                                                                                                     
2 Kelsey (1995) suggests that the financial crisis may have been engineered. In the time prior to the election, 
Roger Douglas, who became Minister of Finance in the Labour government elected in 1984, had announced 
that if elected he would devalue the dollar. 
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reach of an unfavourable shift in the political winds" (Richardson, 1995, p. 164). 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 committed the government to observation of 
specified principles of fiscal responsibility, thus limiting government expenditure 
and bringing some predictability to the level and stability of future tax rates 
(Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994). Ruth Richardson, Minister of Finance from 
1990 until 1993, steered this piece of legislation through parliament and, in doing 
so, sought to put:  
institutional constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy . . . I wanted to help ensure 
governments continued to place major priority on lowering the deficit and reducing 
debt. As far as possible, I wanted to do for fiscal policy what the R[eserve] B[ank] A[ct] 
had done for monetary policy. (Richardson, 1995, p. 164). 
Public sector reforms were a key part of these broader reforms and, according 
to Scott et al (1997 p. 140), consisted of "two main thrusts". The first thrust 
established limited liability companies to administer the government's major 
commercial activities, thus separating those activities from government 
departments. This corporatisation process was achieved through the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 and represented the commencement of a process of 
privatising these entities (Mascarenhas, 1991).  
The second thrust focused on reforming the remaining core government 
departments to make them "more efficient and responsive" (Scott and Gorringe, 
1989, p. 82). Departments were made subject to regular assessments of their role 
and effectiveness, and their employment and financial management practices were 
changed, with the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 
providing the supporting legislation. These Acts also provided the base for the 
introduction of incentives intended to improve departments' efficiency and 
strengthen the government's ability to prioritise expenditure (Scott and Gorringe, 
1989; Richardson, 1995). This thrust of the reforms took the Washington 
consensus to its "neo-liberal extreme" (Kelsey, 1995, p. 19) by viewing the role of 
the state as "a monopolist enforcer of rights or relationships" (Treasury, 1987, p. 
34). Whereas the Washington consensus proposes corporatising and privatising 
reforms for SOEs, in New Zealand, the treatment applied to all government 
departments was similar to corporatisation. The rationale for this treatment was 
that the development of market conditions, or at least the potential for market 
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conditions, would improve both the efficiency and accountability of government 
departments (Treasury, 1987; Kelsey, 1995, p. 59). 
Reviews of public sector reforms 
Much has been written at an overview level about New Zealand's public sector 
reforms generally, about the reforms to the core public sector in particular, and 
about the reformed financial management system. Typically such literature 
comments on the legislation but ignores the considerable body of secondary 
regulation developed through delegated powers. That regulation, which includes 
accounting rules, impacts on the performance assessments made in practice. There 
has, to date, been no attempt to provide any detailed analysis of the financial 
management system. This thesis examines both the primary legislation enacted as 
part of the reforms and the delegated secondary level regulation in an attempt to 
develop a detailed understanding of that system. 
The comprehensiveness and complexity of New Zealand's public sector 
reforms pose difficulties for any commentator, whether promoting or criticising 
the reforms. Publications by the key people involved provide a rationale for New 
Zealand's reforms, and important information on the nature of those reforms. They 
describe aspects of the intended or actual financial management system, although 
without clear distinction between the two (see, for example, Scott and Gorringe, 
1989; Scott et al, 1990, 1997; Scott, 1996). Frequently, these promotional, 
"official-style publications" ignore or barely acknowledge controversial aspects 
and can, therefore, be deceptive, especially if the actual reforms diverged from the 
description of what was intended (Olson et al, 1998a, p. 24). Overseas academic 
commentators, such as Jones and Thompson (2000), rely on Scott et al (1990) for 
descriptions of the then-proposed financial management system, and assume that 
the actual system operates as described. For example, they draw on Schick's 
(1996) critique of the system and assert that "far too few" departments converted 
to the Mode C status specified in the Public Finance Act 1989 (p. 218), thus 
giving the false impression that some departments did convert to this status.  
The comprehensiveness and complexity of New Zealand's reforms make 
extremely difficult the task of attempting an overall evaluation (Boston, 2001). 
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Even the few more independent and, potentially, more critical commentators have 
provided only relatively superficial overviews, possibly because of time 
constraints (see for example, Schick, 1996) or because of lack of awareness, or 
access to, the evolving secondary regulations (see, for example, Boston et al, 
1991; 1996; Pallot, 1998). Overviews are needed, but the impression gained from 
a superficial consideration of some elements may be misleading. Schick (1996), 
for example, cites the Public Finance Act's definition of operating surplus and its 
prohibition of surplus retention by departments to support his view that New 
Zealand's contractual model treats surplus retention as a breach of contract (Public 
Finance Act 1989, s. 2, 14). That legislative requirement has been subjected to 
considerable reinterpretation via the Treasury's delegated powers and today, in 
many cases, departments must pay to the Crown considerably more than any 
reported operating surplus and may be required to pay amounts even when they 
report operating deficits. Arguably, Schick's assessment of New Zealand's 
financial management system as a contract model would change in light of a more 
detailed understanding.  
Proposed research 
New Zealand's NPFM-style financial management system has developed over 
a period of thirteen years since the 1989 enactment of the Public Finance Act. 
During that time, government departments have lost, or are losing, their capability 
to perform core functions (Schick, 1996; State Services Commission, 1998; 
Controller and Auditor-General, 1999; Gregory, 2001; Laking, 2001). Possibly, 
this is because financial resource erosion affects their ability to reinvest in skilled 
staff, information and control systems, and output production methods that do not 
appear in financial reports and are therefore easily overlooked. If so, this financial 
resource eroding process seems to escape parliamentary scrutiny:  
Capabilities can be built up or run down without such changes necessarily being 
evident in the organisation's financial statements . . . To the extent that the Executive is 
able to convert capability resources into current consumption without a transparent 
appropriation for the purpose, it may be escaping Parliament's control of supply. 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 1999, p. 74). 
The discussion about resource erosion, however, is not specific. Scott (2001) 
argues that the claims of capability losses are exaggerated, but suggests the 
controversial possibility that they may relate to the National, and National 
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coalition government's (1990-1999) continuation of former Minister of Finance, 
Ruth Richardson's, fiscal policies even after the government distanced itself from 
her views about the role of government. Others note flaws in the system, but 
comment only vaguely on the possible effect of those flaws (Gill, 2001; 
Kibblewhite, 2001). For example, there is comment about inflexibility and 
possible over-emphasis on the contractual purchasing model. 
The debate over loss of capability and the links drawn to the financial 
management system and financial resource erosion prompts questions whether 
and, if so, how and why a financial management system, ostensibly implemented 
to improve the performance and accountability of the public sector, could be 
linked to such effects, and whether parliamentary scrutiny is indeed avoided. This 
thesis therefore focuses on what seems to be viewed, by some, as a serious flaw in 
the financial management system, financial resource erosion, and explains the 
development of the system with the intention of answering those questions. In 
undertaking that explanation, this thesis does not attempt to question the need for 
New Zealand’s financial management reforms, or challenge the introduction of 
accrual accounting or deny that benefits have been achieved.  
Internationally, it seems that the accounting techniques adopted as part of 
NPFM are, effectively, adopted as rules with which compliance is required  
(Hughes and O’Neill, 2001) and, in New Zealand, these requirements are 
legislated. The acknowledged strength of NPE theories in public sector reforms 
requires taking seriously NPE theorists' views about the importance of rules, or 
institutions, for influencing behaviour and achieving particular, desired, results. 
This thesis, therefore, examines the rules adopted and developed in New Zealand's 
public sector reforms, using historical research methods to trace the development 
of the rules and to consider what results might be achieved by their application. In 
undertaking this examination, it rejects the accounting profession's representations 
of accounting and accounting techniques as a neutral set of techniques applied to 
allow the impartial and representationally faithful production of financial reports, 
which are, in turn, intended to do no more than to provide information useful for 
decision-making. Those claims have, at any rate, long been refuted 
"epistemologically, socially and historically" (Lehman, 1992, p. 145). Instead, in 
this thesis accounting and the accounting rules adopted as part of New Zealand's 
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NPFM-style financial management system are viewed as institutions intended to 
"exercise control by defining reality" (Olsen et al, 1998, p. 442; see also Lehman, 
1992, pp. 78, 83).  
Most literature about New Zealand’s financial management system explains 
and comments on the legislation underpinning the reforms but none has 
considered the extensive delegated regulatory powers or examined the regulations 
developed. Accounting rules are developed at this delegated level. These rules, 
and the use made of the results of applying these rules, play an important part in 
the way in which departments’ financial resources are eroded. Accounting is, 
therefore, implicated in this financial resource erosion process. Further, given the 
tendency for NPFM developments to spread, to the extent that others adopt these 
accounting rules and techniques, some understanding of the nature of those rules 
and their operation is important. Because this thesis explains rules developed at a 
delegated level, it draws on and presents information obtained from archives 
subject to the Official Information Act 1982, much of it originating from the 
Treasury. Access to that information was essential, and understanding of that 
information was aided by the support, assistance and openness to challenge of 
current Treasury staff. The archival information is incorporated in Chapters 4 to 9. 
The information was obtained subject to the conditions set out in the agreement 
reproduced on page 15. The Treasury has reviewed this thesis and has not 
required any deletions or imposed any conditions on its release. Some of the 
archival information, although largely originating from the Treasury was obtained 
from archives similarly subject to Official Information Act requirements, but with 
the condition that the Cabinet Office may vet the thesis prior to publication. The 
conditions are similar to those reproduced on page 15. The Cabinet Office has 
also completed its review and has not required any deletions or imposed any 
conditions on the release of this thesis. For the purpose of assisting with this 
vetting process, this thesis was written using full references to refer to the various 
archival documents. 
NPE theories incorporate an element of institutional theory and the research 
method adopted for this research, which is explained in Chapter 2, uses a 
descriptive-inductive approach to study the institutions developed in New 
Zealand's financial management system. Chapter 3 reviews the NPE literature and 
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the related populist literature which represents the intellectual and practical 
foundations of NPM and NPFM, and has provided the theoretical underpinnings 
for New Zealand's public sector reforms. This chapter also identifies some of the 
accounting techniques which typify NPFM and considers some of the 
international debate over NPFM and those techniques. New Zealand’s public 
sector reformers set about those reforms intending to change the role of the state, 
and Chapter 4 considers their intent and approach to reform, the legislative base 
they created from which the financial management system was developed, and 
notes the level of power delegated to develop that system. Accrual accounting 
simply provides a base on which NPFM techniques must be built and, because a 
transition time was required for all government departments to adopt accrual 
accounting systems, the addition of NPFM techniques did not commence in 
earnest until after a change of government in 1990. The structure and strategies 
adopted by that government therefore affected the financial management system 
developed and the options available to subsequent governments. Chapter 5 
explains the structure and strategies, while Chapter 6 notes that many of the 
developments to the financial management system have occurred in the context of 
an ongoing series of incentives projects, and outlines those projects. The 
government adopted a fiscal strategy to reduce expenditure, and the manner in 
which this strategy has been designed into the budgeting process and the rules 
developed to control access to resources is the subject of Chapter 7. The 
government’s policy strategies included commercialisation, and Chapter 8 
explains how this commercialisation strategy was applied to the whole of the 
public sector, with the idea that comparative cost assessments between public 
sector and private sector operations would enhance the expenditure reduction 
strategy if goods and services provided by departments may be obtained at less 
cost from other sources. While Chapters 7 and 8 both cover decisions about 
departments receiving financial resources, Chapter 9 considers monitoring and 
review processes which are used to assess departments’ operations, and, in effect, 
to decide whether departments should receive further resources or whether they 
should return resources. Chapter 10 draws on the literature reviewed and the 
archival material to produce my interpretation of the nature of the financial 
management system and to make brief suggestions for change.  
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2 Research focus and method 
Chapter 1 noted that New Zealand's NPFM-style financial management system 
has evolved over the thirteen years since the enactment of the Public Finance Act 
1989. Recent comment attributes to the financial management system government 
departments’ loss of capability to perform core functions, with argument that 
resource erosion occurs without parliamentary scrutiny (State Services 
Commission, 1998; Controller and Auditor-General, 1999). Legislative change 
has been suggested although there has, so far, been no explanation of how the 
system erodes resources (Controller and Auditor-General, 1999). Those 
responsible, at least for the early stages of system development, have promoted 
the financial management system as successful, accepting that the system may 
contain bugs, but arguing that the government's ownership interest in departments 
may have been neglected rather than damaged by the system (see, for example, 
Scott, 1996; Scott et al, 1997; Scott, 2001). Evidently, the Treasury (1999, pp. 47-
48) believes the system is soundly based. This thesis aims to explain the 
development of New Zealand's financial management system with the aim of 
determining whether, and if so, how and why the system might erode 
departments’ financial resources, with such erosion assumed at least partly 
responsible for loss of departments’ ability to perform core functions.  
A spectrum of related ideas underpins financial management reforms of the 
type adopted in New Zealand, ranging from NPE theories at the theoretical end to 
populist advocates proposing specific rules at the practical end. NPE theories 
apply economics to politics, and have drawn from political studies a pillar of that 
discipline, the study of rules, or institutions (Jones, 1992a, p. 149; Rhodes, 1997, 
p. 64). The development and adoption of rules feature strongly in both NPM and 
NPFM. The first part of this chapter defines institutions and explains the 
relevance of the study of institutions to understanding New Zealand's financial 
management system, while the second part explains the research method adopted, 
followed by a description of the sources of information used in this research and 
the nature of that information. 
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The study of institutions 
Institutions are systems of "formal rules, compliance procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure relationships between individuals in various 
units of the polity and the economy" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 78, citing Hall, 1986). For 
as long as these institutions are in force, they will regulate behaviour, even if the 
rules are flawed and the resulting behaviour is dysfunctional (Furubotn and 
Richter, 1991, p. 2-3).  
Approaches to the study of institutions tend to focus either on the rules or on 
the behaviour that the rules are intended to regulate, although the difference 
between these approaches is merely one of emphasis because the behaviour and 
the rules cannot be separated. The descriptive-inductive approach focuses on and 
describes the rules, with the aim of understanding the whole combination, or 
system, of rules. According to Rhodes (1997), institutions tend to grow, often by 
accretion and without conscious design and, because of this tendency, the use of 
historical research techniques is central to the descriptive-inductive approach. 
Early descriptive-inductive approaches tended to describe the institutions but to 
ignore theory, and thus to overlook any theoretical implications of the institutions. 
Expectations today are that the descriptive-inductive approach should be "located 
in an explicit theoretical context" for such understanding to emerge (Rhodes, 
1997).  
The formal-legal approach to the study of institutions views institutions as 
causal and therefore focuses on the behaviour caused by institutions, with that 
behaviour considered likely to cause particular results. Causality interpreted 
strictly ignores the possibility of any other influence and therefore views the 
institution as the sole cause of the behaviour. A less strict interpretation of 
causality accepts that factors other than the institutions may also have an effect 
and therefore views institutions as part of a larger incentive structure which 
influences behaviour (Israel, 1987). The formal-legal approach to institutions may 
also be applied normatively by identifying the desired results and then, based on 
assumptions about likely behaviour, deducing the rules necessary to achieve those 
results.  
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Early NPE theorists, especially those associated with the Virginia School, 
believed that theoretical study alone would achieve little and sought some way to 
bring their theories into practice (Jones, 1992a). The normative formal-legal 
approach to institutions became popular with NPE theorists, all of whom have 
adopted the same behavioural assumptions, that opportunistic and boundedly-
rational individuals will always act in their own self-interest (Moe, 1984; 
Williamson, 1996; Boston et al, 1996). Consequently, the legitimised rule-making 
processes of legislators and regulators, as well as trade associations and other 
standard-setting organisations, which are ideal for NPE theorists' purposes, 
became of increasing interest (Jones, 1992a; Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998). 
Arguably, all that is required to achieve the desired results is to ensure that the 
various rules in operation are structured to generate those results, and that 
compliance with the rules is enforced.  
The normative formal-legal approach to institutional studies emphasises the 
intended outcomes, suggesting the need for careful attention both to the rules and 
to any rule changes in order to ensure that these desired outcomes occur. Some 
theorists have noted that not all people are so attentive, and the ease with which 
institutional changes may be agreed and implemented without agreement or 
understanding of the intended or likely effects (March and Olsen, 1989; Jones, 
1992a; Buchanan, 1997, p. 49; Barzelay, 2001).  
NPM, NPFM and accounting 
NPFM consists of various accounting techniques applied in combination. 
Barzelay's (2001, p. 156-157) description of NPM makes clear that NPFM, which 
relates to financial matters, is a fundamental part of NPM: 
New Public Management is a field of discussion largely about policy interventions 
within executive government. The characteristic instruments of such policy 
interventions are institutional rules and organizational routines affecting expenditure 
planning and financial management, civil service and labor relations, procurement, 
organization and methods, and audit and evaluation. These instruments exercise 
pervasive influence over many kinds of decisions made within government. 
Controversy surrounding NPFM reveals contrasting views about the nature of 
accounting and its role in NPFM. On one hand, the accounting profession and 
some NPFM reformers represent accounting as a set of neutral techniques which 
allow impartial reporting about some objective form of financial reality. This is 
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the case in New Zealand where, especially in the early stages of financial 
management reform, key reformers claimed that the support of both main political 
parties for New Zealand's financial management reforms meant that those:  
reforms are seen as providing a technical approach toward improving the operations 
of government agencies which was neutral with regard to the outcomes desired by the 
government of the day. It also indicates that the success of the reforms will be judged by 
their practical effects and not on ideological grounds. (Scott et al, 1990, p. 26). 
Arguably, accounting's neutrality and impartiality is assured by the accounting 
profession's conceptual framework from which its accounting standards and 
practices are, ostensibly derived, thus ensuring consistency and reducing political 
interference (McGregor, 1999; FASB, 2001). On the other hand, accounting's 
usefulness for devising institutions intended to achieve particular results has long 
been recognised (Jones, 1992a; Lehman, 1992; Covaleski et al., 1995; Olsen et al, 
1998). 
The recent revival of some early uses of accounting to produce particular 
effects is evident in NPFM, even though some of those uses require the 
endorsement of ideas apparently rejected by the profession's conceptual 
framework (Storey and Storey, 1998; Poskitt and Newberry, 1998). For example, 
John Commons, an early institutional economist, introduced into the law such 
connotative concepts as reasonable value and best practices, both of which are 
undergoing resurgence in popularity today. The manipulable concept of 
reasonable value was interpreted as requiring physical valuations, "the cost of 
construction or reconstruction of the physical property", while those physical 
valuations provided the asset valuation base used to devise accounting rates of 
return on which monopoly price regulation and utility regulation were based 
(Covaleski et al, 1995, p. 17, citing Commons (1907)). Commons acknowledged 
that the rules devised greatly benefited the assets' owners and disadvantaged those 
required to pay for the services.3 This use of accounting in the regulatory process, 
however, changed the nature of conflict over rate regulation by providing a 
                                                 
3 The idea of the assets' owners is based on a proprietary theory view which views an entity as merely an 
extension of its owners or proprietors. According to this view, assets are the property of the proprietors and 
liabilities are the proprietors' obligation. Accounting has since distanced itself from this theory, with a rather 
more muddled theory operating today but one which regards assets and liabilities as belonging to the entity, 
not to proprietors (Crook, 1997). 
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"rhetorical device for setting forth the concept of reasonable value which makes 
rage, coercion, physical force unreasonable" (Covaleski et al, 1995, p. 26). 
An institutional approach to understanding New Zealand's 
financial management system  
If institutional changes may be implemented without agreement or 
understanding of the intended effects of those changes, then technical changes, 
such as the many financial management changes found in NPFM, may be 
vulnerable to the production of effects unintended by those who agreed to their 
implementation (March and Olsen, 1989; Jones, 1992a; Buchanan, 1997; 
Feigenbaum et al, 1998; Olson et al., 1998; Barzelay, 2001) This possibility is 
strengthened by Olson et al's (1998, p. 459) suggestion that politicians may have 
relied too heavily on their advisers and NPE theorists' assumptions about 
opportunism which suggests that such reliance may be unwise.  
Hopwood (1984) observed that the stated aims of financial management 
reforms in the public sector tend to be both general and ambiguous, an 
observation no less true in New Zealand, where the stated aims included 
accountability, improved performance, and the extraction of "better value from 
public spending" as just some of the many positive outcomes to be achieved 
(Scott et al, 1990, p. 2).  
New Zealand's key reformers of the financial management system state that 
they applied comprehensively "a consistent set of principles and approaches" 
Scott et al, 1997 p. 357), acknowledging their debt in this application to "an 
interpretation of contemporary institutional economics as developed, for the most 
part, by American theorists" (p. 359), and to ideas about the "sociology of 
organizations" (p. 360). They paid careful attention to the incentives required to 
ensure that "the policy objectives that legislatures establish either directly or 
though authorized governing bodies" are achieved (p. 360). Apparently, these 
reformers used a normative, formal-legal approach to developing New Zealand's 
public sector financial management system. This research therefore adopts the 
alternative emphasis for its study of institutions and takes a descriptive-inductive 
approach to understanding that system. Given the acknowledged sources of 
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inspiration for New Zealand's financial management reformers, these same 
sources, the contemporary institutional economics and related literary sources, 
provide the theoretical context for this research together with a summary of 
international debate over NPFM. These are considered in the next chapter.  
A descriptive-inductive approach 
According to Hopwood (1984), technical developments should be interrogated 
to determine what is achieved, rather than simply accepting the stated 
rationalisations. He proposed that such interrogation would allow the deeper 
questions to be asked about NPFM including, "what effects it truly has on the size 
of government; on the capacity government requires to fulfil its job; and on the 
fundamental mechanisms of elected democracy" (p. 460). Given the loss of 
capability receiving comment in New Zealand, the first two of these questions, in 
particular, are issues on which this research might shed some light.  
The descriptive-inductive approach to the study of institutions requires the use 
of historical research techniques to "systematically describe and analyse 
phenomena that have occurred in the past and which explain contemporary 
political phenomena with reference to past events. The emphasis is on explanation 
and understanding" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 65, citing Kavanagh, 1991, p. 482). This 
research therefore aims to describe New Zealand's financial management system 
using a descriptive-inductive approach in an attempt to understand the likely 
effects of that system.  
Following J. Scott (1990), New Zealand's financial management system may 
be viewed as a system consisting of three layers: a conceptual instruments layer, a 
technical instruments layer and a situated interpretation layer. The conceptual 
instruments layer consists of definitions of key terms and provides a system's 
framework. In any system, the definitions may be specific to the system and may 
differ from the understandings of others. The conceptual instruments layer of New 
Zealand's financial management system apparently consists of two sets of 
conceptual instruments, one embedded in the other. The interpretations of terms 
used or assumed in the Public Finance Act 1989, such as outputs and other 
expenses are at least partially embedded in the second set of conceptual 
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instruments through which performance may be assessed and accountability 
discharged. This second set of conceptual instruments is linked to the accounting 
profession's conceptual framework for financial reporting, and its definitions of 
elements of financial reports, assets, liabilities, equity, revenue and expenses. 
Arguably, by adopting the accounting profession's generally accepted accounting 
practice (GAAP), accountability and control of the public sector may be achieved 
through financial reporting by reporting on and assessing the production of 
outputs, thus allowing assessment of the government's different interests in a 
department. These conceptual instruments are important because any assessment 
of the meaning of published reports requires prior understanding of the meaning 
attributed to the conceptual instruments (Scott, 1990, p. 85). For example, reports 
about outputs and their cost requires understanding of the meaning attributed to 
these terms in the Public Finance Act 1989. 
The technical instruments layer of a system consists of the methods used to 
collect and process the information which will, eventually result in reporting on 
the conceptual instruments. It requires that the conceptual instruments be 
"translated into specific administrative procedures", with those procedures used to 
produce the reports which "depend upon, and help to define, the conceptual 
instruments that are employed" (Scott, 1990, p. 62, 85). In this way, both the 
conceptual and the technical instruments affect the administrative records and 
record-keeping required. For example, although the interpretation of outputs in the 
Public Finance Act 1989 has remained unchanged, changing ideas about how the 
costs should be determined affect both the record keeping requirements and what 
is reported about outputs.  
The technical instruments layer of New Zealand's financial management 
system consists of accounting requirements prescribed by GAAP and instructions 
issued by the Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the 
State Services Commission. The most prominent of the instructions issued from 
within government are Treasury circulars, Cabinet Office Circulars and various 
sets of guidelines and requirements. Application of these technical instruments 
result in financial reports presented as part of a department's annual report, and in 
the forecast reports used to support appropriations, which, in turn, provide the 
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means of assessing, for example, outputs and performance, and the government's 
purchase interest and ownership interest in a department.  
The situated interpretation layer of any system results from the ambiguity 
remaining even after defining the conceptual instruments and specifying the 
technical instruments which, in turn, report on the conceptual instruments. This 
layer leaves some flexibility to bend or reinterpret the conceptual and technical 
instruments layers. According to Scott (1990, p. 90): 
No matter how precise the concept and no matter how systematic the method, those 
responsible for applying it to particular cases will always have a high degree of 
discretion in the decisions they make. It is never possible for a general rule to be 
unproblematically applied to particular cases: an official must decide that in this 
situation, under these circumstances, the rule will be applied. It is always necessary for 
agents to construct concrete interpretations of the rules under which they operate and 
which they see as relevant in the situations with which they are faced. 
The situated interpretation layer may be viewed with either dismay or approval. 
Gregory (2001), for example, who considers New Zealand's financial 
management system inappropriate, views it with some hope: 
The encouraging aspect of all this is that effective and able officials will get on and 
try to do as best they can, using their energy, skill and intelligence to try to work their 
way around contextual constraints placed on them, when they find those constraints 
oppressive or irrelevant. T'was ever thus, and I have no doubt remains so. (p. 218). 
Whereas the use of historical research techniques is appropriate for describing 
the first two formal layers of the financial management system, the conceptual 
instruments and the technical instruments layers, such techniques are inadequate 
for understanding the situated interpretation layer. Although the research 
techniques adopted in this research will not uncover that layer, any researcher 
seeking to explain this layer may find helpful a detailed description of the first 
two layers. 
Data sources 
The descriptive-inductive approach to the study of institutions relies heavily on 
documentary, especially archival, analyses to explain those institutions. Following 
Yin (1989), multiple information sources are important for triangulation and 
enriched analysis. The sources used in this research include publications by those 
involved in the public sector reforms, legislation, regulations issued under 
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delegated powers, archival records, documentation, and, to a lesser extent, 
interviews. 
Publications by those involved in the public sector reforms 
Following each election the Treasury has provided a comprehensive briefing to 
the incoming government which includes discussion of the financial management 
system and proposes developments to it. These briefings give some indication of 
developments of the time. New Zealand’s public sector reforms received 
considerable international attention and key reformers, mostly Treasury staff or 
former staff writing as  individuals, have published their views about the reforms. 
Much of this literature is, as Olson et al. (1998a) suggest, in the nature of 
promotional work but it does explain some of the thinking of the time and 
provides a helpful cross-check with the detailed system developments.  
Legislation 
New Zealand's financial management system is legislated and this legislation 
provides an important source of information about the financial management 
system. In effect the legislation provides the conceptual instruments layer of the 
financial management system. The legislation reviewed for this research includes 
the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988, the Public 
Finance Act 1989, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994.  
Regulation 
The three central departments in New Zealand's government, the Treasury, the 
State Services Commission and the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, each advise their respective Ministers, the Minister of Finance 
(Treasury), the Minister of State Services (State Services Commission) and the 
Prime Minister (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) about the ongoing 
coordination and operation of the core public sector. To some extent, but not 
always, these departments work together. The Treasury is the key central 
department in relation to the financial management system and has conceptualised 
its relationship with departments as analogous to that of a head office relationship 
with branches. The Public Finance Act 1989 delegates to the Treasury the power 
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to issue instructions to departments and, provided the instructions are lawful, 
departmental chief executives are required to comply with those instructions. 
These instructions may regulate the management of public money, or regulate 
accounting and financial management and control procedures (Public Finance Act 
1989, s. 80). 
The Treasury issues a manual which may be found on the Treasury's web-site. 
The manual contains predominantly general instructions covering such matters as 
financial reporting policies and costing policies. In addition, the Treasury issues 
circulars which contain specific detailed instructions with which departments are 
required to comply. Requests to the Treasury and to the Audit Office brought 
forth some circulars and the revelation that neither organisation holds a file 
containing a complete set of circulars. Other documentary sources, including 
departmental sources, supplemented the set obtained for this research.  
Cabinet Office circulars relevant to the financial management system establish 
limits for delegations and requirements for appropriations. These are issued by the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Current Cabinet Office circulars 
are available on the web-site of the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. 
The State Services Commissioner employs departmental chief executives on 
behalf of the Crown and must assess their performance. Part of that performance 
assessment uses information drawn from the financial management system and 
the system, therefore, traces through to the State Services Commission at various 
points. The Treasury and the State Services Commission have developed some 
requirements in relation to the financial management system jointly. Some of 
these are published and available on the State Services Commission's web-site. 
Archives 
Three sets of archival records were perused in this research: the Parliamentary 
Library's archives relating to the enactment of legislation; former Minister of 
Finance Ruth Richardson's archives; and Treasury files in relation to aspects of 
the financial management system.  
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For three Acts of Parliament, the Public Finance Act 1989 and its amendments, 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, and the Financial Reporting Act 1993, all bills 
were obtained, together with records of parliamentary debate on those bills. The 
Parliamentary Library holds public submissions on bills, officials' commentary 
about the submissions, and the reports of the relevant select committees to 
Parliament. For those three acts, this information was examined at the 
Parliamentary Library and relevant comment was either noted or photocopied. 
The objective of examining these documentary sources was to discover the debate 
of the time and how it was addressed. 
Ruth Richardson was Minister of Finance from 1990 to 1993, an important 
period in the development of the financial management system. Although the 
previous Labour government enacted the Public Finance Act 1989, a considerable 
amount of work on the detailed development of the system occurred during Ruth 
Richardson's term as Minister of Finance. These developments occurred largely 
through the issue of instructions and policies and therefore in relation to the 
technical instruments layer of the financial management system.  
On her retirement from parliament, Ruth Richardson contributed her papers to 
the MacMillan Brown library at the University of Canterbury. The Official 
Information Act 1982 applies to those archives and access required Ruth 
Richardson's written permission and the permission of the Cabinet Office. An 
index of those archives was used to request particular files for retrieval from an 
off-site warehouse. Files requested included Treasury advice to and 
correspondence with the Minister of Finance, and the minutes and papers of 
Cabinet Meetings, Expenditure Control Committee meetings, some Cabinet 
Strategy Committee meetings, some Cabinet State Sector Committee meetings, as 
well as documents related to specific issues. Because, at the time of examining 
these archives, the intended research involved a case study of two departments, 
the Department of Justice and the Department of Statistics, information related to 
those portfolios was also collected. Permission was obtained to photocopy 
relevant documents and these photocopied documents were catalogued and sorted 
into one of 13 categories according to the then-vague understanding of the 
financial management system. 
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The task of perusing Richardson's archives commenced with about ten days 
work in January 2001, after which it became apparent that the volume of 
information requested was straining library staff resources. After January, the 
arrangement changed to two days each week perusing between six and eight large 
boxes of files each time. Because the archives were stored off-site, the size of this 
task was not apparent. Subsequent information obtained from MacMillan Brown 
library staff revealed that this set of archives consists of approximately 160 linear 
metres. At a rough estimate, approximately 250 - 300 large boxes of files were 
examined.  
The Treasury is the department responsible for the development and 
management of the financial management system. Development commenced prior 
to Ruth Richardson's term as Minister of Finance and the system has undergone 
continuous development throughout its existence, although the 1990-1993 period 
was a time of major development. A request to Treasury for information about the 
financial management system resulted in three visits to the Treasury, each of 
several days duration, and access to Treasury files, with the information derived 
from those files subject to the requirements of the Official Information Act 1982.  
The three visits were in late February 2001 (three days), June 2001 (four days), 
and early August 2001 (three days). Desk space was provided in the Treasury's 
information department with access to the photocopier and library resources. A 
schedule of files which may be of interest was provided and the files requested 
were retrieved by a Treasury staff member, although a few requested files were 
missing, or in use by others. Information department staff arranged discussion 
sessions with relevant staff and these sessions allowed debate and clarification of 
information retrieved from files as well as information already retrieved from 
other sources. Typically following these sessions, further documentary sources 
were identified and additional documents obtained. 
Intensive reviewing and photocopying documents from the files made available 
dominated the first visit to the Treasury. The second and third visits allowed for 
filling in the gaps. While these later visits also involved documentary information 
retrieval and photocopying, this aspect of these visits was less intensive than 
previously. Instead, the typical nature of these visits consisted of questions to 
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people concerned with particular aspects of the financial management system and 
a request for particular documents to support the further discussion. In addition, 
other sources of information were suggested, resulting in referral to the State 
Services Commission and information about the Commission-led CAP project 
(Chapter 5). 
The documents obtained from Treasury were catalogued and then sorted into 
the categories and files obtained from Ruth Richardson's archives. The objective 
of this process was to develop, for each category of information, a picture of the 
evolution of the various aspects of the financial management system. These 
documents were sorted and re-sorted several times as system understanding 
gradually emerged. They are presented in the references in date order because the 
date is the only consistent reference point, which allows a reader to check the 
references cited against the documentary sources. 
Other documentation 
As noted above, at the outset of this research a case study approach was 
intended to examine how two departments fared under the financial management 
system. Two departments were chosen, one smaller department which had not 
been restructured, the Department of Statistics, and one larger department which 
did undergo restructuring, the Department of Justice. The annual reports of these 
departments were obtained for every year from the date of implementation of 
accrual accounting. For the Department of Statistics this documentation consists 
of eleven years of annual reports, from 1990 to 2000 inclusive, while for the 
Department of Justice, which commenced accrual accounting in 1991, this 
consists of five years of annual reports, from 1991 to 1995 inclusive at which time 
the department was restructured into three departments, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Department for Courts, and the Department of Corrections. The annual reports 
for each of these departments from 1995 to 2000 were obtained. Subsequently, a 
third department, the Inland Revenue Department, was included following a 
request from the State Services Commission to provide a long-term financial 
analysis. All financial reports were analysed and summarised into Excel files to 
give a picture of each department's operation over the whole period under review. 
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The financial analysis and, particularly, the obvious erosion of departments' 
resources through the development of the repayment of surplus rule resulted in 
recognition of the need to understand fully the financial management system 
itself. This, in turn, led to a changed research focus from how particular 
departments fared under the financial management system to how the financial 
management system has been developed for application to all departments. 
Information from those annual reports and from the Treasury's files and Ruth 
Richardson's archives is presented in Chapters 6 to 10 to illustrate the financial 
management system and its operation. 
Interviews 
In research intended to interrogate technical developments, stated 
rationalisations are of less use than documentary sources. Multiple documentary 
sources support both triangulation and a pattern matching approach to piecing 
together the system, with the multiple sources allowing some corroboration. For 
example, the development and operation of the repayment of surplus rule was 
corroborated by cross-checking section 14 of the Public Finance Act 1989, 
information from Ruth Richardson's archives and Treasury instructions against the 
surplus repayments shown in departmental financial reports. To the extent 
discernible in the published financial reports, other developments were also 
corroborated in this manner but this was not always possible, usually because 
parts of the system are not necessarily revealed in the published financial reports.  
When important aspects of the financial management system either could not 
be corroborated from documentary sources or were unclear, attempts were made 
to clarify and corroborate through discussions with staff of Treasury, the State 
Services Commission, and a former Treasury staff member. Interviews were also 
conducted with a former departmental chief executive and a current 
knowledgeable staff member of each of the Department of Statistics and 
Department of Corrections. These discussions were treated as informal for two 
reasons: first, the complexity of the system, the period of time over which it 
developed, and some of the early comments made by Treasury staff led to the 
view that the system understanding of those commenting may be partial, with 
limitations on their understanding imposed by such matters as level of 
Chapter 2 Research focus and method 31
 
 
 
involvement and focus of attention, and time and length of service. The system, 
for example, comprises both budgeting and financial reporting aspects, but these 
are separate functions within Treasury. Further, the budgeting rules are 
administered via the Cabinet Office while the State Services Commission is 
involved in performance review functions. Also, the developers of New Zealand's 
public sector financial management system have changed over time, suggesting 
the possibility that the originators of the system may no longer understand, or 
fully agree with the system that has evolved, while subsequent developers might 
not fully understand the base on which they are building. These possibilities help 
to explain why historical research techniques are appropriate for the study of 
political institutions, because institutional developments can occur, often without 
conscious design (Rhodes, 1997). The decision made was to place greatest 
reliance on the system documentation and examination of the formal system, 
rather than oral explanations and/or rationalisations for it.  
The second reason for treating discussion as informal follows from the first. 
Given the decision to rely on documentation, the potential quotability of 
comments made during discussions was thought more likely to hinder, rather than 
to assist with the research objective. Those with whom discussions were held 
were advised that their comments would not be quoted. Discussion provided a 
source of information for understanding documents obtained, how they linked to 
other aspects of the system, and for seeking further documentation. There was 
considerable follow up from discussions to obtain such additional documentation. 
Arguably, the discussions resulted in a more extensive and comprehensive set of 
documents than would otherwise have been possible. Where reliance has been 
placed on discussion for supporting particular assertions, such reliance is largely 
related to the current status of particular parts of the system. Those with whom 
discussions were held were advised that they would be quoted only after receiving 
advance notice of the matters on which formal comment was sought. 
The nature of the documentary sources 
Almost all of the documentary sources obtained for this research consist of 
government administrative records. Two of those sources are not accessible to the 
general public except under application via the Official Information Act 1982. 
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Before considering the general nature of government administration records some 
explanation of the Official Information Act and the manner in which it is applied 
for researchers is necessary. 
Official Information Act 1982 
New Zealand's Official Information Act 1982 is based on the principle that 
official information should be made available unless there is good reason for 
withholding it. The reasons for withholding official information are set out in 
sections 6 (conclusive reasons), 7 (special reasons) and 9 (other reasons) of the 
Act. Neither the conclusive reasons, which relate largely to the country's security, 
nor the special reasons, which refer to New Zealand's relationship with some 
Pacific Islands are relevant to this research. Some of the other reasons set out in 
section 9, however, do apply to this research. Section 9 allows for information to 
be withheld to:  
(a) protect information which is subject to an obligation of confidence;  
(f) maintain the constitutional conventions for the time being which protect . . .  
(iii) the political neutrality of officials;  
(iv) the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and 
officials;  
(g) maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through  
(i) the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the 
Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any 
Department or organisation in the course of their duty; or  
(ii) the protection of such Ministers, members of organisations, officers, and 
employees from improper pressure or harassment. 
Generally, obtaining information under the Official Information Act requires 
an application citing the specific information required. In the event of a decision 
to withhold information, reasons for withholding must be stated if requested and 
an appeal may be made to the Ombudsman (s. 19, 28-30). For the purposes of 
research such as this thesis, however, a practice has developed of applying the 
Official Information Act in reverse. Access to a particular set of records may be 
allowed provided that the information obtained is treated as confidential and that 
anything written for publication which incorporates that information is submitted 
to the relevant authority(ies) for assessment under the Act.  
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The information obtained from Ruth Richardson's archives and Treasury files, 
may, potentially at least, be withheld under section 9 of the Act. There is however, 
some balance required, in any decision to withhold information. Section 9 requires 
consideration of particular circumstances, especially whether the "withholding of 
that information is outweighed by other considerations which render it desirable, 
in the public interest, to make that information available". Also, the Act does not 
include as reasons for withholding information such reasons as "political 
sensitivity, embarrassment or shame" (New Zealand Official Yearbook).  
The Cabinet Office granted access to Ruth Richardson's archives which are 
held at the MacMillan Brown Library at the University of Canterbury. The 
Treasury granted access to its files which are held in its offices in Wellington. 
Both applied the Official Information Act in reverse, with the Treasury requiring a 
signed agreement before access was allowed (reproduced at the end of Chapter 1). 
The support, cooperation, and assistance of Treasury staff was essential, willingly 
given, and extended to preparedness to read and comment on early drafts. The 
detailed contents of the documents obtained from both sets of files, cannot 
necessarily be divulged. For this reason, throughout chapters 6 to 9, documentary 
sources are cited to support statements made but quotations from the documents 
are minimised to those necessary to show the direction, development and, 
apparent reasoning of the time. 
Government administrative records 
Most of the documents studied in this research are government administrative 
records which typically are "shaped by the political context in which they are 
produced and by the cultural and ideological assumptions that lie behind it" 
(Scott, 1990, p. 60). Although such documents tend to present action as rational 
and calculative, generally by separating any proposed action from its context, they 
should not be viewed as neutral (Scott, 1990, p. 61). Scott (1990) proposes that for 
evidential research, the information obtained requires assessment of its validity 
according to four criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and 
meaning. 
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Authentic records must be genuine and of unquestionable origin. The 
documents used for this research are drawn from primary sources and their 
authenticity may, therefore, be fairly well assured.  
According to Scott (1990), credibility implies freedom from error, evasion and 
distortion. To the extent that the documents obtained in this research contain 
errors, at least some of those errors may be discovered through examination and 
triangulation. Alternatively, errors may be expected to translate through to the 
system or to the understanding of the system and thus result in misunderstanding. 
Evasion is rather more difficult to assess with the most obvious forms of evasion 
in relation to these documentary sources being omission and unrecorded 
discussion.  
The possibility of omission was suggested by some documents which 
mentioned the Official Information Act and the fact of discoverability. Potentially, 
some documents might not be filed and one noted feature of this research was the 
lack of debate in Treasury working documents, especially given the Treasury's 
reputation for intellectual rigour. The recent publication of Gorringe's work 
suggests that there was considerable disagreement within Treasury in 1994 and 
1995 over the development of the financial management system. Although some 
disagreement is noted at the time, its nature is not evident from the files obtained.  
Many of the documents retrieved from Ruth Richardson's files were forwarded 
to her in advance of discussion. The terminology in the documents suggests 
rationality but the nature of the matters under discussion suggests considerable 
scope for evasion and distortion to the extent that the language used in the 
documents may belie the actual intent which may have been clarified in 
discussions. That documents may be lost or omitted from archives, or that 
discussion may be more revealing than the documents should not be surprising, 
but it does require recognition that information retrieved from these sources may 
be partial. 
Representativeness implies that documentary evidence obtained should be 
"typical of its kind". The need for representativeness relates only to the Treasury 
files and Ruth Richardson's archives because, where possible, complete sets of 
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other documents were obtained, that is, Cabinet Office circulars and departmental 
annual reports. The documents retrieved from Ruth Richardson's archives and the 
Treasury's files were drawn from large files each of which required perusal to 
decide which documents were relevant to the financial management system. Very 
large volumes of documents were sighted and copies taken of all assessed as 
relevant, with potential error on the side of copying too many documents. In the 
case of the Treasury files, there was some supplementation by Treasury staff 
members who provided, for example, a copy of the very important "Report on 
Departmental Incentives" (Treasury and State Services Commission, 1989) which 
was not in the archival files supplied. From the files examined, however, the 
documents extracted were representative of the type of documentation.  
Representativeness also requires consideration of the different sources from 
which information was obtained. Although access was obtained to both Ruth 
Richardson's archives and Treasury files, Ruth Richardson's role as Minister of 
Finance means that the dominant source of documented information is the 
Treasury, with the documents taken either direct from the Treasury files or 
indirectly from Ruth Richardson's files. This domination of Treasury-sourced 
information could be misleading. It would be easy to conclude from the evidence 
available, for example, that the financial management system has been devised 
and developed gradually over time by the Treasury and that politicians play only a 
very small part. The validity of such a conclusion, however, may be questionable. 
A different research method would be required to draw any conclusions about the 
driving force behind the financial management system and such a question would, 
in any case, require a different research topic. This research focuses on the system 
itself and not on its developers, recognising that the documentary sources involve 
a heavy reliance on Treasury information and the possibility of misleading 
partiality. Clearly, other parties were involved in the financial management 
system and its development (for example, the good practice proposals of some 
major consultancy firms) and this research makes no attempt to identify the 
particular roles played by the different parties involved. There is, therefore, no 
suggestion that the research findings represent anything other than an analysis of 
the financial management system itself which is the research focus. 
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Understanding the meaning of the evidence collected requires some assessment 
and understanding of the terminology used and the meaning attributed to that 
terminology in the context in which it is used. Official documents may be based 
on a political intent to sell a particular viewpoint, often by presenting that 
particular choice of action in a manner which justifies it, and so the terminology 
can be misleading (Scott, 1990, p. 23). Although the documentation used in this 
research provides evidence about the development of the financial management 
system, the documents cannot necessarily speak for themselves, thus requiring 
some interpretation. This may require some frame of reference to assist with 
understanding, a point consistent with current expectations that descriptive-
inductive research be conducted using a theoretical context. The frames of 
reference used here consist of the theoretical frameworks that the reformers 
acknowledged, especially NPE and the wider international trade-liberalisation 
context within which New Zealand's public sector reforms have occurred, together 
with the published work of key reformers and commentary about the public sector 
reforms. According to Scott (1990) "the most that can be achieved by a researcher 
is an analysis which shows how the inferred internal meaning of the text opens up 
some possibilities for interpretation by its audience and closes off others" (p. 35).  
Chapter summary 
This research adopts a descriptive-inductive approach intended to explain the 
development of New Zealand's financial management system and to understand 
the nature of that system as it operates today. Although this research may be 
expected to access the conceptual and technical instruments layers of New 
Zealand’s financial management system because those are both formal layers 
which may be uncovered through the predominantly documentary research 
method adopted, the informal situated interpretation layer of the system will not 
be revealed.  
NPE theorists' acknowledged views and assumptions of behaviour suggest that 
the stated rationalisations for particular institutional reforms should not be taken at 
face value. Neither should the documents obtained during the course of this 
research, with recognition that, as government administrative records, those 
documents must project an appearance of rationality. Assessment of the 
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institutions developed requires a theoretical context and the context adopted for 
this research is that of the various NPE theories and the more practical proposals 
of populist advocates of the reforms, as well as the debate over particular NPFM 
techniques. This context is adopted because of its acknowledged influence on 
NPM and NPFM, and because key figures involved in the development of New 
Zealand's financial management system acknowledge that this literature has 
provided much of their inspirational source.  
The next chapter provides the theoretical context for this research while 
Chapters 4 to 9 set out the research findings to explain the financial management 
system developed in New Zealand. 

  
 
3 Influences on NPM-style public sector 
reforms 
Chapter 1 identified the spectrum of related ideas from which NPM and NPFM 
emerged, with new political economics (NPE) at the theoretical end, and the work 
of populist authors such as Osborne and Gaebler (1992) at the more practical end 
(see figure 1.2). Much of this literature is from the United States of America and 
its application in New Zealand may be questioned. New Zealand’s NPM-style 
public sector reforms are renowned for their application of ideas drawn from "the 
literature on institutional economics and contemporary macro-economic and 
micro-economic theory" (Scott et al, 1997, p. 359; see also, Boston et al, 1991; 
1996; Schick, 1996; Barzelay, 2001), but the populist literature has received 
almost no acknowledgment. There are, however, clear indications of a strong link. 
For example, a novel feature of New Zealand’s Public Finance Act was the 
distinction between the government’s purchaser and owner interests in 
departments, but Savas (1982), who devised this distinction (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992), receives only coy acknowledgment from Scott et al (1997, p. 
363), even though Savas’s book has been in the Treasury library since 1984. 
Similarly, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and Osborne and Plaistrik (1997) cite New 
Zealand’s developments and report discussion with New Zealand’s reformers, 
thus suggesting that New Zealand’s reforms have influenced them, although 
whether there is an influence in the other direction is not clear from their work. 
This chapter outlines the ideas in the spectrum from which NPM and NPFM 
emerged, beginning with an explanation of NPE, identification of different waves 
of NPE theories, and discussion about their consistency and validity. It then 
considers the more practical populist literature which proposes various techniques 
for use in public sector management and financial management systems. Finally, 
it explains the international debate over NPFM and especially the accounting 
techniques adopted as part of NPFM. 
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New political economics (NPE) 
New political economics consists of a body of relatively recently developed, 
and still developing, theories that became popular in the United States in the 
1970s and are associated academically with the Chicago and Virginia Schools 
(Moe, 1984; Goldfinch, 2000). A key difference between these schools is that the 
Chicago School suggests that only money matters whereas the Virginia School 
believes that institutions (rules) are crucially important (Meckling, 1978, p. 106).  
These NPE theories apply economics to politics, and include public choice 
theory, constitutional economics, transaction cost economics, and agency theory, 
which, in combination, focus on government and the management of government 
(Jones, 1992a, p. 149; Buchanan, 1997).4 The ideas underlying these theories 
range from ideas about people's voting behaviour, about how a government 
operates and ideal constitutional rules, to ideal structures for organising and 
coordinating activities, and arrangements for controlling relationships within 
those structures.  
All of these NPE theories rely on the same underlying assumptions, that 
individuals are self-interested, opportunistic and boundedly rational. In the context 
of self-interested rationality, opportunistic means that individuals will take 
advantage of any opportunity to pursue their own interests, while boundedness 
indicates their lack of perfect knowledge, so their actions occur in an environment 
of some uncertainty about events and likely outcomes (Moe, 1984; Williamson, 
1996; Boston et al, 1996). These individualistic assumptions reject, or at least 
ignore the possibility of, any concept of public interest or altruistic behaviour. 
Two waves of NPE theories are of particular interest in New Zealand's public 
sector reforms: the early wave associated with the Virginia School, which 
developed in opposition to Keynesian economics and draws on ideas about 
markets and market efficiency; and a later wave which focuses on politicians and 
their behaviour.  
                                                 
4 Transaction cost economics and agency theory were developed in the context of the business sector and 
require adaptation for use in relation to government. Both, for example, take for granted the enforceability of 
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Early wave NPE theories 
The Virginia School’s early wave of NPE theories seemed to commence in the 
late 1940s to counter Keynesian economics, then dominant in Western countries 
(Jones, 1992a). Keynesian economics proposes that governments should try to 
counterbalance economic cycles and allocate resources to maximise welfare. The 
NPE theorists, however, argued that Keynesian economics and, in particular, the 
rules of functional finance theory associated with Lerner, contained an inbuilt bias 
towards government expansion and caused increased public sector debt and 
inflation (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978). They proposed a set of rules (meaningful 
constitutional norms) intended to reverse the rules of functional finance theory 
and, therefore, the effects of Keynesian economics by tightly constraining a 
government's access to resources. Their proposed norms consisted of a 
government's commitment to a balanced budget without incurring debt; a 
constitutional limit to the amount of tax that a government may take; creation of a 
central banking institution charged with ensuring that "a country might achieve … 
low and predictable inflation"; and constraints on a government to prevent it from 
removing private property rights, thus providing incentives for private sector 
investment (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978, p. 176; see also Buchanan, 1989, p. 56; 
Jones, 1992a, p. 153).5  
According to these Virginia School NPE theorists, economics should focus on 
"the creation of value . . . and . . . the interactive relationships among persons that 
define the order of the economy" (Buchanan, 1997, p. 65). They therefore seek to 
impose rules for this purpose, using, at times, highly emotive language revealing 
strongly-held philosophical views. Buchanan (1997, p. 41), for example, argued 
that any "means of production that are collectively owned and managed" amounts 
to socialism and that many government activities should be the preserve of 
markets (see also Buchanan et al, 1987). Meaningful constitutional norms did not 
                                                                                                                                     
private property rights, ideas requiring considerable translation in respect of the elected authority to govern 
(Moe, 1984). 
5 The proposed commitment to a balanced budget commenced with an argument that current taxes should 
cover the costs of current public spending but subsequently equivocated over whether all government 
spending is current spending or whether non-current spending could be debt financed provided it could earn 
an acceptable return (Jones, 1992a; Rowley, 1993; Musgrave, 1999). 
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directly address these government activities, but Niskanen's (1971) development 
to NPE theory did. Niskanen argued that government provision of services will 
always be inefficient when it is the "only game in town" and that self-interested, 
budget-maximising bureaucrats cause this inefficiency (1975, p. 617). This early 
wave of NPE may therefore loosely be described as the market-efficiency wave 
because Niskanen's proposals to restore efficiency subsequently became: 
the cornerstone of a scientific movement of sorts, led by the public choice school of 
economists and political scientists, against the bureaucratic supply of public services 
and in favor of two fundamental dimensions of reform: privatization and competition. 
(Miller and Moe, 1983, p. 297). 
Later wave NPE theory 
A later wave of NPE theory, the New Economics of Organization (NEO) 
seems to have commenced in the late 1970s (Moe, 1990b), and is consistent with 
the Virginia School in that it views institutions as crucially important. NEO 
conceptualises politicians as legislators who want to obtain and retain power, and 
governmental relationships as hierarchically structured. It proposes that voters 
organised into powerful interest groups can influence elections, and therefore that 
legislators must gain the support of those interest groups (Horn, 1995, Chapters 1 
and 2). In this context, politics becomes a game of legislation-passing because the 
legislators must pass legislation (rules) designed to provide on-going benefits to 
the supporting interest groups. 
NEO conceptualises governmental relationships as a hierarchical chain of 
agency relationships in which the powerful interest groups are the ultimate 
principals and legislators are their agents. At the next level, legislators are 
principals in relation to their bureaucratic heads who are their agents, the 
bureaucratic heads are the principals of their bureaucratic staff agents, and so on. 
This results in a three-tiered approach to understanding public management, with 
the first tier involving a corporate view of executive government; the second tier 
dealing with the relations between legislators and bureaucrats; and the third tier 
addressing management within a bureau (Barzelay, 2001, p. 102-103). NEO also 
recognises that elections bring about changes in legislators, and distinguishes 
between enacting legislators, those legislators who pass particular legislation 
while in power, and incumbent legislators, those legislators who may follow the 
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enacting legislators and receive their support from different interest groups. 
Because incumbent legislators may amend or reverse earlier legislation, the 
powerful interest groups make their continued support of enacting legislators 
conditional on the provision of assurance (credible commitment) that the 
legislation will continue to deliver its benefits even when those legislators are no 
longer in power. Embedding the legislation so that it remains effective even when 
subsequent incumbent legislators are opposed to its effects may provide this 
assurance. 
The embedding of legislation requires decisions about its administration. Very 
detailed legislation implies greatest certainty about its subsequent administration 
but has drawbacks because its beneficiaries may be identifiable and it can be too 
inflexible. Often less detailed legislation is preferable, with the administration and 
interpretation of that legislation delegated to one of three forms of regulatory 
agency: courts, a commission, or a bureaucracy. All regulatory agencies are tax-
financed and may expect expert outsiders to assess their performance but differ in 
the extent of their independence from the legislature: courts are independent; a 
commission is subject to the legislature's power of appointment, generally on 
fixed terms, but the legislature which creates the commission can promote 
continuity in thinking by staggering the first members' terms; and the bureau is 
subject to the direction of the legislature. The differing levels of independence are 
appropriate for administering and interpreting different types of legislation (Horn, 
1995, Chapter 3). 
Legislators must also determine the procedures to be adopted by the 
legislation's administrators. Much of NEO's concern with the delegated 
administration of legislation focuses on administration in bureaux (government 
departments) because they are most subject to influence by subsequent legislators 
(see Horn, 1995, p. 13 for more detailed explanation). 
NEO assumes that administrators of government departments are self-
interested but apolitical, and that the heads of such departments will serve under 
any legislature. Based on these assumptions, it identifies three key influences on 
their decisions. The first influence is the terms and conditions of employment, 
which affects the type of person likely to consider appointment. The second 
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influence is the level of control imposed over access to resources for the 
department, and over the use of those resources. Starving a department of 
resources, for example, can prevent it from performing its function. Although 
incumbent legislators might appear able to control departments' access to 
resources by requiring them to compete for resources in the annual appropriations 
process, prior legislation may mandate expenditure, either by establishing 
particular entitlements, or by requiring permanent or multi-year appropriations. 
Mandated expenditure, therefore, helps to bind subsequent incumbent legislators, 
reducing their influence over department administrators. Those incumbent 
legislators would be forced to amend or repeal the relevant legislation to regain 
control of the resources and departmental administrators (Horn, 1995).  
Once legislators control departments' resources, agency theory concerns about 
the use of resources within a department may be addressed through the 
appropriations process by imposing controls on the amount that may be spent on 
specific expense items, and by imposing "separate capital spending controls, 
restrictions on realising assets, and restrictions on the ability to borrow and lend" 
(Horn, 1995, p. 89). These restrictions, together with a requirement to return 
revenues to the Treasury, help to prevent discretional "intertemporal transfers" 
which otherwise would allow departments to evade the control provided by annual 
appropriations and, effectively, the control of incumbent legislators.  
The third influence on departmental administrators' decisions is the 
determination and operation of incentives. Legislators use incentives to ensure 
that the apolitical public servants, when administering legislation, respond to the 
interests represented in that legislation at the time it was enacted, rather than to the 
desires of whichever legislature is incumbent. 
Horn (1995, p. 95) summarises these NEO issues from the perspective of 
enacting legislators seeking to reassure powerful supporting interest groups that 
they will receive ongoing benefits from the legislation: 
the enacting legislature will look for arrangements that promote the selection of 
administrators who have the incentives to administer legislation in the way the enacting 
legislature intended. In addressing the commitment problem, the enacting legislature 
will also want administrative arrangements that explicitly limit the extent to which 
future legislatures can control administrative outcomes. 
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Challenges to the validity and nature of NPE theories 
Some NPE theories are built on relatively simple and, perhaps, intuitively 
appealing ideas and assumptions. Their validity has been challenged (see, for 
example, Sen, 1977; Miller and Moe, 1983; Moe, 1990b) but even contradictory 
ideas seem to endure (Barzelay, 2001). For example, the market efficiency ideas 
suggest that the public sector is inefficient because legislators are the victims of 
self-interested, budget-maximising bureaucrats, while the NEO ideas suggest that 
bureaucrats are mere agents of self-interested legislators, who are in turn agents of 
powerful interest groups (Miller and Moe, 1983; Horn, 1995, p. 90). Both views 
seem to be overly simplistic: legislators might not be victims of bureaucrats, but 
little evidence exists to suggest that they want to apply the rational control 
measures that NEO implies (Aucoin, 1995, p. 36-37; Moe, 1990a). Instead, both 
legislators and bureaucrats may prefer less conflict-oriented structures and seek to 
"put distance between themselves and whatever conflicts arise" by adopting 
institutionalised routines or objective processes to resolve disputes (Moe, 1990a, 
p. 139). Further, if dominant interest groups are the prime movers in politics, as 
NEO suggests, then all three sets of actors — interest groups, legislators and 
bureaucrats require consideration in light of the way each group operates to 
further their own ends rather than through narrow application of agency theory 
ideas (Moe, 1990a; 1990b).  
These theories may also be misleading. For example, the chain of 
accountability traced through the NEO hierarchical control structure may appear 
simple and straightforward, but the reality is far more complex. The existence of 
multiple powerful interest groups suggests multiple chains of accountability in 
relation to different politicians and groups of politicians within a legislature (Moe, 
1990a, 1990b; Barzelay, 2001). Similarly, legislation focused on the provision of 
benefits to particular powerful interest groups may be technically dysfunctional or 
subversive (Moe, 1990a, 1990b). 
If bureaucrats are not in control, as NEO suggests, competition and 
privatisation will not necessarily improve efficiency and may even reduce it 
(Miller and Moe, 1983). Moe (1984, p. 773) advised caution when considering the 
practical application of simple models, arguing that they "threaten to supply us 
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with theoretical 'insights' that are actually quite incorrect; given the difficulty of 
conducting empirical research on these topics, these could easily gain acceptance 
and serve to mislead us for years to come”. Horn (1995, p. 34), however, rejected 
such caution, proposing a weak test, satisfied when a "theory in its early stages of 
development . . .  [is not] . . .  vastly inconsistent with the readily available 
institutional evidence".  
Philosophical, as opposed to technical, dimensions? 
NPE theorists are noted for their tendency to ignore contrary views, and to 
build on each other's work, including the inconsistencies, as if there are no 
contradictions (see for example, Barzelay's (2001) discussion of Aucoin (1995)). 
It seems that philosophical views may provide a better key to understanding and 
appreciating their work, a point that acknowledged sympathisers with those views 
have made clear (see, for example, Meckling, 1978; Demsetz, 1993, while for 
philosophical views see, for example, Buchanan and Wagner, 1978; Buchanan et 
al, 1987; Buchanan, 1993; Wagner 1993; Rowley, 1993). Some NPE theorists 
acknowledge both philosophical and technical dimensions to their arguments 
which generally emphasise privatisation in public sector reforms. The 
philosophical dimension represents a government with its coercive powers as a 
necessary evil which should be constrained to enforcing, but not setting, the rules 
within which a market economy can function (Tullock, 1993, p. 78; Wagner, 
1993). This implies a "liberal position that rejects the desirability of collective 
control" (Buchanan, 1997, p. 42), and views privatisation as simply preferable 
because it supports liberty and freedom from state coercion (Buchanan and 
Musgrave, 1999, p. 1; Rowley, 1993; Williamson, 1996).  
NPE theorists may present their proposals using technical terminology but 
some acknowledge their philosophical stance as the key to those proposals. For 
example, arguments that property should be held in the private sector because that 
sector will use the property more efficiently have more to do with the view that 
possession of private property acts as a defence against state coercion (Rowley, 
1993). Similarly, the meaningful constitutional norms advocated to reverse the 
rules of functional finance theory are rationalised with technical arguments: a 
monetary constitution will ensure that "a country might achieve not only low and 
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predictable inflation but fiscal discipline as well" (Parkin, 1987, p. 331); a 
constitutional limit on taxes will force a government to be efficient (Buchanan, 
1989); and a balanced budget constraint will demonstrate fiscal responsibility 
(Breit, 1978). Economic efficiency and fiscal responsibility, however, are 
acknowledged as minor issues (Buchanan, et al, 1987, pp. 69). The proposed 
norms are intended to cause governments to shrink: a monetary constitution 
prevents the imposition of disguised taxes by removing a government's easy 
ability to print money, and thus dilute the value of money already in circulation; a 
constitutional limit on taxes helps to regulate the master-slave relationship 
between the state and its citizens (Buchanan, 1989, p. 54); and the real force 
behind a balanced budget constraint is the way in which it keeps a government in 
a state of starvation and thus limits the size of the state (Breit, 1978, p. 13). 
Initially, NPE theorists seemed to advocate for all of a country's taxpayers, 
viewing them all as engaged in a virtual slave relationship with an overly 
powerful state (for example, see Buchanan, 1989, p. 54). More recently, this 
apparently civil society view has evaporated in light of NEO theories. With trade 
liberalisation developments increasing the mobility of capital while leaving 
countries' citizens relatively immobile, Buchanan proposed that governments 
should compete to attract businesses with favourable business conditions. 
According to Buchanan, differential tax rates could be imposed, with citizens 
paying taxes sufficient to provide those favourable conditions (Buchanan and 
Musgrave, 1999, p. 257). This suggests that Buchanan now represents a particular 
set of taxpayers, rather than all taxpayers. Musgrave noted this change, 
commenting that fiscal competition is no more than "a glorious arrangement for 
rent seeking by capital" (Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999, p. 144, 257).  
NPE theorists admit that their philosophical views encounter public resistance 
(see, for example Buchanan, 1997), and acknowledge that proposals for reform 
require symbolic rhetoric (such as economy and efficiency) intended to appeal to 
the particular government structure and political climate (March and Olsen, 1989, 
p. 76; see also Henisz, 1999). They also recognise that the "pragmatic objectives 
of internal efficiency" increase the likelihood of privatisation: 
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The necessary trade-off is seen to be that between the sacrifice of collective control - 
a sacrifice that is intrinsically undesirable —and the promised gains in productivity, an 
objective that is valued. (Buchanan, 1997, p. 42)  
Whether such promises of efficiency and productivity gains should be 
believed, or whether privatisation should stop once optimum efficiency has been 
achieved, however, is another matter.  
[E]ven if the overall size of the politicized sector of the economy should be set 
precisely at some efficiency-enhancing optimum, the utility value of independence itself 
would dictate some reduction in public sector size. (Buchanan, 1993, p. 57). 
Populist advocates for public sector reform 
Populist advocates for public sector reform, exemplified by Drucker, Savas, 
and Osborne and his co-authors, sought, and still seek, privatisation (Savas, 2000). 
They draw on practical, rather than theoretical, backgrounds but recognise 
consistencies between their work, that of new political economists, and NPM. 
Savas, for example, who views NPM as consistent with both the practical and the 
theoretical approaches, maintains that "privatization is the New Public 
Management" but acknowledges public resistance and the need for euphemisms 
(Savas, 1987, p. 111-112; 2000, p. 319, emphasis in original).  
Privatisation 
Savas was influential from the late 1970s when he advised President Reagan 
and collaborated with those promoting privatisation in the United Kingdom 
(Savas, 2000). At that time, he proposed four privatising strategies: load-
shedding; limitation of government arrangements; the imposition of user charges; 
and competition, which includes contracting. Load-shedding allows the 
government's role to diminish gradually, either systematically, by identifying 
which services should revert to the private sector, or more simply, and with less 
likelihood of "bruising" ideological battles, by allowing services to run down to 
sub-standard levels, thus encouraging "natural forces" to develop markets in those 
services: 
To implement load shedding, then, can involve no more than a no-growth policy for 
government and natural growth for the alternative arrangements. Limiting devices such 
as  . . .  spending caps, budget cuts, revenue cuts, revenue limitations and balanced 
budgets all facilitate this process. Inflation can actually help to the extent that 
limitations are applied in absolute dollar amounts. (Savas, 1982, p. 123). 
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The limitation of government arrangements require institutional structures 
intended to minimise government involvement. Savas identified four types of 
goods, alternative structures for providing those goods, and a set of criteria to 
evaluate those alternatives. For collective goods, those goods used jointly and 
from which people cannot be excluded, he identified a limited set of alternative 
structures: government provision, contract, and voluntary arrangements. For the 
other three types of goods he identified additional possibilities. For common-pool 
goods, goods consumed individually but which people cannot be prevented from 
consuming, in addition to those structures for collective goods, grants or vouchers 
may be used; for toll goods, those goods used jointly and for which users must 
pay, additional alternatives include government vending, franchises, and markets; 
while for private goods the possibility of self-service could also be added (Savas, 
1982, p. 124-131; 1987, p. 39, p. 94). 
According to Savas, contracts are appropriate for all types of goods. The 
limitation of government arrangements necessary for contracts require a 
"distinction between providing for a service and producing the service" (1982, p. 
134, emphasis in original). Such arrangements offer "an excellent opportunity to 
introduce and institutionalize competition by employing procedures such as 
competitive bidding", especially if the public sector and the private sector produce 
the same services (1982, p. 145). This requires carefully devised contract 
specifications which define the required service and performance requirements, 
but do not "transgress the bounds of management prerogatives" by specifying 
exactly how the service will be produced (p. 150). It requires valid cost 
comparisons, achievable only if the government-produced services reflect full 
costs, which include interest costs on capital expenditure, recognition of the 
opportunity cost of land and buildings, and taxes (p. 145-154; see also 1987, p. 
259-261). 
Arguably, units of government could make significant savings without adverse 
effects on either the quality or level of service by applying contracting at lower 
levels. Savas, however, observed reluctance to take this step, noting the need for 
"serious fiscal stress" facing that unit and the political feasibility of contracting. 
He identified as essential motivating factors, "some precipitating event that makes 
it impossible to continue with the status quo", such as the threat of closure; and 
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the force of a strong advocate who builds the consensus needed to make feasible 
this form of privatisation (1982, p. 256; 1987). 
User charges should, eventually, force users to bear "fully the true cost of 
service". Savas (1982) proposed the imposition of user charges on government-
provided private or toll goods, arguing that budget and tax limitations would force 
gradually-increased charges, and the eventual prohibition of "hidden subsidies for 
government-produced services" would prompt citizens to seek alternative services 
if they believe that "the service isn't worth the price" (p. 131-133). 
Savas viewed all of his privatising strategies as mutually reinforcing (1982, p. 
155): 
A decline in the quantity or quality of service leads some citizens to seek out or 
devise alternatives to supply or supplant the service. This invites load shedding. User 
charges provide information that facilitates evaluation and accelerates the process. 
Contracting and vouchers encourage competition and promote efficiency, and can be 
employed in concert with load shedding. 
Savas (1982, p. 89) noted the ideological arguments adopted by most advocates 
of privatisation but, by 1987 recognised gathering opposition to those arguments. 
Acknowledging that privatisation "is more a political than an economic act" (p. 
277, emphasis in original), he advised the use of euphemisms to help overcome 
opposition to privatisation, especially euphemisms likely to appeal to the populist 
and pragmatic forces, such as productivity enhancement, and alternative service 
delivery (p. 280).  
Reinventing government and steering 
Osborne and Gaebler are well known for promoting the distinction between 
steering and rowing, and for arguing that governments should do no more than 
steer, but they acknowledge Savas as the source of this idea: 
The word government is from a Greek word, which means "to steer." The job of 
government is to steer, not to row the boat. Delivering services is rowing, and 
government is not very good at rowing. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 25, quoting 
Savas). 
Osborne and Gaebler argue that a government must retain its governance role 
of collective decision-making through which the rules of the market are both 
made and enforced (p. 45). They also recognise that the nonprofit sector cannot 
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carry the whole welfare load of health care for the poor and housing for the 
homeless, so they argue that privatisation is not the only answer to poor 
government performance. Drawing heavily on Savas's earlier work, they propose 
reinventing government, listing 36 alternatives to government service provision 
which would reduce a government's functions to steering. 
Osborne and Gaebler define an entrepreneur as one who "shifts economic 
resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and 
greater yield" (1992, p. xix). They propose that their reinvented government 
would be entrepreneurial and innovative, with innovation prompted by reducing 
available resources. This would force government managers to "constantly use 
their resources in new ways to heighten both their efficiency and their 
effectiveness" (p. xix). 
According to Osborne and Gaebler (p. 137), an entrepreneurial government 
would adopt accrual accounting, focus on “information about the results of 
government spending”, and “marry their budget systems to performance 
measures”. For output budgeting, it would focus on the volume of outputs to 
allow determination of true unit costs, while allowing scope for innovative 
productivity increases by avoiding any link between the money spent and the 
volume of outputs (p. 39, 162-165). Such a government would evaluate its 
investments in assets by the return to be gained from them using, for example, a 
rate of return calculation (p. 207). Its managers, however, would require 
incentives by receiving a portion of savings. Alternatively, or additionally, 
departments could "keep all or part of any funds they save or earn", thus allowing 
retention of capital for innovation. These incentives would require budget 
formulae to prevent "green-eyeshade budget officers" from trying to capture 
savings or earnings. (p. 210).  
Osborne and Plaistrik (1997) aim to re-invent governments and cite New 
Zealand as a leading and extreme example of re-invention. They argue that 
successful public sector reforms require rewriting the genetic code for "a system's 
purpose, its incentives, its accountability systems, its power structure . . . and 
 . . . its culture". Osborne and Plaistrik proposed rewriting the code for each of 
five "most fundamental pieces of public sector DNA". They identified these codes 
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as strategies: core strategy, consequences strategy, customer strategy, control 
strategy and culture strategy ("the five C's") (Osborne and Plaistrik, 1997, p. 38).  
The core strategy represents a government's most important steering role, while 
the other four strategies are merely subsidiary, rowing functions. Central to the 
core strategy is a "clear the decks" procedure which Osborne and Plaistrik propose 
should be institutionalised as a series of small periodic exercises intended to 
"gradually and continuously" reduce the government's role to a steering function. 
Success is more likely from these small and regular routines than from less regular 
major ones. They present the prior options reviews adopted in the United 
Kingdom as a leading example of such routines. These reviews consider: 
Is there a continuing need for the activity? If so, does the government have to be 
responsible for it or can it be privatised and left to the market? Where the government 
needs to remain responsible for an activity, does it have to carry out the task itself, or 
can it contract the task to one or more outside providers? If the latter, should the 
government contract out the entire activity, or should it be market tested, with civil 
servants competing with outside suppliers to determine which method provides the most 
value for the money? (Osborne and Plaistrik, 1997, p. 93). 
Examples of small, routine exercises include performance or programme 
reviews ("periodic exercises . . . to develop recommendations for abandoning, 
privatizing, devolving, restructuring, or otherwise reforming public programs"), 
sunset rules, asset sales and quasi-privatisation methods in which asset ownership 
is retained but its operation is assigned to private sector entities, viz franchising.  
There are two other parts to the core strategy. One is the separation of 
functions such as policy, regulatory and service functions (uncoupling steering 
and rowing). This allows the use of a flexible performance framework using 
contracts and competitive bidding. The other part is the clarification of direction 
by requiring frequent definition and re-definition of core purposes (improving 
your aim).  
Osborne and Plaistrik recognise that the decks cannot completely be cleared, 
but argue that that clearing the decks "narrows and orders the universe” to which 
the other four C's may be applied to improve performance. They propose a 
comprehensive decision tree for reinventors which illustrates their approach to 
public sector reform (Box 3.1), but deny that public sector reform is all about 
"eliminating, privatizing and reorganizing functions" (p. 94-95).  
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Osborne and his co-authors are less open than Savas about the intent of the 
reforms they propose. The approaches they propose for adoption are inconsistent, 
severely flawed and, to the extent that their advice provides little clear guidance 
for would-be public sector reformers, discredited and misleading (Williams, 
2000). Nevertheless, the inconsistencies, and the emphasis in the decision tree 
suggest that as with Savas, privatisation and minimal government is the aim. 
Box 3.1 A decision tree for re-inventors 
 (From Osborne and Plaistrik (1997, p. 318-319) 
  
1. What are the outcomes we desire?  
2. Should government play a role in 
producing these outcomes? 
If not, abandon, sell, or give away the existing 
asset, or eliminate the existing policy, 
regulatory, service-delivery, or compliance 
function 
5. If government should operate the activity, 
can the public steering and rowing roles be 
uncoupled? 
If so, the options include 
• Flexible performance frameworks 
• Competitive contracting systems 
3 Should government operate the activity? 
If not, what arrangement would be best?  . . .  
• Contracting out 
• Regulation of private sector activities 
• Tax incentives or disincentives 
• Franchising 
• Subsidies to producers (grants, loans, equity 
investments, favorable procurement 
policies, favorable investment policies) 
• Subsidies to consumers (vouchers, tax 
credits) 
• Policies allowing use of public property 
• Risk sharing (insurance, loan guarantees) 
• Information for customers 
• Technical assistance 
• Demand management through fees or taxes 
• Persuasion 
• Catalyzing voluntary activity 
• Public-private partnerships 
6. How should the organization be given 
incentives and consequences for 
performance? 
The options include: 
• Enterprise management 
• Managed competition 
• Performance management 
7. Should the organization be accountable to 
its customers? 
If so, the options include 
• Customer choice 
• Competitive choice 
• Customer quality assurance 
8. Where should control of resources and 
operations lie? 
• With policy makers and central 
administrative agencies 
• With the organization’s top managers 
• With work teams within the community 
• With some combination of the above 
4. If so, which level of government should 
operate the activity? 
• National 
• State/Provincial 
• Regional 
• Local 
9. How should we change the organizations 
culture? 
10. How do we need to reform our 
administrative systems to accommodate 
these changes? 
• The budget and finance system 
• The personnel system 
• The procurement system 
• The auditing system 
Privatisation is the New Public Management 
Savas (2000) emphasises that governments should divest both enterprises and 
assets, with divestment essential to block arguments for resumption of previously 
discontinued activities. He revised his earlier analyses of types of goods and 
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alternative institutional structures, identifying worthy goods as a subset of private 
and toll goods for which the argument has been accepted that they should be 
either produced or subsidised by government. Examples of worthy goods include 
education, mass transit, sports arenas and museums. Savas argues that the 
fundamental purpose of government is the provision of collective goods, and the 
collective action needed to regulate the acceptable supply of all other goods. 
Because government operations have extended to include a large proportion of 
worthy goods, the provision of collective goods is now a relatively small 
proportion of government operations. This is "a source of profound unease for 
libertarians and conservatives, and highlights the important question of the proper 
role of government in today's society" (p. 60).  
Savas also added to his earlier set of alternative structures the public-private 
partnership (PPP) as appropriate for the continued supply of those toll goods 
requiring major investment, especially infrastructure. He believes that toll goods 
could be financed with private capital, "thereby reducing or obviating the need for 
government borrowing . . . this can leverage limited public funds and may 
improve the government's credit rating" (2000, p. 237-240). 
Savas (2000) continues openly to advocate privatisation, arguing that the 
profound distinction between providing for and producing a service is "at the heart 
of the entire concept of privatization and puts the role of government in 
perspective" (p. 65). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that: 
Privatization is like dismantling a bomb — it must be done very carefully, for wrong 
decisions can have nasty consequences. There are obstacles to be overcome, arguments 
to be rebutted, proponents to be mobilized, and opponents to be thwarted. (p. 284, 
emphasis in original). 
According to Savas, the continued contentious nature of privatising reforms 
requires some understanding of the different forces behind the privatisation 
movement. The ideological force prefers a free market and seeks a smaller and 
less powerful government; the commercial force prefers more business, and seeks 
redirection of government spending to businesses and privatisation of 
government-owned operations and assets; the populist force wants a better 
society, choice in public services, and seeks to generate increased reliance on 
community and community support instead of on government; and the pragmatic 
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force seeks better government, with more cost-effective public services achieved 
by prudent privatisation (Savas, 1987, p. 4-10, p. 233, 277, 280). Savas argues 
that ideological views should be de-emphasised and that other objectives should 
be stated for privatising NPM-style public sector reforms. Acknowledging overlap 
among alternative objectives he suggests pragmatic, commercial and populist 
rationalisations such as: withdrawal from public sector provision of services is 
appropriate because increased affluence enables people to provide for themselves; 
the shrinking of government is appropriate because increased business 
opportunities are needed and government activity crowds-out the business sector; 
the privatisation of government organisations and contracting out might improve 
the cost-effectiveness of services and therefore help to overcome the constraints 
imposed by rising costs and increased resistance to tax increases; and a greater 
role for the community and the potential for increased choice of public services 
might result in a better society (2000, p. 119-120). Irrespective of the need for 
euphemistic terminology or the need to present privatisation as a pragmatic 
response to circumstances, Savas argues that privatisation has now "advanced 
beyond the point of no return", and that this is being achieved through NPM (p. 
318, see also p. 5-15).  
NPFM and international debate 
If privatisation is NPM (Savas, 200, p. 319), and if NPFM is a fundamental 
part of NPM (Olson et al, 1998a), then the possibility arises that privatisation is 
also NPFM. NPFM consists of a range of accounting techniques adapted from the 
private sector and implemented in combination in the public sector. The result is a 
financial management system built on the base provided by accrual accounting 
concepts and practices developed in the private sector, but including accrual-based 
budgeting and financial reporting, integrated costing systems, cost centres, full 
costing and full-cost pricing methods, performance measurement and auditing 
(Hood, 1995; Scott, 1996; Guthrie, 1998; Olson et al, 1998; Guthrie et al, 1999). 
Typically, the use of these techniques for financial management in the reformed 
public sector is justified on the basis that there should be no differences between 
sectors, that private sector techniques are equally applicable to the public sector, 
and that the techniques are helpful.  
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International debate about NPFM covers a variety of issues ranging from the 
early debate over the form of accounting appropriate for the public sector and 
especially whether it should be based on the concepts and practices developed for 
the private sector. After adoption and adaptation of the private sector base, the 
debate shifted to the techniques applied in the public sector: whether cross-
sectoral differences really have been removed; the appropriateness of the 
techniques for the public sector; whether the techniques improve accountability; 
and the connections and intent of NPFM's promoters.  
Form of accounting appropriate for the public sector 
Interest in applying accrual accounting to the public sector developed in the 
mid-1970s when the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United 
States was developing its private sector-oriented conceptual framework. 
Anthony's (1978) study concluded that, with some specified modifications, the 
FASB's conceptual framework could be applied to the non-business sector but 
Anthony later opposed the modifications the FASB made (Anthony, 1983; 1989). 
The FASB did not obtain jurisdiction over governmental financial reporting, but 
its modified private sector-oriented conceptual framework was taken up in 
Australia and NZ, with NPFM reformers arguing that this conceptual framework 
is, with the addition of a few explanatory paragraphs, equally applicable to the 
public sector (see for example McGregor, 1999). 
The appropriateness of applying this conceptual framework to the public sector 
has been the subject of ongoing debate over the appropriateness of its user 
needs/decision usefulness focus on shareholders, and the tendency for the chosen 
focus of accounting to select what is made visible, making invisible those things 
not selected (Roberts, 1991). Pallot (1992, p. 39-40), for example, argued that 
"democratic control over the use of funds" is the distinguishing feature of 
government accounting, and that financial reports should allow effective 
parliamentary scrutiny. She cited Gladstone's concerns about the consequences 
should that democratic control be lost, linking the need for constitutional 
constraints to accountability issues. Other authors have also argued for a focus on 
accountability and for consideration of the nature of accountability (Day and 
Klein, 1987; Glynn, 1987; Patton, 1992; Fowles, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Boston et 
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al, 1996). Alternative foci suggested include the needs of other users (Lapsley, 
1992; Mayston, 1992a; 1992b; Rutherford, 1992), intergenerational equity issues 
(Robinson, 1998c), the pre-existing system of national accounts (Jones, 1992b), 
and, given privatisation objectives, the accounting requirements appropriate for 
regulated industries (Vass, 1992). Development proceeded, however, on the 
accrual accounting base provided by the private sector, and this accrual 
accounting base seems to provide an essential foundation for NPFM (Scott, 1996; 
Guthrie, 1998). Debate shifted to the nature of the particular accounting 
developments built on that base. 
Techniques to remove sectoral differences? 
The modification of private sector accounting concepts for application in the 
public sector generated debate over whether the modifications are merely minor 
adjustments to remove sectoral differences or are instead a poor attempt to 
disguise fundamental differences between sectors, and whether the differences are 
such that cross sector comparability is impossible (Stanton and Stanton, 1998; 
McGregor, 1999; Newberry, 2001). Although the techniques introduced may 
remove some sector differences, they also introduce new differences and their 
derivation from the concepts is, at times, debatable (Guthrie, 1998). Examples of 
these include requirements for valuation and depreciation of assets, which use 
valuation and depreciation techniques previously rejected in the private sector, 
and the imposition of a capital charge, which bears no resemblance to the use of 
cost of capital ideas in the private sector. 
Asset valuation and depreciation  
Unlike the private sector, which can choose between historical cost and 
modified historical cost for financial reporting, public sector entities have no such 
choice. Replacement cost has been adopted as the valuation base of some major 
assets, a requirement that has been supported by the accounting profession 
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through its financial reporting standard-setting activities (Robinson, 1998a; 
1998b).6  
Clarke (1982) delivered a devastating critique of the replacement cost ideas 
and current value accounting developments undertaken by the accounting 
profession in the late 1970s. The replacement cost ideas were imported from 
utility pricing regulation practices in the United States but their use for a different 
purpose, external financial reporting, and in a different context was dubious. 
Eventually, these practices were rejected in the private sector, and the accounting 
profession's conceptual framework project distanced itself from those techniques. 
In New Zealand at least, the accounting standard-setters wrote a remarkable piece 
of "mumbo-jumbo" to justify both the adoption of replacement cost and 
depreciation requirements, and to imply that these accounting requirements are 
consistent with the profession's conceptual framework (Poskitt and Newberry, 
1998; Storey and Storey, 1998). Generally, replacement cost-based valuations 
increase the reported asset base and this, in turn, increases both the capital charge 
and depreciation expense, with the result that the financial reports of public sector 
and private sector entities cannot validly be compared (Newberry, 2001).  
Capital charge 
Typically, governments carry debt at a central level which means that 
government departments reporting separately carry no debt in their individual 
financial reports. This gives the impression that the resources necessary for 
departments to acquire assets are provided free and, potentially, biases some 
decisions. First, in the event of comparisons with private sector providers of goods 
and services, lack of finance costs may result in decisions biased in favour of 
public sector provision of services; and secondly, departmental expenditure 
decisions may be biased in favour of capital expenditure. 
                                                 
6 Officially, the values required for the public sector may be called deprival values, optimised deprival values, 
value to the entity, or even fair value but this approach to valuation generally requires determination of three 
different values, depreciated replacement cost, discounted cash flows and market value. Frequently for 
public sector assets, determination of the latter two values may be impossible, and the method of valuation 
reverts to depreciated replacement cost. 
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One element of NPFM is the imposition of a capital charge to remove these 
biases, with the charge acting as a proxy for both interest and dividends. Even 
when imposed at a supposedly private sector rate, the capital charge does not 
merely remove the bias but reverses it. Government departments do not share the 
commercial freedoms businesses enjoy and are, therefore, less flexible and less 
able to adjust to the effects of a capital charge. Further, the requirement that a 
capital charge must be paid irrespective of economic conditions or results operates 
on a government department as if that department is fully debt-financed, whereas 
a business's sources of finance tends to be partly debt and partly equity. A 
business that reports poor results or wishes to retain funds would pay reduced or 
no dividends to its equity holders (Robinson, 1998b). 
Robinson observed that, despite stated intentions, capital charges tend to be 
nominal — with departments reimbursed for the charge — rather than true 
charges requiring government departments to bear the full risk involved. This 
defeats one stated justification for a capital charge, that it should demonstrate to 
departments that their capital is not free, although it has no effect on a significant 
implication of a capital charge, its impact on determination of costs and prices. 
Full cost requirements 
NPFM typically requires the adoption of full costing techniques to determine 
the costs and prices of government-produced goods and services, and inclusion in 
those full costs both the capital charge and depreciation. Jones and Thompson 
(2000) view the full costing model as consistent with Anthony's project prime 
model, but Anthony states that his model was based on historical cost, and 
required a capital charge but not depreciation (Letter, Anthony, 2001). Full costs 
are well recognised as irrelevant for many decisions but, in the context of NPFM, 
they seem to be important for pricing purposes (Guthrie, 1998; Robinson, 1998b).  
The idea underpinning the full cost pricing model is that prices which include 
depreciation expenses calculated on a replacement cost basis will allow the 
accumulation of cash for asset replacement (Guthrie and Carlin, 1999). The idea 
may be intuitively appealing, but none of its proponents has explained how 
depreciation can "create a cash fund adequate for the replacement of assets", and 
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neither have they explained the idea of physical capital maintenance on which the 
replacement cost model is based. "The 'physique' of the capital assets may be 
retained and restored by incurring maintenance costs, not by debiting the income 
account with depreciation charges" (Clarke, 1982, p. 206). Further, the 
replacement cost ideas imply a static environment with an unchanging asset base, 
whereas today’s economic environment emphasises organisational flexibility 
(Guthrie and Carlin, 1999).  
The pricing model derives from early utility pricing regulation in the United 
States where utilities operated under restrictions that "their capital be employed 
primarily for the continuous provision of a public service of a specified quality" 
(Clarke, 1982, p. 208). The depreciation component of the prices operated, in 
effect, as hypothecated taxes, implying that any cash accumulated as a result of 
those pricing practices is restricted to asset replacement. Arguably, the 
combination of a capital charge and full costing on a replacement cost reporting 
base results in overcharging because the capital charge is a charge for the 
financing costs on the depreciated replacement cost of today's assets, while 
depreciation charged is supposedly sufficient to replace those assets (Aiken and 
McCrae, 1992a; 1992b). 
These pricing practices were also intended to simulate the price effects of 
competitive forces. The ideas underlying them, however, are almost 100 years old. 
The danger of translating the pricing practices to a different context, external 
financial reporting, in today's fast-changing and relatively unregulated setting is 
that the early constraints that the cash be used to replace assets may not be 
imposed, or that the assets may not be replaced (Clarke, 1982; Whittington, 1985, 
Aicken and McCrae, 1992a; 1992b; Whittington, 1994).  
Appropriateness of the techniques for the public sector 
Some accounting techniques applied as part of NPFM are not necessarily 
helpful for public sector management. Debate has centred around the 
appropriateness of some techniques for the public sector, the limits of accounting 
(Carnegie and Wolnizer, 1995; 1997; 1999; Micallef and Peirson, 1997; Guthrie, 
1998; Barton, 1999a; 1999b), and proposals made for the use of alternative 
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accounting techniques, such as renewal accounting, which may provide superior 
information for public sector management (Pallot, 1997).  
Other accounting techniques in the NPFM toolbox have already been widely 
discredited in the private sector (Mayston, 1993). Performance assessment 
techniques, for example, rely heavily on the accounting profession's techniques 
and standards, many of which are of questionable validity, while rejecting the 
assessment techniques and standards of other professionals from other, less 
numerically-oriented fields, especially those within government (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1993; Thompson, 1999; 2001). Many of the financial performance 
assessment techniques rely on costing systems which are well recognised as 
arbitrary, while the discredited replacement cost ideas which underpin these 
costing systems in the public sector make little sense in today’s economic 
environment (Guthrie and Carlin, 1999). Non-financial performance assessment 
techniques, although widely promoted, remain undeveloped (Thompson, 1999; 
2001). 
Effect of the techniques: improved accountability? 
NPFM has been promoted on the basis of the improved accountability likely to 
result, but some techniques seem more likely to erode accountability and to erode 
Parliament's ability to scrutinise and control public money (Pallot, 1991; Guthrie 
and Carlin, 1999). According to Pallot (1991, p. 193), the use of accrual 
accounting for appropriations increases the executive government's and 
management's discretion while reducing parliamentary scrutiny and control 
because paying departments for the full costs of their services allows the 
accumulation of funds prior to their being needed to replace equipment: "Such 
funds can be used to finance other activities in the short term, and this tends to 
undermine the control taxpayers would normally have over management".  
Evidently, the capital charge regime erodes accountability by encouraging off-
balance-sheet financing arrangements (Heald and Dowdall, 1999). Because the 
capital charge is calculated on the reported asset base, the sale of assets reduces 
that base and reduces the capital charge. Entry into off-balance sheet financing 
arrangements allows the use of assets without them appearing in the balance sheet 
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and therefore without triggering an increased capital charge. Operating leases are 
the most obvious form of off-balance-sheet arrangement but a variety of executory 
arrangements are possible in which legal ownership of assets is avoided, thus 
avoiding recognition of the associated financial obligation. Some of these, 
involving major commitments, are known by names similar to the PPP mentioned 
by Savas (2000).7 That this perverse effect receives support, and even 
encouragement at central government level is highly inconsistent with the 
accountability justifications for financial management reform (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1999). 
Engaging in off-balance sheet financing arrangements may appear less 
expensive for an individual government department because of savings in the 
capital charge, but it may be considerably more expensive for the government as a 
whole. Such arrangements always contain a financing component, yet 
governments can raise funds at a lower cost than can the private sector partners in 
such arrangements. Further, the improved efficiency and effectiveness expected 
on commencement of such arrangements are at risk because of the inflexibility of 
the arrangements, the length of time involved, and the cost of renegotiating 
service specifications (Lapsley, 1999; Hodges and Mellett, 1999; Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1999; Mayston, 1999). 
Connections, intent, and evaluations of NPFM 
NPFM has developed most strongly in those countries where accounting 
standards are set in the private sector by the accounting profession and where the 
very large transnational accountancy firms are most influential. Apparently, 
NPFM developments have been accomplished through epistemic communities 
comprised of professionals (both economists and accountants) who hold similar 
views and values, who seek out like-minded others to spread their ideas, and who 
control developments to exclude other views (Laughlin and Pallot, 1998; Ryan 
1999; Ryan et al., 1999).  
                                                 
7 The private finance initiative (PFI) is a common reference in the United Kingdom. 
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Often the promoters of NPFM techniques are seen as pragmatic, practically-
oriented management consultants and members of the accounting profession, 
particularly members of the transnational accountancy firms, merely applying a 
useful set of accountants' toolbox techniques. Their strong links with the 
theoretically-oriented economists who support NPE and the closed method of 
development of NPFM, however, generates debate about unstated intent, and the 
philosophy and implications of NPFM (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993; Fowles, 
1993; Humphrey et al, 1993; Mayston, 1993; Deegan, 1995; Olson et al, 1998; 
Laughlin and Pallot, 1998; Hughes and O'Neill, 2001). Much of that debate 
centres on the issue of whether "in a whole series of ways the practices of 
accounting are increasingly being used to infiltrate and change, rather than merely 
record, the activities of the State" (Hopwood, 1984, 171; Humphrey, et al, 1993; 
1998; Olson et al, 1998).  
Surprisingly, given that an important focus of NPFM is on stating in advance 
the results to be achieved and then comparing those expected results with actual 
results, overall evaluations of NPFM are lacking (Humphrey et al, 1993; 1998). 
Although NPFM reforms typically have been advocated on the basis of the 
improved efficiency, effectiveness and accountability they will achieve, before- 
and after-implementation comparisons have proved impossible, at least partly 
because of the magnitude of the changes. Differences between the claimed 
benefits of implementing particular NPFM techniques and the consequences of 
such implementation have been noted (Humphrey, et al, 1993; 1998; Olson et al, 
1998; Guthrie et al, 1999). Also noted has been the tendency to attribute adverse 
effects to teething problems, which the application of more NPFM techniques will 
correct.  
Acceptance that NPFM will achieve the results claimed for it requires faith in 
the system's designers, and rejection of the many reservations expressed in 
international debate as unfounded and unwarranted. Given the theoretical and 
practical literature reviewed earlier in this chapter, such faith in NPFM system 
designers may be misplaced. International debate about NPFM and about the 
connections and intent of those designers suggests that some politicians may have 
relied too heavily on their advisers for financial management developments 
(Olson et al, 1998). 
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Chapter summary 
The three broad strands of literature reviewed here as underpinning NPM-style 
public sector reforms consist of two waves of NPE theories and a set of populist 
literature on how to achieve reforms. Although these three broad strands state 
different intentions, they also recognise that privatisation as an objective in itself 
and debate about the appropriate role of government encounter public resistance. 
The need to use euphemisms and to claim other stated intentions is recognised, 
with terminology matched to the political climate of the time. Evidently, however, 
there is considerable appeal in claims the NPFM reforms will improve 
government and/or ensure efficiency through competition (Niskanen, 1971; March 
and Olsen, 1989; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Buchanan, 1997; Horn, 1995; 
Savas, 1987; 2000). The technical rationality of the proposals for privatising 
techniques has been challenged, raising questions about those stated intentions 
(see for example, Miller and Moe (1983); Williams (2000)), but privatisation is 
always an underlying theme which some, such as Wagner (1993), Buchanan 
(1997) and Savas (1982, 1987, 2000), acknowledge openly, while others, such as 
Osborne and Plaistrik (1997) deny is their sole objective but make clear in their 
reform proposals that it is a major objective. The problem facing all, theorists and 
populist authors alike, seems to be how they may achieve privatisation, especially 
in the face of resistance. Savas (2000, p. 319) believes that "privatization is the 
New Public Management", and implies that privatisation may be achieved through 
NPM-style reforms. If that is the case, then the consistency between the rules and 
techniques he proposed and the techniques adopted as part of NPFM suggests that 
NPFM may be a tool in privatising developments, rather than purely a means of 
improving accountability.  
Clearly, in all three strands of literature, the authors expect to achieve their 
desired objectives by obtaining and exerting control over others, with that control 
achieved through legislation or rules. Tight financial constraints are important to 
all authors, although they offer different reasons for imposing them. Some 
acknowledge their privatising intent to starve the government, limit the size of the 
state, and force services to sub-standard levels (Breit, 1978; Savas, 1982). Others 
offer technical rationales, such as efficiency and fiscal responsibility, and, perhaps 
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noting Savas's advice to use euphemisms, the idea that reducing resources 
prompts innovation (Buchanan, 1989; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
The desire to devise and adopt legislation or rules is also consistent throughout 
the two waves of NPE and in the populist work. These rules range from macro-
level norms intended to reverse Keynesian biases and thus shrink the size of the 
state to micro-level strategies intended to privatise government operations, 
including budget caps or cuts, load-shedding, the imposition of user charges, and 
limitation of government arrangements such as contracting (Savas, 1982, p. 123; 
1987, 2000). Given recognition that controlling financial resources is a key to 
achieving control over others, the fundamental role of NPFM in NPM-style 
reforms seems apparent. Accounting offers the opportunity to develop various 
rules which will be used for decision-making, and the accounting rules proposed 
for, and adopted in, the public sector have been highly contentious. Among the 
many particular accounting techniques adopted as part of NPFM is included a 
replacement cost base for reporting assets, imposition of a capital charge, and 
pricing based on full costs. These techniques are consistent with Savas’s proposals 
for costing government services, but they are inconsistent with both the private 
sector conceptual framework and with current private sector techniques. Whether 
the NPFM techniques adopted improve accountability has also been debated. The 
development of off-balance sheet financing arrangements in the context of 
arguments for improved accountability seems somewhat surprising but such 
arrangements are consistent with Savas’s (2000) promotion of PPPs. The 
consistencies between NPM and NPFM, and the concerns expressed about the 
connections and intent of NPFM reformers, raise the possibility that NPFM 
reforms may have more to do with privatisation objectives than with the possibly 
euphemistic claims made for them. 

  
 
4 New Zealand’s NPFM-style financial 
management reforms 
New Zealand’s radical economic reforms were intended to affect all sectors of 
the economy. After initial economic restructuring, public sector reform soon 
followed: 
It is not entirely clear where economic restructuring ends and public sector 
management reform begins, or where the latter ends and financial management reform 
begins. All are related components of a set of reforms designed to improve the 
performance of the New Zealand economy in delivering social and economic outcomes. 
(Treasury, FMRP1, August 1989, p. 1, Treasury files). 
This chapter explains the stated intent of New Zealand's public sector 
reformers, before setting out the public sector reform process which commenced 
with the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 and the corporatisation of market 
activities, then extended a similar set of ideas to the core public sector, before 
adding a set of macro-level constitutional norms evidently intended to function as 
a balanced budget constraint. 
Intent of the public sector reformers 
From the beginning, the proposals for public sector reform were argued on two 
bases: the appropriate role of government and the appropriate fiscal and financial 
management of the public sector. The intention was to make "fundamental 
changes to the strategic direction of New Zealand's economic policy [and] to 
profoundly alter the role of the state" (Scott et al, 1997, p. 359).  
Role of the government 
The Treasury (1984) proposed a greatly reduced role for the government, and 
by 1987 (p. 34), suggested that the government was no more than a "monopolist 
enforcer of rights or relationships". This implied such changes as withdrawal from 
the direct government provision of many services, including social welfare 
services. The early suggestion was that either these services should cease 
altogether, or they should be replaced with the delivery of financial assistance to 
targeted individuals, leaving them to purchase for themselves whatever services 
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they desired (Treasury, 1984, p. 259). Later proposals retreated from the idea of 
individuals purchasing services to represent the state as a purchaser of outputs on 
behalf of those individuals (see for example, Treasury, 1987, p. 159), and this 
developed into the idea that Ministers would do the purchasing, selecting from the 
range of outputs available in the market (Treasury, 1990, p. 85).8 Ruth 
Richardson, Minister of Finance from 1990 until 1993, discussed this role of state 
issue in moralistic terms:  
There are few, if any, areas where the state should be a provider of goods and 
services . . . We should  . . .  transfer to the private sector the government's current 
provider functions in social services. . . Under my proposals the government would 
retain a crucial role as funder of social services and setter of standards (Richardson, 
1995, p. 230). 
Lack of public support for this reform agenda soon became evident. Public 
debate changed to avoid comment on the role of government, focusing instead on 
affordability, and implying that "the welfare state is a 'good thing', and that the 
only discussion we can have is over how much of a good thing we can afford" 
(Richardson, 1995, p. 208). The parallel proposals for fiscal and financial 
management reform became increasingly important as the role of government 
debate foundered. After a close election result in 1993, Richardson was replaced 
as Minister of Finance (Richardson, 1995).  
Fiscal policy 
The Treasury (1984, p. 135) defined fiscal policy as the "use of government 
expenditure and revenue collection to affect the use of resources and distribution 
of income across the economy and through time". It defined a fiscal deficit as the 
excess of government expenditure over government revenue, and regarded it as 
depicting the government's overall borrowing requirement (see also Treasury, 
1987, p. 231). It (1984, p. 195-207) predicted damaging effects should the 
existing trend of increasing fiscal deficits continue, proposed that on average, the 
fiscal deficit should be zero, and recommended improved expenditure control 
procedures and the publication of medium-term fiscal policy settings such as 
                                                 
8 More recently, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand has supported this approach with 
proposals for financial reporting standards which use the concept of a purchase interest to help determine 
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expenditure and revenue projections or a particular deficit target. Following the 
1990 general elections the new government, with Ruth Richardson as Minister of 
Finance, aimed to eliminate the fiscal deficit by reducing expenditure (Scott et al, 
1997, p. 359; see also Scott and Gorringe, 1989).  
The Treasury proposed that "the Government should aim to finance out of 
current revenue all current expenditures including replacement of capital", thus 
confining the need for government borrowing to increases in capital stocks and 
any required on-lending activities (Treasury, 1984, p. 183-184, 233). Further, it 
argued that: 
Where the [Government's] objectives can be achieved using commercial processes, 
then that option should be selected. . . . Where the goods or services might be provided 
more efficiently by the private sector, the Government should review its involvement in 
that area. . . . Where assets produce a better return in the private sector than the public 
sector, they will be more valuable if they are sold than if they are retained in 
government control. (Treasury, 1984, p. 233). 
The commercial processes differed, however, depending on whether the 
activities concerned were market activities, those activities producing goods or 
services which could be sold, or non-market activities, those activities about 
which a decision had been made on behalf of the community to supply them 
collectively (Treasury, 1984, p. 275). The public sector reforms commenced with 
the market activities. 
The government's market activities 
In 1984 when New Zealand's radical economic reforms commenced, the 
government played a major role in the economy, with extensive involvement in 
such services as electricity generation and supply, air and rail transport, and 
banking, as well as the provision of social welfare services and benefits. The 
Treasury (1984) advised that the government's market activities would perform 
better in a competitive environment. This would require treating those activities as 
profit centres and removing all: commercial advantages and disadvantages 
affecting performance, including inappropriate management incentives; 
constraints on activities caused by the slow and uncertain process of obtaining 
                                                                                                                                     
business combination issues (ED83, 84), and to develop the supposedly non-financial statements of service 
performance into statements of purchase performance.  
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parliamentary funding, and the input controls imposed by the central control 
agencies; free capital provided by government; exemption from taxes and many 
regulations; and the ability to cross-subsidise sales to third parties. The use of 
corporate plans, measurable performance targets and appropriate management 
incentives would motivate managers to meet specified targets while improved 
information systems would allow performance assessments (Treasury, 1984, p. 
283-286). The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 provided the means to 
corporatise these activities, and, eventually, to privatise them. 
The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 provided for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to be corporatised as limited liability companies. It removed from SOEs 
the responsibility for non-commercial functions and required that they operate as 
successful businesses with managers responsible to a board of directors for 
achieving agreed performance objectives. SOEs would operate without political 
interference in decisions about the use of inputs, pricing or marketing 
(Mascarenhas, 1990).  
SOEs' annual financial reports and their Statements of Corporate Intent must be 
tabled in parliament. The annual financial reports must comply with generally 
accepted accounting practices, while the Statements of Corporate Intent identify 
an SOE's objectives and the scope of its activities, its accounting policies, the ratio 
of shareholders' funds to total assets, performance targets and the amount of 
profits expected to be distributed to the Crown, the value of the Crown's 
investment in the SOE, any non-commercial activities for which agreed 
compensation would be sought, and the type of information to be provided to 
Ministers (Mascarenhas, 1990). 
With the passage of this Act, many of the government's activities were 
corporatised into SOEs and the Treasury (1987, p. 74) identified significant 
efficiency improvements. By 1990, however, their public ownership and lack of 
tradeable equity apparently impeded further efficiency improvements. Some SOEs 
had already been privatised and the Treasury questioned the need for continued 
government ownership of the remainder (Treasury, 1990). 
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The government's non-market activities 
The Treasury (1984, p. 288) proposed that performance of the government's 
non-market activities would be improved by treating departments as cost centres, 
and devising a system providing benefits comparable to those of the competitive 
price system. This would require appropriate management incentives, managerial 
freedom to determine the mix of inputs to produce outputs, and sufficient relevant 
information to allow performance assessment based on outputs.  
In 1987, the Treasury proposed that the nature of government expenditure 
implied the appropriate manner of financing that expenditure (p. 239). Goods and 
services that could be supplied in a commercial manner should be financed by 
user charges, while any capital expenditure required to support those goods and 
services should generate investment returns sufficient to cover the borrowing 
costs.9 For the goods and services supplied in a non-commercial manner, the 
borrowing costs associated with any capital expenditure should be spread across 
the life of those assets:  
By charging departments undertaking such expenditures for depreciation and interest 
costs, and financing these out of taxation like other current expenditures which cannot 
be recovered from user charges, enough current revenues will be raised to cover interest 
and full principal repayment during the life of the asset. The net effect for the 
Government is that only net additions to the stock of assets is funded from borrowing. 
(p. 235). 
The earlier market/non-market distinction suggested that the extensive 
government-provided social welfare system was a non-market activity. By 1987, 
however, the Treasury (p. 74) no longer referred to public sector activities as 
market and non-market activities. It referred to them instead as commercial and 
non-commercial activities, acknowledging that the distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial was imprecise. The activities remaining in the 
public sector were identified as a mixture of commercial and non-commercial 
activities covering "policy, regulatory and operational functions" (Scott et al, 
1990; p. 17, 23). The introduction of competitive conditions, transferable and 
contestable ownership, and the removal of impediments to the development of a 
                                                 
9 Subsequent legislation related to Local Government develops these ideas. 
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market were thought likely to change non-commercial activities to commercial 
ones (Treasury, 1987, p. 112).  
The success of the earlier SOE reforms had led to the view that a similar 
corporatising set of reforms could be applied to the core public sector and this 
required both management and financial management reform. 
The need for management and financial management reform to the 
public sector 
The Treasury (1987) argued that both the existing cash-based financial 
management system and the performance assessment processes were inadequate 
for effective public management. Although the cash-based financial management 
system was effective for "constraining cash expenditure, and hence the tax burden 
for a given year", it focused on controls over the expenditure of public money in 
the current year, failing to present "an accurate picture of the amount of activity 
which is being undertaken". It ignored future commitments, which ranged from 
"signed contracts to public assurances from the Government", and even 
encouraged entry into such commitments as well as encouraging departments to 
spend the full amount of their appropriations (Treasury, 1987, p. 59, 81, 82). This 
system was, therefore, less effective for controlling the executive government 
because: 
To the extent that liabilities and others result in future expenditure the Estimates 
understate current activity  . . . ; 
To control the activities of the Executive, Parliament requires more indication of the 
output it is purchasing from the Executive; 
Concentrating on cash payments alone could result in an unnoticed deterioration in 
our stock of assets. There is presently no comprehensive record of state owned assets in 
terms of historic let alone current cost. It is therefore difficult to judge whether the stock 
of assets is being maintained. (Treasury, 1987, p. 81) 
Performance assessment was also a problem, partly because of the fragmented 
governmental structure under which "no single government body is responsible 
for reviewing overall expenditure, nor for focussing on broad management issues" 
(The Treasury, 1984, p. 288). As the central control agencies, the Treasury and the 
State Services Commission were responsible for different functions and liaison 
between them was probably insufficient (p. 288). Neither of them was responsible 
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for assessing the "best use of resources", output monitoring, or "performance in 
meeting goals" (Treasury, 1984, p. 289; 1987, p. 59,82). 
The Treasury was responsible for expenditure control, largely in the context of 
budgeting, and therefore imposed input controls on departments' resource use, 
while the State Services Commission was responsible for management reviews 
and imposed input controls on departments' staff. The onerous nature of some 
input controls affected management's ability to control performance, and 
departments tended to withhold information in an attempt to resist those controls. 
Recognising their limited information, the central control agencies responded with 
further input controls, thus further constraining management freedom (Treasury, 
1987, p. 80-93). Arguably, rejection of the input controls and the cash based 
system would allow an alternative system to be devised. This system would have 
"clearer objectives for departments and staff, appropriate incentives, and a proper 
review mechanism" (The Treasury, 1984, p. 293). It would allow managers 
greater freedom to manage, with that freedom at least partly offset by increased 
accountability requirements. Such a system would contribute to the country's 
economic well-being and improve parliamentary scrutiny and control (Treasury, 
1987, p. 80-93): 
A focus on net consumption of resources and resource commitments backed up by 
supporting information (stating performance objectives and historical accounting for 
performance against objectives) would enable Parliament both to measure more clearly 
the commitment by the Executive of future and current revenues and to establish more 
clearly the nature of the activity being conducted. (Treasury, 1987, p. 84). 
Management and financial management reform would, therefore, allow the 
extraction of "better value from public spending" by focusing on outputs, and 
calling attention to "the choices of goods and services and the transfers paid for by 
taxpayers" (Scott et al, 1990, p. 20). Both the decisions made and the results 
achieved would be transparent (Scott and Gorringe, 1989). The State Sector Act 
1988 provided the means for management reform, while the Public Finance Act 
1989 provided the means for financial management reform. 
Management reform: the State Sector Act 1988 
The State Sector Act 1988 defines the public service as comprised of all 
government departments. It requires the State Services Commissioner: 
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a) to review the machinery of government including —  
(i) the allocation of functions to and between Departments; and 
(ii) the desirability of or need for the creation of new Departments and the 
amalgamation or abolition of existing Departments; and 
(iii) the co-ordination of the activities of Departments. 
b) To review the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of each Department, 
including the discharge by the chief executive of his or her functions.  . . . (State Sector 
Act 1988, s. 6).  
This act was passed at speed and was the subject of considerable controversy, 
largely because it removed permanent tenure from public service staff and 
removed from the State Services Commission the function of employing all 
departmental staff (Walsh, 1991). That controversy should not allow the 
importance of the State Services Commission’s review function to be overlooked. 
The Treasury (1984) had argued the importance of a centralised review function, 
both review of departmental management and review of the functions and 
operations of departments (p. 290), in particular, for establishment of a review 
process that would allow the “functions and objectives of each department” to be 
aligned with government policy (p. 291—292).  
The State Sector Act did leave some employment functions with the 
Commissioner. This was the responsibility for the employment and assessment of 
departmental chief executives. The State Services Commissioner, with Ministerial 
input, appoints chief executives for five year terms which are renewable, again 
with Ministerial input, depending on performance as assessed by the 
Commissioner. Performance assessment covers all requirements imposed on the 
chief executive and may extend beyond the scope of the State Sector Act 1988 (s. 
43). 
The chief executive of a government department is responsible for the 
employment, employment conditions, motivation, and assessment of departmental 
staff. The chief executive is free to operate the department within the general 
constraints imposed by legislation and regulations, but that freedom is constrained 
by an accountability relationship with the minister responsible for the department. 
Performance and performance assessment are important to that relationship 
(Treasury, FE/89/203, 26 April 1989, documentation on Public Finance Act 1989; 
Chapter 4 New Zealand’s NPFM-style financial management 
reforms 
75
 
 
 
Walsh, 1991). That accountability relationship underwent significant development 
with the financial management reforms. 
Financial management reform: the Public Finance Act 1989 
The Public Finance Act 1989 builds on the principles of public finance 
contained in the Constitution Act 1986 (s. 22) which states that it is unlawful for 
the Crown, except by or under an Act of Parliament: 
a) To levy a tax; or 
b) To raise a loan or to receive any money as a loan from any person; or 
c) To spend any public money. 
The Public Finance Act was designed around three conceptual dyads (Scott et 
al, 1997, p. 363). Two of these, ideas about accountability and controls, and the 
distinction between outputs and outcomes, were drawn from public sector 
financial management literature, while the third, the distinction between the 
government's purchaser and owner interests, "emerged from the finance literature 
in conjunction with consideration of appropriate governance arrangements for the 
state's commercial activities". The third dyad created a limitation of government 
structure (Savas, 1982) applied to the core functions of government (Scott et al, 
1997, p. 366).10 It was controversial because it drew an artificial distinction 
between the Crown and its departments.  
The Constitution Act does not state what is meant by the Crown, implying that 
the Crown is the "Sovereign in right of New Zealand" by referring to the "demise 
of the Crown" as the death of that Sovereign (s. 2, 5). The Public Finance Act 
refers to "Her Majesty" as an alternative term for the Crown and then extends the 
idea of the Crown by interpreting both terms to mean, "Her Majesty the Queen in 
right of New Zealand; and includes all Ministers of the Crown and all 
departments" (Public Finance Act 1989, s. 2). The Act interprets a department as 
"any department or instrument of the Government, or any branch or division 
thereof; but does not include a body corporate or other legal entity that has the 
power to contract . . . ", and identifies capital contributions to departments as "the 
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amount of money to be provided to increase the Crown's net asset holding in a 
department" (s. 2, 4), thus suggesting a relationship between the Crown and its 
departments in the nature of a financial investment.  
The Legislative Advisory Committee considers whether proposed legislation 
will give effect to the stated policy and makes submissions on all bills. In its 
submission on the Public Finance Bill of 1989, this committee argued that the idea 
of the Crown owning a department's net assets in the manner of an investment and 
making capital contributions to departments misrepresents the nature of the 
relationship. This was because "departments are part of the Crown. The public 
legal relationship between them is not one of investment" (Legislative Advisory 
Committee, submission on Public Finance Bill, 1989, Parliamentary Library).  
This limitation of government structure allowed the government to be 
portrayed as a purchaser of outputs on behalf of individuals, with those outputs 
intended to achieve the government's desired outcomes. Ministers, acting on 
behalf of the government, would be responsible for the "quantity, quality and 
cost" of the outputs purchased and would, therefore, decide which outputs to 
purchase in order to achieve their desired outcomes; and where to purchase the 
outputs from, bearing in mind that government departments might not be the best 
source of supply (Scott and Gorringe, 1989, p. 84; see also, Scott et al, 1990; 
McCulloch and Ball, 1992; Pallot and Ball, 1996, p. 530). This implied that both 
output specifications and costs should be comparable, and this could be achieved 
by making "output definitions resemble goods or services which could be 
purchased in the private sector", and using accrual accounting to "compare the 
costs in each case. Previously, the differences in the accounting, regulatory and 
tax regimes have precluded meaningful cost comparisons" (Treasury, 1990, p. 85-
86). Parliamentary scrutiny and control could focus on outputs, the "goods and 
services supplied outside the organisation, and not on the goods and services 
consumed within a department in the production of those outputs" (Bushnell, 
1989, p. 416). 
                                                                                                                                     
10 This is the closest reference to Savas’s influence and neither his work, nor the finance literature sources, 
receive acknowledgment in Scott et al's references. 
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The Treasury (1984) had proposed a review process for both new and existing 
expenditure programmes. This involved a series of questions such as (p. 204): 
a) Is it necessary for the Government to carry out this activity . . . ; 
b) What are the objectives of the activity and what are the policy options to achieve 
these objectives? . . .  
c) In the case of new policy, will the Government receive value for money spent? 
For existing policy, is the Government currently getting value for money? . . .  
d) What is the priority of the activity in relation to other policy objectives in related 
areas? 
Although this review process was obviously resource intensive, and only a few 
reviews could be conducted each year, slow procedures were not a problem 
because the time involved would allow public support to be secured (p. 204-205). 
Key reformers suggested that adoption of a purchasing focus would support this 
process because the purchase focus would assist with decisions: to stop 
purchasing particular outputs; to redirect available resources to the purchase of 
higher priority outputs; to require users, instead of taxpayers, to pay for some 
outputs or for part of the cost of those outputs. The purchase focus could also 
disconnect input costs from output prices, allowing efficiency dividends to be 
extracted by requiring price reductions (Scott and Gorringe, 1989, p. 86; Scott et 
al, 1990; Dale, 1992; McCulloch and Ball, 1992; McCulloch, 1993, p. 29; Scott et 
al, 1997).  
The idea that the government owned departments required consideration of 
longer-term issues. The minister assigned responsibility for a department would 
consider the department's long-term strategy and decide on the level of investment 
sufficient to prevent deterioration of any assets required for longer term capacity, 
but there would be no expansion into new service areas (Scott and Gorringe, 1989, 
p. 87; Scott et al, 1997). Within that level of investment, the department's chief 
executive would be responsible for the department's personnel, cash, and other 
assets, and free to determine the most efficient production configuration. (Scott 
and Ball, 1993; Scott et al, 1997). This freedom would include the "power to buy 
and sell assets within the department's level of capital, without appropriation", 
facing restrictions only if a capital contribution were required to provide 
additional finance (Ball, 1995, p. 10, see also, McCulloch, 1993, p. 29). 
Departments would be prohibited from borrowing or investing, and accrual 
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accounting would assist the ownership focus by allowing profitability assessments 
of departmental performance (Scott and Gorringe, 1989, p. 86; Scott et al, 1990, 
p. 9-10, 25).  
With the government viewed as both the owner of a department, and the 
purchaser of its outputs, there was an obvious tension between these different 
interests:  
Buyers generally want to pay as little as possible for goods of the required quality. If 
it was prepared to incur a loss on the production side, the government could achieve a 
'price' as low as it desired. Yet lower prices reduce the rate of return. As owner, 
however, the government desires the best return possible from the resources tied up in 
the department. If the government cannot achieve a rate of return with the resources in 
the department equivalent to the level they would have earned in private ownership then 
public production lowers the wealth of society. (Scott et al., 1990, p. 21). 
Resolution of the tension would be achieved by requiring departments to set 
their prices to cover but not exceed full costs, including the cost of capital, and 
paying departments no more than a fair market price for outputs (Scott et al, 1990; 
Ball, 1993c). Expectations were that the competitive pressures generated would 
make unnecessary the "hands-on approach that UK ministers have needed to take 
at times to ensure that contracting was considered" (Scott et al., 1990, p. 160). 
With ministers free to purchase outputs from other sources, chief executives were 
likely to pursue all possible efficiencies in output production, including out-
sourcing (Treasury, 1984, p. 276; Scott and Gorringe, 1989, p. 87; Dale, 1992; 
Ball, 1995).  
Stated objectives of the Public Finance Act 1989 
Although the limitation of government structure is crucial to understanding the 
Public Finance Act, the Act’s stated objectives suggest that its focus is more 
conventional. According to the long title of the Act, it was enacted to: 
a) Provide a framework for Parliamentary scrutiny of the Government's management 
of the Crown's assets and liabilities, including expenditure proposals; and 
b) Establish lines of responsibility for the use of public financial resources; and 
c) Establish financial management incentives to encourage effective and efficient use 
of financial resources in departments and Crown entities; and 
d) Specify the minimum financial reporting obligations of the Crown, departments 
and Crown entities; and 
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e) Safeguard public assets by providing statutory authority and control for the raising 
of loans, issuing of securities, giving of guarantees, operation of bank accounts, and 
investment of funds. 
This Act varies principles (b) and (c) of s. 22 of the Constitution Act by 
introducing several new terms. The raising of loans is included within the broader 
concept of issuing public securities, while the spending of public money is 
included within the broader concept of management of Crown resources (s. 2, 4, 
55).  
Identification and interpretation of public securities and resources 
The Public Finance Act interprets public security, as including any securities 
issued by the Minister in respect of any loan raised under s. 53 of the Public 
Finance Act or any other act, but it also includes "any loan or credit agreement, 
guarantee, indemnity, bond, note, debenture, bill of exchange, Treasury bill, 
Government stock, and any other security representing part of the public debt of 
New Zealand" (s. 2).11 Taxpayers are responsible for the obligations arising from 
all public securities which are a "charge upon and payable out of the revenues of 
the Crown equally and rateably with all other general loan obligations of the 
Crown" (s. 55). 
Controls over the issue of public securities vary according to the nature of the 
security. The Act identifies and interprets three broad types of public security: 
loans, commitments, and contingent liabilities, although it is not clear that these 
three broad types capture all of what is intended by the interpretation of public 
security. Raising a loan includes borrowing, entering into hire purchase or finance 
lease agreements, and accepting debt on assignment from other persons. 
Specifically excluded from either the Public Finance Act's, or the Constitution 
Act's interpretation of raising a loan is:  
the purchase of goods or services or the obtaining of an advance by the Crown 
through the use of a credit card or by a supplier supplying credit for the purchase of 
goods or services, for a period of 90 days or less from the date the credit card is used or 
the credit is supplied. (s. 49). 
                                                 
11 The Minister is the minister assigned responsibility for administration of the Act. 
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Because these arrangements are obviously credit agreements, they are included 
within the concept of public security and they would, therefore, be the taxpayers’ 
responsibility. They seem to be classed as commitments, which are "future 
expenses and liabilities to be incurred on contracts that have been entered into at 
balance date". The third broad type of public security is a contingent liability, 
which is "a liability that by reason of something done by a person, will necessarily 
arise or come into being in relation to that person if one or more certain events 
occur or do not occur" (s. 2). The third schedule of the Act contains a list of items 
specifically excluded from the interpretation of contingent liabilities — for 
example, any guarantee or indemnity contained in any overseas loan agreement —  
but, again, not necessarily excluded from the concept of public securities. 
The Public Finance Act 1989 refers to but provides no interpretation of Crown 
resources. Presumably, the term is intended broadly and would therefore include, 
but not be limited to, public money which is "all money received by the Crown", 
except for trust money. The Act specifies that all "public money is the property of 
the Crown" and must be lodged in either a Crown or departmental bank account 
(s. 20).  
Identity and responsibilities of those involved in management of the Crown's 
activities 
In addition to the Crown, the Public Finance Act 1989 identifies and 
distinguishes between several other parties involved in public management. For 
the purpose of this thesis, the key parties are: the minister responsible for 
administration of the Public Finance Act; the Secretary to the Treasury; and 
departmental chief executives, and departments. Others identified are the 
executive government; responsible ministers; ministers responsible for votes; and 
the Governor-General. 
Consistent with the Constitution Act 1986, the Crown is prohibited from 
issuing securities, raising a loan or issuing guarantees without an Act of 
Parliament (s. 46, 52A, 58A). An appropriation by Act of Parliament is also 
required for the Crown to spend public money, and to incur any expenses and 
liabilities (s. 4).  
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The minister responsible for administration of the Public Finance Act is 
referred to throughout the Act as the Minister who is most likely to be, but is not 
necessarily, the Minister of Finance, while ministers responsible for other 
functions are referred to in relation to those functions. The Public Finance Act 
delegates to the Minister the power to raise loans, and issue securities and 
guarantees and indemnities, and states that all loans and securities issued will be 
deemed lawfully raised. If any guarantee or indemnity exceeds $10 million the 
fact of that guarantee or indemnity must be published in the Gazette and a 
statement laid before Parliament (Constitution Act 1986, s. 22; Public Finance Act 
1989 s. 46, 47, 49, 52A, 53, 56, 57, 58A, 59, 62).  
The Minister may lend money and has extensive powers over the banking and 
investment of public money, which must be held in either the "principal bank 
account of the Crown", known as the Crown bank account, or in departmental 
bank accounts. The Minister may decide on the bank or banks at which the Crown 
bank account and departmental bank accounts will be operated, while either the 
Minister or the Treasury may direct the terms and conditions under which those 
bank accounts operate, obtain information, issue instructions regarding the public 
money held and transfer money between these accounts. No money may be paid 
out of the Crown bank account without Audit Office certification of a supporting 
appropriation or authority and the Governor-General's signature (s. 18-19, 21).  
The Act interprets the Secretary to the Treasury as the chief executive of the 
Treasury and requires that any reference to the Treasury be taken to refer to the 
Secretary. The Treasury is authorised to invest any public money, including that 
held in departmental bank accounts. Any interest earned from these investing 
activities must be paid into the Crown bank account (s. 23). 
Both the Treasury and the Governor-General by order-in-council may issue 
instructions to departments. The Treasury may also request from chief executives 
information about a department's "financial management, financial performance, 
or banking activities", and issue instructions for any of the following purposes: for 
obtaining information to enable the Treasury to fulfil any functions imposed on it 
by the Government or any Act; for prescribing the accounting policies to be 
adopted by departments; for regulating the management of public money; or for 
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regulating the "accounting and financial management and control procedures 
relating to contracts of the Crown" and the "custody and control by the Crown of 
public securities". Treasury instructions, however, are subject to the provisions of 
the Public Finance Act and to any other regulations made under the act (s. 79-81). 
A department's chief executive is the head of the department responsible to the 
responsible minister for the financial management and financial performance of 
that department. The chief executive must comply with the financial reporting 
requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989 and any other act, and comply with 
any lawful instructions given by the Minister, the minister responsible for the 
department, the Governor-General and the Treasury (s 33(2), 33(3), 37, 79, 80).  
All money paid to a department by the Treasury and all departmental receipts 
for revenue and for the disposal of fixed assets must be paid into that department's 
bank account. Departments must not invest money or raise loans but may 
purchase goods or services on credit. The Minister or the Treasury may direct the 
use of money in the department's bank account or, after consultation with the 
responsible minister, transfer it to another Crown or departmental bank account (s. 
20, 21, 49).  
Of the other parties involved in public management, the executive government 
is the government; and a responsible minister is the minister allocated 
responsibility for a particular department (s. 2).  
Specification of what must be subjected to Parliamentary scrutiny 
Parliamentary scrutiny and control is achieved through the tabling in 
Parliament of various reports, especially the Estimates of appropriations and the 
audited financial reports. 
The Estimates of appropriations is a “statement of the proposed expenses and 
liabilities to be incurred by the Crown or the Crown’s proposed expenditure of 
public money” (s. 2). The Minister must table the Estimates with departments' 
forecast financial reports which are reconciled to the appropriations sought in the 
estimates, while departments' audited annual financial reports are tabled 
separately (s. 9, 34A, 35, 38 and 39). The broad content of the financial reports is 
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briefly considered here before explaining the estimates requirements in more 
detail. 
Departments' financial reports must be presented in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting practice (GAAP), which means compliance with approved 
financial reporting standards to the extent that those standards apply. If there is no 
standard and no applicable rule of law, the accounting policies adopted must be 
appropriate and have authoritative support (s. 2). The forecast and annual financial 
reports must include: a statement of financial position, an operating statement, and 
a statement of cash flows, all accompanied by comparative figures so that actual 
figures may be compared with forecast and prior year figures; a statement of 
accounting policies; and any other statements necessary. The forecast financial 
statements must also include a statement of objectives providing details of 
forecast revenues and expenses for each output class, as well as the forecast 
financial performance and these must be re-presented in the annual financial 
statements together with a statement of service performance showing the actual 
performance of each class of output as compared with that forecast (s 34A(3)(d)). 
The annual financial statements must include a statement of commitments, a 
statement of contingent liabilities, a statement of unappropriated expenditure, and 
a statement reporting actual expenditure against each appropriation.  
The estimates are compiled from more detailed information about each Vote. A 
vote is interpreted as an appropriation or grouping of appropriations, which is the 
responsibility of one minister and is administered by one department (s. 2). The 
estimates must identify the minister responsible for each vote and state whether 
that vote minister is also the minister responsible for the department administering 
the vote. Within each Vote the amounts to be charged to each appropriation must 
be shown and, for each class of output, the estimates must identify separately the 
costs to be incurred and the expenses to be incurred where those classes of output 
are to be supplied by others, while comparative figures must show budgeted and 
estimated actual appropriations for the previous appropriation period and for the 
previous financial year as well as comparative actual figures for the four financial 
years before that (s. 9). 
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The idea of the vote minister's responsibility for a vote, suggested that a 
department may "produce outputs for several different Ministers", that "one 
Minister may purchase outputs from more than one department", and that 
"different Ministers 'purchase' outputs from the same department" (Treasury, 
Tsy/2, 1989, "Summary for departments", documentation on Public Finance Act 
1989, Parliamentary library). This means that the votes trace to Ministers, but the 
lines of responsibility for public resources and for safeguarding public assets trace 
to departments. This distinction between Votes and departmental responsibilities 
prompted the Legislative Advisory Committee to comment in 1989 that: 
The Bill would be improved if Treasury were to focus on what it envisages the 
estimates and the Appropriation Acts will look like after its passing. In some respects 
these documents should be the starting place of the legislation given that it is through 
them that Parliament is expected to scrutinise financial management and performance. 
(Legislative Advisory Committee, submission on Public Finance Bill, p. 6). 
Appropriations are not interpreted in any Act but an important feature of the 
Public Finance Act was the change from cash appropriations to appropriations that 
are either cash or accrual. Section 4 refers to both of these, specifies the items for 
which appropriations is required, and restricts the use of any appropriation: 
(1) No expenditure of public money shall be made other than in accordance with an 
appropriation by an Act of Parliament. 
(2) No expense or liability shall be incurred by the Crown in relation to any 
transaction for which expenses or liabilities are required to be appropriated under 
subsection (3) of this section other than in accordance with an appropriation by an Act 
of Parliament.  
(3) A separate appropriation shall be made for (a) each class of outputs. . . (b) each 
category of benefits or other unrequited expenses . . . (c) each category of borrowing 
expenses . . . (d) each category of other expenses . . . (e) each capital contribution. . . . 
(f) each purchase or development of capital assets contained in the Estimates . . . and (g) 
each repayment of debt . . .   
(4) Any money or expenses or liabilities appropriated under subsection (3) of this 
section may be incurred only in relation to that appropriations and for no other purpose. 
(Public Finance Act 1989, s. 4). 
The appropriations of most relevance to departmental management are 
appropriations for classes of outputs, other expenses and capital contributions. 
Outputs are goods or services produced by a department and measured by their 
full production cost including the allocation of overhead and non-cash costs such 
as depreciation, while a class of outputs is a grouping of similar outputs  (s. 2, 4). 
Mode B output appropriations authorise a department to incur the costs necessary 
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to produce the outputs, while Mode C output appropriations authorise a 
department to incur the expenses necessary to produce the outputs.12  
Departments may sell outputs to entities other than the Crown and require 
authorisation to incur the cost of producing those outputs. Trading revenue is that 
revenue departments earn from the sale of goods and services over which the 
department does not have a monopoly (s. 2). Under Mode B output 
appropriations, a permanent appropriation is provided for departments to spend up 
to the amount of the expected trading revenue from particular outputs on the cost 
of those outputs, provided that there is an appropriation act for that class of 
outputs and the Minister agrees (s. 10). This is known as Mode B net 
appropriations. 
Other expenses are those expenses that are not part of the cost of outputs (s. 2, 
4) and these require a separate appropriation. This category of expenses was 
added to the Public Finance Act 1989 in 1992. The Treasury, when proposing this 
amendment to the Minister, explained that these other expenses are:  
 . . . costs associated with ownership. They include costs such as writing down the 
book value of fixed assets, loss on sale of fixed assets and restructuring costs. . . . Such 
ownership costs will normally reduce the level of taxpayers' funds in a department. In 
cases where the operating surplus achieved by a department in the supply of outputs is 
large enough, ownership costs will reduce but not eliminate the operating surplus and 
thus will not reduce taxpayers' funds. (Treasury, T91/4462, 8 October 1991, Richardson 
files 750). 
Section 11 of the Act provides a permanent appropriation allowing change in 
the composition of a department's balance sheet. This section allows for the 
proceeds from sale of assets, and any working capital of a department to be used 
to purchase other assets or to pay any liabilities. The department's net assets at the 
end of the year must not be increased as a result of such transactions.13 
                                                 
12 Mode A output appropriations were cash-based and applied to departments until they converted to accrual 
accounting. This Mode was deleted after all departments had converted to accrual accounting. Until 1994, 
Mode C output appropriations meant "an appropriation of public money for acquiring a specified class of 
outputs required by the Crown" and this was interpreted as an appropriation for the price rather than for 
costs or expenses. Mode C output appropriations have never been used, contrary to Jones and Thomson's 
(2000) suggestion that they have. 
13 The section allows departments to change the composition of their assets and liabilities and the proviso 
seems unnecessary. It has been used to develop the repayment of operating surplus rule covered later in 
this chapter.  
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An appropriation act, for example the Appropriation (1997/98 Estimates) Act, 
which suggests cash appropriations in s. 3 and accrual appropriations in S 4 and 5, 
shows the form of parliamentary approval: 
3. Appropriations of public money – (1) Public money may be spent in relation to–  
(a) The capital contributions by the Crown to . . .  
(b) the repayment of debt set out  . . .  
(2) The amounts of public money to which subsection (1) relates are separately 
appropriated  . . .  
4. Appropriations for expenses to be incurred – (1) Expenses may be incurred in 
relation to –  
(a) the classes of outputs set out . . .  
(d) the categories of other expenses set out . . .  
(2) Public money . . . may be spent for the purpose of meeting expenses  
5. Appropriations for liabilities to be incurred – (1). Liabilities may be incurred in 
relation to –  
(2) Public money . . . may be spent for the purpose of meeting liabilities incurred 
under the authority of subsection (1). 
When accrual appropriations were first proposed in the Public Finance Bill 
issued in 1989 they were limited to appropriations for outputs. From the 
Treasury’s perspective, the concept of accrual appropriations for outputs was 
consistent with shifting controls away from inputs. Arguably, fully costed outputs, 
with depreciation expense included in those full costs, would generate tight output 
appropriations. This would allow external reporting obligations to replace the 
parliament’s ex ante controls (Treasury, November 1989, FMPG8, Treasury files). 
The Legislative Advisory Committee queried these accrual appropriations: 
How can you say that there will be no depreciation of assets except by appropriation 
of Parliament? Certainly Parliament might wish to know of such a depreciation - but 
how can it allow it? Doesn't it just happen? (Legislative Advisory Committee, 
submission on Public Finance Bill 1989, p. 6). 
Evidently, the government agreed that some form of ex ante control was still 
required and, although the appropriations were for expenses (output costs), the 
disbursement of cash from the Crown bank account was viewed as a proxy ex ante 
control for the purposes of the controller function (see Appropriation (1997/98 
Estimates Act) above, sections 4(2) and 5(2)). Later, when the concept of accrual 
appropriations was extended, the Legislative Advisory Committee argued that the 
reformed financial "reporting regime should not be confused with the annual 
appropriation legislation", and questioned the point at which the prospect of 
incurring an expense would require Parliament to:  
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approve in advance not just the spending of public money but also the incurring of 
expenses. Consider the decision of the Crown to enter into a contract, say, to buy 
frigates over the next 20 years. Would it now have to be based on prior statutory 
authority? Is not the Crown by entering into that contract 'incurring expenses'? If so, 
[this] would reverse the long established principle that the power of the Crown to enter 
into a contract is unaffected by the distinct need repeated in the Constitution Act for 
Parliamentary appropriation of the money to be paid under the contract. (Legislative 
Advisory Committee, submission on Public Finance Amendment Bill No 3, 1992). 
The Legislative Advisory Committee's comment was interpreted as a concern 
that the appropriations requirements might inhibit the Crown from entering into 
long term contracts (Treasury, T/2 "Further comment on issues identified in paper 
of 6 October", Public Finance Amendment Bill (No, 3), Parliamentary Library). In 
an effort to prevent such inhibitions, expenses were interpreted as related to one 
financial year but not beyond that year; and the interpretation of commitments 
was changed from "future payments and expenditure to be incurred on contracts 
that have been entered into at a balance date" to "future expenses and liabilities to 
be incurred on contracts that have been entered into at balance date" (Public 
Finance Act 1989, s. 2). Commitments are, therefore, omitted from appropriations 
requirements. 
Financial management incentives 
Although the Public Finance Act 1989 states in its objectives the intention to 
establish financial management incentives, there is no other specific mention of 
incentives in the Act. The broad economics interpretation of incentives suggests 
that the Act itself establishes incentives, but there were early intentions to develop 
incentives based on the Treasury’s (1984, p. 283-288) ideas of market and non-
market activities and the appropriate ways to manage those activities.  
The Public Finance Bill contained more extensive reference to mode B and 
mode C appropriations than merely the output appropriations that now appear in 
the Act. Initially, mode C output appropriations were intended as payment of an 
output price for the production of outputs, while mode B output appropriations 
represented the full accrual cost of outputs (Scott et al, 1990). The implications of 
the proposed types of appropriations were that a department could be classified as 
either a mode B (non-commercial activities and treated as a cost centre) or mode 
C (commercial activities and treated as a profit centre) department and this was 
the idea suggested in the Public Finance Bill (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Public Finance Bill: departmental appropriation modes and interest earning 
proposal 
Mode B  Mode C 
Output appropriation: for output costs (cl. 2). Output appropriation: of public money for 
acquiring outputs (cl. 2). 
Capital contribution: appropriation of public 
money for acquisition of goods and services of a 
capital nature (cl. 2). 
Capital contribution: appropriation of public 
money to adjust level of Crown's investment 
in department (cl. 2). 
Any increase or decrease in a department's 
accumulated capital contribution requires an 
appropriation (cl. 13(1)). 
Any increase or decrease in a department's 
accumulated capital contribution requires an 
appropriation (cl. 13(1)). 
No retention of operating surplus (cl. 13 (2)). Silent for mode C. 
Interest or dividends may be payable on 
accumulated capital contribution (cl. 13(3)).  
Interest or dividends may be payable on 
accumulated capital contribution (cl. 13(3)). 
The Treasury invests all surplus money, 
including that held by departments, and interest 
earned paid to the Crown (cl. 21). 
The Treasury invests all surplus money, 
including that held by departments, and 
interest earned paid to the Crown (cl. 21). 
  
Evidently the mode B appropriations, as proposed in the Bill, imposed tighter 
controls than the mode C appropriations by limiting output appropriations to the 
incurrence of costs for production of outputs, prohibiting retention of any 
operating surplus, limiting the amount of cash held by departments by separating 
the output appropriations from the amount of cash passed on to departments, and 
requiring a capital contribution appropriation for all fixed asset purchases (Public 
Finance Bill, 1989; The Treasury, 24 October 1990, An overview of Mode C, 
Treasury files). Those departments that responded to the Public Finance Bill did 
so at short notice and generally responded negatively (submissions on the Public 
Finance Bill, 1989, Parliamentary Library).  
The proposed distinctions between mode B and mode C departments were 
impractical because departments could, feasibly, supply both mode B and mode C 
outputs:  
Where an organisation has more than one set of outputs, this clause [cl 6(4) requiring 
outputs to be classified into appropriation modes] has the effect of enabling that 
organisation to operate under more than one mode at the same time. This would appear 
to be in conflict with the reporting clauses in the Bill, all of which would require the 
department to be operating under either Mode A, Mode B or Mode C, but not under 
more than one mode concurrently. (Deloitte Haskins and Sells, submission on the 
Public Finance Bill, 2 May 1989, FE/89/164, Parliamentary library).14 
                                                 
14 Deloitte Haskins and Sells included in their submission the information that they had been involved with 
Treasury in developing the reforming legislation. 
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Further, the interpretation of the capital contribution appropriation proposed for 
mode B seemed to derive from some confusion over accounting ideas: 
The controls on capital appropriations contained in the Bill appear to confuse the 
concept of equity, the shareholders investment in an enterprise, with capital equipment 
purchases, by assuming, incorrectly, that the two are equivalent. No firm would tag 
revenue from its operations in order to refrain from purchasing capital items with those 
funds. The idea of investment monies being used just for capital purchases and revenue 
monies only being available for operations is nonsensical. Further, these provisions 
ignore the continuing substitution between capital, labour and other inputs which is an 
integral part, in this modern age, of the decision-making and planning process of any 
organisation that is not technologically moribund. (Department of Statistics, submission 
on the Public Finance Bill 1989, Parliamentary library). 
Some of the distinctions between modes were removed from the Act (Table 
4.2). 
Table 4.2 Public Finance Act 1989: departmental appropriation modes and interest earning 
proposal 
Mode B  Mode C 
Output appropriation for output costs (s. 2) Output appropriation of public money for 
acquiring outputs (s.2) 
Capital contribution: appropriation of public 
money to increase the amount of the Crown's 
net asset holding in a department (s. 2) 
Capital contribution: appropriation of public 
money to increase the amount of the Crown's 
net asset holding in a department (s. 2) 
A department may use the proceeds of the sale 
or disposal of capital assets, together with any 
working capital to purchase or develop other 
capital assets, provided there is no increase in 
net assets as a consequence (s. 11) 
A department may use the proceeds of the sale 
or disposal of capital assets, together with any 
working capital to purchase or develop other 
capital assets, provided there is no increase in 
net assets as a consequence (s. 11) 
No retention of operating surplus (s. 14 (1)) The department shall pay to the Crown a 
return of an amount determined by the 
Minister (s. 14(2)) 
The Treasury invests all surplus money, 
including that held by departments, and interest 
earned paid to the Crown (s. 23) 
The Treasury invests all surplus money, 
including that held by departments, and 
interest earned paid to the Crown (s. 23) 
  
The changes made the capital contribution appropriation the same for both 
modes and allowed all departments to purchase fixed assets within the scope of 
resources held. The requirement to pay interest or dividends to the Crown was 
removed from mode B, and the requirement that any increase or decrease in a 
department's accumulated capital contribution be appropriated was removed from 
both. This meant that departments receiving mode B output appropriations, which 
represented approval to incur costs, were unable to retain any operating surplus, 
while departments receiving mode C appropriations of public money, presumably 
for the price of outputs, were required to pay a return to the Crown but not 
prohibited from operating surplus retention. The Act interprets operating surplus 
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as the "amount by which departmental revenue exceeds the expenses of a 
department". Departmental revenue is the revenue resulting from the supply of 
"goods, services, rights, or money to other parties, including the Crown", while 
expenses, which include the cost of outputs, are "expenses measured in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting practice" (s. 2, 14). 
The Act assumed that a department would operate under only one mode. The 
idea of these modes was that mode B departments would receive only the cash 
needed for operations instead of the full amount appropriated because cash would 
be held centrally, while extensive developmental work was required to achieve 
mode C output appropriations because contracts would be needed to specify the 
"quantity, quality, time and place of delivery, and price" of departments outputs, 
and this information would be publicly reported (Scott et al., 1990, p. 20; 
McCulloch and Ball, 1992, p. 10). In 1990, however, the Treasury questioned 
whether government departments should even operate commercial activities, 
arguing that "the SOE form appears better suited for some activities currently 
performed by government departments" (Treasury, 1990, p. 91, 93).  
Following a pilot trial of a capital charge and interest payment regime, its 
application to all departments was recommended (Treasury, 1990). The capital 
charge, imposed on all departments from mid-1991, was explained as analogous 
to a company's dividends, interest and taxes. This charge is calculated by 
multiplying the department’s reported net assets by a particular rate. Its imposition 
was considered desirable to provide a rate of return to the Crown similar to that 
which could reasonably be expected from similar investments in the private 
sector; make clear the full costs of a department's goods and services; give 
departments incentives for efficient management of the Crown's investment, with 
this incentive including the disposal of fixed assets; and act as a disincentive to 
seeking capital contributions (Gilling, 1991; Lally, 1991; McCulloch, 1991; Dale, 
1992; Ball, 1995; Scott, 1996). The capital charge regime is considered in more 
depth in later chapters. It was credited with prompting improved cash 
management systems within departments but was considered too low because 
departments' balance sheets excluded human resources and some intangibles 
(McCulloch, 1991; 1993; Ball, 1993; Scott et al, 1997). 
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Embedding the financial management reforms 
The Financial Reporting Act 1993 is not normally mentioned in the context of 
the public sector reforming legislation but the requirement in the Public Finance 
Act that all financial reports be presented in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice (GAAP) links the reporting requirements to a separate 
regulatory process established by the Financial Reporting Act. This Act brought 
both the public sector and the private sector under the same financial reporting 
requirements, compliance with GAAP, and established a Crown entity, the 
Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB), to decide exactly what is GAAP in 
New Zealand (s. 3, 24).  
The Financial Reporting Bill proposed this regulatory process for most of the 
business sector, a proposal that the Treasury initially opposed (T91/3516, 12 
August 1991, Richardson files 721; T91/3587, 16 August 1991, Richardson files 
723). Almost two years passed before the bill was read in parliament for the 
second time, still without any suggestion that it should apply to the public sector. 
Much of the parliamentary debate at that time concerned the constitutional 
implications of delegating "to an outside body, to be called the Accounting 
Standards Review Board, the power to make binding rules. In many respects we 
are being asked to delegate the power to legislate — our own principal power" 
(Caygill, 4 May 1993, Debate on Financial Reporting Bill second reading, 15071). 
In July 1993 the Treasury recommended extending the Financial Reporting Act to 
encompass the public sector, partly to: 
enhance the credibility of state sector reporting by having an independent body 
approve standard accounting practice for state sector financial statements. This should 
reduce the scope for charges of political manipulation of state sector financial reporting, 
thus strengthening the impact of the fiscal transparency initiatives. (T93/1792, 12 July 
1993, Richardson files 909). 
This extension was made by supplementary order followed, a week later, by 
the third reading and enactment. In the brief debate on that third reading the 
extension to include the public sector received no mention. 
Fiscal policy  
Both macro-level fiscal policy reform and micro-level financial management 
reforms were proposed in 1984 but the legislation for the macro-level fiscal policy 
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developed only after implementation of the Public Finance Act 1989. The Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 establishes a framework within which a government must 
define and report on its overall fiscal strategy. 
The Treasury (1984) had proposed the publication of fiscal targets and the 
adoption of fiscal balance as a general rule. It again recommended the adoption of 
"aggregate expenditure limits or targets" in 1990, and its favoured target seemed 
to be expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Treasury, BR No. 62, 20 May 1992, 
Richardson files 295; Treasury, T93/671, 25 March 1993, Richardson files 815). 
There was no formal development of fiscal policy and by 1993, when net public 
debt was 47.9% of GDP, fiscal policy was a big challenge, and debt reduction was 
proposed by "closing the deficit over the next three years, and then run[ning] 
fiscal surpluses" (Treasury, 1993, p. 94). 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 was regarded as a logical addition to NZ’s 
financial management reforms because it would increase the credibility of fiscal 
policy, "integrate macro and micro" approaches, and link "the information 
systems for budgeting with those of reporting the government's finances (Scott, 
1995, p. 10-12). Surprisingly, when the Fiscal Responsibility Bill tabled in 
parliament shortly before the 1993 general election, it omitted any proposal for 
fiscal targets.15 A set of five principles intended to provide fiscal targets was 
added to the Bill following what may have been an orchestrated response to it, and 
those principles were adopted in the Act (Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
submissions, Parliamentary library).  
a) that Crown debt should be reduced to "prudent" levels by achieving 
operating surpluses every year until that level has been achieved; 
b) that Crown debt should then be held at a prudent level by ensuring that 
Crown operating expenses are not more than Crown operating revenue; 
c) that Crown net worth should be maintained at a level sufficient to provide a 
buffer against adverse events; 
d) that the Crown's fiscal risks be managed prudently; and 
                                                 
15 In 1978, James Buchanan co-edited a book titled Fiscal Responsibility in a Constitutional Democracy. 
Buchanan was a strong advocate of governments adopting constitutional norms including a balanced 
budget constraint (see also, Chapter 3). 
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e) that these policies be pursued in such a manner that the level and stability of 
future tax rates is predictable (FRA, 1994, s. 4A) 
The first two of the principles supposedly adapt the earlier fiscal balance 
proposal to New Zealand's "almost unique internationally and highly desirable" 
accrual accounting regime (Scott, 1995, p. 5). In an accrual accounting 
environment, however, there is no necessary connection between reported 
operating surpluses (that is, revenue minus expenses) and debt reduction, but the 
Treasury’s explanation of those principles shows no sign of awareness that the 
first two principles are nonsensical 
(www.treasury.govt.nz/legislation/fra/explanation/details1.asp): 
The principles of responsible fiscal management, as set out in the Act, are: 
a) Reducing Crown debt to prudent levels, so as to provide a buffer against future 
adverse events, by achieving operating surpluses every year until prudent levels 
of debt have been achieved; ie., the Government is to spend less than it receives 
in revenue until public debt is reduced to prudent levels. 
 . . . The principle is a two-tiered test; debt must be reduced and this must be achieved 
by running operating surpluses. This prevents governments from achieving prudent debt 
levels simply by selling assets. 
b) Maintaining  total Crown debt at prudent levels by ensuring that, on average, 
over a reasonable period of time, total operating expenses do not exceed total 
operating revenues; ie., the Government is to keep debt at prudent levels by 
living within its means.  
The second principle implies that once prudent levels of debt have been achieved, a 
government should not expect to borrow to “pay for the groceries” on an ongoing basis. 
This principle is a medium- to long-term one. In the short term, cyclical factors may 
well result in temporary, and desirable operating surpluses or deficits. 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act requires regular reports on the government's 
fiscal policy and the consistency of that policy with the principles. By 31 March 
each year, approximately two to three months prior to presentation of the annual 
budget, a budget policy statement must be published stating the government's long 
term fiscal policy in relation to the Crown's operating revenues, operating 
expenses, operating balance, Crown total debt and net worth (s. 5A). The targets 
for these variables must be compared with the principles of fiscal responsibility. A 
half yearly economic and fiscal update and a pre-election update must also be 
published (s. 12, 13). 
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Chapter Summary 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms commenced with a strong focus on 
privatisation and the legislation enacted is consistent with that focus. Preceded by 
a financial crisis, possibly engineered, and economic restructuring as readying 
procedures, the reforms soon moved on to the corporatisation and privatisation of 
SOEs (see Chapter 1) and, with  the Reserve Bank Act 1989 and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994, the adoption of constitutional norms (see Buchanan and 
Wagner (1978) and previous chapters). 
Although to this point, New Zealand might have provided a text book example 
of the type of reforms advocated by the Washington consensus, its reforms to the 
core public sector took an extreme privatisation stance (Osborne and Plaistrik, 
1997) which has some consistencies with Savas’s (1982) four privatising 
strategies (see Chapter 3). Key reformers have stated that the Public Finance Act 
and the State Sector Act interlock (for example, Scott et al, 1990), with that 
interlocking largely explained in the context of principal-agent theory and 
monitoring: “The State Sector Act is only part of the picture because, while it 
enables ministers to take action on the results of monitoring, it does not establish 
the criteria for that monitoring. That task is addressed by the financial 
management reforms in the Public Finance Act 1989” (Scott et al, 1990, p. 155). 
The obvious key to the Public Finance Act is the implementation of a limitation of 
government structure, which is one of the four privatising strategies Savas (1982) 
proposed, and that Act follows through with Savas’s proposals for contracting by 
interpreting outputs as measured by their full costs. It might, therefore, be 
suggested that the key to the State Sector Act is the State Services 
Commissioner’s review function which could operate as another of Savas’s 
proposed privatising strategies: a systematic load-shedding device (Savas, 1982, 
p. 123). While this represents only two of Savas’s proposed strategies, promotion 
of the other two is also apparent. Since 1984 the Treasury had proposed fiscal 
balance, the need for expenditure reductions and control, while the Treasury 
(1987) proposed the implementation of user charges.  
The possibility that these proposals may be linked with Savas (and Buchanan 
for the principles of fiscal responsibility) is not intended to imply that there is no 
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merit in the proposals, but merely to show the consistency between those 
proposals and the privatisation movement and, with those ideas applied to the core 
public sector, the reason that New Zealand’s public sector reforms are viewed as 
extreme. Questions of merit do arise when examining the practicality of some 
aspects of the legislation and the implications of that legislation. Just two 
examples that are consistent with the influential literature reviewed in Chapter 3 
but of questionable merit in application are the limitation of government structure 
and the nature of accounting. First, although the limitation of government 
structure is the key to understanding the Public Finance Act, the Legislative 
Advisory Committee’s advice that this structure misrepresents the nature of the 
relationship between the Crown and its departments suggests that the Public 
Finance Act is constructed upon shaky foundations, but there is no evidence that 
the advice was considered. Secondly, the Public Finance Act required adoption of 
accrual accounting, but the principles of fiscal responsibility in the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act were drawn from cash-based accounting, and obviously were 
not well-translated into accrual accounting terms.  
A financial crisis prompted New Zealand’s economic and public sector 
reforms, and given that this financial crisis was attributed to the high level of debt 
incurred by the government without effective scrutiny, the failure to address this 
issue in the Public Finance Act seems surprising. The Treasury’s early arguments 
against cash accounting, which included the observation that it ignored future 
commitments, suggested that the adoption of accrual accounting would at least 
allow prior parliamentary scrutiny but the Public Finance Act continues to omit 
commitments from prior parliamentary scrutiny. With the more recent 
development of financing arrangements constructed as the purchase of goods and 
services, and Savas’s (2000) advocacy of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
which frequently involve very large amounts of money, this loophole in the Public 
Finance Act increases taxpayers’ vulnerability. Given the stated objectives of the 
Public Finance Act it also seems surprising that nowhere is there any 
interpretation of what is meant by appropriations, and it is not clear that the two 
forms of appropriation devised either capture all that seems to be contemplated by 
the Constitution Act, or are mutually exclusive.  
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Finally, the powers delegated by the Public Finance Act must be noted. The 
Minister still has the power to issue all forms of public security, evidently without 
prior parliamentary scrutiny, while the power to enter into contracts for the supply 
of goods and services is widely delegated, including to all departments. In 
addition, the Treasury’s delegated powers relate to both the handling of public 
money and the issue of instructions to departments and, as institutional theorists 
would recognise, these powers, and the effects that may be achieved with them, 
should not be under-estimated. The focus of this thesis is the financial 
management system as it affects departments and that system has been developed 
through the use of delegated powers. Until this point, most of the comment about 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms and its financial management system in 
particular is drawn from publicly available sources. With the legislation in place, 
however, the financial management system underwent considerable development, 
and much of that development occurred under a National government which, for 
at least the first three years of its term, strengthened the reform agenda. That 
government’s strategies are the subject of the next chapter before considering the 
detailed development of the financial management system in Chapters 6 to 9. 
  
 
5 Executive government: structure and 
strategy 
The State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989 required the chief 
executive of each government department to take responsibility for staff 
employment and conditions, and for the development of an accrual accounting 
system. Departments were required to complete the transition to accrual 
accounting by 30 June 1991 and so when the government changed in late 1990, 
departments were still in the transition stage. Because accrual accounting merely 
provides a base for the development of NPFM techniques, it was under the 1990 
National government that key NPFM developments occurred. 
This chapter briefly outlines the developments planned for the financial 
management system at the time, the structure adopted by the government, and its 
fiscal and policy strategies. It suggests that those strategies were incorporated in 
the financial management system and provides an introduction to the subsequent 
four chapters which explain the ongoing developments to the financial 
management system. This chapter includes illustrative boxes showing how the 
National party's 1990 election manifesto commitments to involve the private 
sector in the justice system were translated into financial issues for pursuit 
through the operation of the financial management system.  
The financial management system and its development 
Shortly after taking office, the Minister of Finance received advice about the 
nature, general intent and state of development of the financial management 
system. The system devised was a management system controlled by outputs. It 
required explicit agreement over what is to be produced and how it is evaluated, 
and the removal of most input controls to allow departments to determine for 
themselves the appropriate input mix. The requirements for full costing would 
allow comparison of departments’ outputs with those from other sources 
(T90/N12, 7 November 1990, Richardson files 758). The government's ownership 
interest in a department would require decisions about a department's particular 
line of business, the level of investment in a department, whether the return on 
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investment by the department is satisfactory, and the management practices to be 
observed (T90/N13, 8 November 1990, Richardson files 758). Chief executives 
were crucial to this system and accountable for both personal results achieved and 
those of the department. With employment conditions in the reformed public 
sector changed to base part of a chief executive's remuneration on results 
achieved, the relationship between a responsible minister and departmental chief 
executive required formal specification of expected performance and the basis for 
assessment of that performance in a written performance agreement (T90/N14, 7 
November 1990, Richardson files 758). 
At the time, considerable development of the financial management system 
was intended. A set of incentives projects, which resulted "from a desire by 
departmental managers to earn interest on the cash balances generated through 
better cash management and to retain any resultant operating surpluses", was 
planned and the previous Labour Cabinet had endorsed these projects in principle. 
The incentives projects were planned for implementation in several phases and 
phase 1, the development of a general incentives model and announcement to 
departments had been completed. Phase 2, incentives to "encourage efficient use 
of both fixed and working capital", was in the process of implementation, while 
subsequent phases were yet to be implemented. Phase 3 was "incentives to supply 
the outputs required by the Government", and phase 4 was "incentives to 
encourage chief executives' performance" (T90/N17, 7 November 1990; 
Richardson files 758). The phase 3 incentives were important to the development 
of the output management system and included (T90/N12, 7 November 1990, 
Richardson files 758, p. 5): 
− Mechanisms to bring about better specification and costing of outputs; 
− Mechanisms by which Ministers can better monitor whether the outputs have 
been delivered; 
− Mechanisms for independent output pricing; 
− Procedures which allow the Crown to pay for outputs when they are 
delivered rather than when costs are incurred in their production; 
− Options for supporting Ministers in the detailed output negotiations and 
monitoring; 
− Potential benefits resulting from consumer based monitoring rather than 
ministerial monitoring. 
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Implementation of phase 2, which was a capital charge and interest payment 
regime for application to all departments, was to be completed by 1 July 1991. 
Capital charge rates "appropriate to each department" had not been determined. A 
process had been devised for determining default rates for application in the 
absence of private sector counterparts or in the event of failure to determine an 
appropriate rate (TC1990/13, 25 October 1990, p. 3-4, Treasury files). Individual 
departmental rates had not yet been devised and, as a transitional measure, the 
application of default rates to all departments was proposed and agreed. The 
default rates were very high, and generated a negative response which prompted 
the Minister of State Services to propose an evaluation of the state sector 
reforms.16 He proposed to review the "changes to the structure, accountability 
relationships, operations and financing of the public sector resulting from the 
introduction of the State Owned Enterprises Act, the State Sector Act and the 
Public Finance Act", with the review supervised by a group publicly-perceived as 
having no vested interests in the reforms, while the project work itself would be 
conducted by officials (STA(91)45, 29 April 1991, Richardson files 1032). 
Treasury officials advised the Minister of Finance that the review should 
protect "existing and potential benefits" of the reforms while proposing 
improvements in "implementation or design" and any other necessary changes. 
The proposed terms of reference for the review should, therefore, be narrowed, the 
time period of the review extended, and the critical importance of the "quality" of 
those appointed to the steering committee for the review be recognised (T91/1716, 
30 April 1991, Richardson files 669). Correspondence between Treasury officials 
and the Minister of Finance at the time and during the course of the review 
suggest that the Treasury input influenced the terms of reference, the selection of 
some personnel, and the eventual report (T91/2142, 24 May 1991, Richardson 
files 682; T91/2212, 28 May 1991, Richardson files 684; STA(91)M18/6, 19 June 
1991, Richardson files 934; T91/3666, 20 August 1991, Richardson files 726; 
T91/3944, 6 September 1991, Richardson files 734; T91/5246, 3 December 1991, 
                                                 
16 The development of the capital charge regime is significant and it will be considered in greater detail 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. At the time, the idea was that two default rates would be devised with the difference 
between them related to different levels of risk. The default rates proposed were 20.5% and 17.8% whereas 
the 5-year government bond rate on which they were based was 12%.  
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Richardson files 834). The report, known as the Logan Report, largely endorsed 
the reforms, making a number of recommendations for their further development 
and represented a consensus view of the steering committee (Interview, former 
departmental chief executive, June 2001). It also commented on the 1991 budget 
process, the first budget prepared using the reformed financial management 
system, and noted confusion about “both the direction of the reforms and the roles 
and responsibilities of central agencies in facilitating reform”, as well as concern 
over the fact that “there is no common view on what will constitute the endpoint 
of the reforms and how far away that is” (Logan, 1991, p. 11). Following the 
Logan review, the reforms continued and, if anything, strengthened (Scott et al., 
1997). 
Structure and strategy within executive government 
The Treasury's 1990 briefing to the incoming government recommended 
commercialisation and expenditure reduction and, consistent with its election 
manifesto, the incoming National government adopted both. The Treasury (1990) 
proposed the adoption of fiscal targets in addition to two processes for achieving 
expenditure reduction: controlling the amount of resources available and 
establishing criteria to be satisfied for spending proposals to receive approval; and 
making use of information from the new financial management system to 
determine how to spend those resources (1990, p. 80-81). Advice to the Minister 
of Finance of the incoming National government in 1990 explained the need to 
align the government's fiscal strategy with its chosen policy strategy (Treasury, 
1990; Treasury, 30 October 1990, T90/4152, Richardson files 1171). 
The government viewed privatisation as a "natural corollary to 
commercialisation", and a "natural part of the Government's management of the 
Crown's . . . business interests". According to the Treasury’s subsequent advice, 
privatisation was an "important part of the Government's overall economic and 
financial policy mix", and should be "presented as the last step in a broadly based 
more business-like approach to efficient management in the public sector. The 
performance gains that can arise from commercialising Government activities 
would be the main focus of Government strategy, with sale being one of the 
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options open to the Government" (Treasury, 16 December 1991, T91/5496, 
Richardson files 834). 
Shortly after the election, the Prime Minister announced the government's goal 
to "control, reduce and eliminate the deficit in our first term" without raising 
taxes. Reducing low priority expenditure and improving value-for-money in high 
priority expenditure areas would achieve the expenditure reductions (Richardson, 
21 November 1990, "Spending review announcement" Richardson files 1029; 
Bolger, CSC (91)2, 12 February 1991, Richardson files 989; T91/1737, 1 May 
1991, Richardson files 670).  
The Prime Minister was advised that the large size of any Cabinet inhibits 
effective decision-making and that, typically, a small group of senior ministers 
would make strategic decisions informally and then seek Cabinet endorsement. 
The proposal to formalise such an arrangement included recommended committee 
titles and terms of reference. It resulted in a multi-tiered cabinet sub-committee 
structure, largely consistent with the recommendations, with the Cabinet Strategy 
Committee (CSC) at the top, specialist committees such as the Cabinet 
Expenditure Control Committee (ECC), the Cabinet State Sector Committee 
(STA) and the Cabinet Committee on Enterprise, Growth and Employment (CEG) 
at a level lower, and portfolio-holding ministers, possibly grouped into sector sub-
committees at a level lower still (Treasury, 30 October 1990, T90/4152, 
Richardson files 1171; Bolger, 9 November 1990, Richardson files 1171). There 
was considerable overlap in membership of these committees. 
Evidently the government’s chosen strategies determined the roles of the 
Cabinet sub-committees. The CSC's role was to set strategic goals, establish 
priorities and monitor progress, and thus "provide the clear framework within 
which detailed policy decisions can be developed by the other Cabinet 
Committees" (Bolger, 9 November 1990, p. 1, Richardson files 1171). The CSC 
sought the promotion of growth and employment, and expenditure reductions of 
approximately $2 billion in relation to the budget projections prepared according 
to the Treasury's instructions shortly before the 1990 election (CSC, 9 May 1991, 
Richardson files 989; CSC(91)2, 12 February 1991, Richardson files 989; 
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CSC(91)29, 14 May 1991, Richardson files 989; CAB(92)M3/3d, 3 February 
1992, Richardson files 837).17 
The roles devised for the second tier committees supported these strategies and 
drew on the framework provided by the Public Finance Act and the State Sector 
Act. The ECC's role was to identify how to achieve savings "without injury to 
essential services from Government departments and agencies, and how we 
increase the value for money that is spent"; the STA's role was to review 
government operations "in order to identify activities which could be better 
undertaken by State Owned Enterprises or by the private sector, and  . . . promote 
and oversee their formation"; and the CEG's role was to "develop and coordinate 
policies relating to industry and commerce, trade, transport, and employment to 
foster an enterprise culture" (Bolger, 13 November 1990; Committee Terms of 
Reference, Richardson files 1171). These committees would, therefore, act in 
accordance with the policy strategy to influence the operation of individual 
portfolios. In its 1990 election manifesto, the privatising intent was evident but, 
following the outcome of a public referendum in 1992 on alternative electoral 
systems, which was conducted as a preliminary step for a promised binding 
referendum on New Zealand’s electoral system, the overt intent softened (Box 
5.1).18 This type of hierarchical committee structure, albeit with different 
committee titles and different terms of reference, remains in operation today (see 
for example, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/committees). State sector issues are 
incorporated within the terms of reference of the Government expenditure and 
administration committee which is also concerned with expenditure control.  
                                                 
17 The Minister of Finance explained the alignment between these policy and fiscal strategies. The 
government's manifesto commitment to reduce government expenditure would "reduce pressure on interest 
rates, stimulate economic growth and create more job opportunities" (Richardson, 21 November 1990, 
"Spending review announcements" Richardson files 1029). 
18 The binding referendum resulted in a Mixed Member Proportional representation electoral system which 
tends to result in loosely bound government. (Pallot, 1998). The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 and the 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 both seemed to be an attempt to embed the reforms in anticipation of this 
changed electoral system. 
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Adoption of strategy: informal  
The Logan report noted that the reformed financial management system 
assumes a centralised direction-setting process with specification of both fiscal 
and policy strategy. It recommended formal statements of these strategies (Logan, 
1991, Recommendations 4 and 5, p. 46-52). For 1992 and 1993, strategy 
specification remained relatively informal: the growth and employment strategy 
continued for those two years, while the fiscal strategy, which was not publicly 
announced, was to achieve a trend of reducing government expenditure as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for 1992, and then to contain 1993 
expenditure at or below the projected level for 1992 (ECC(91)345, 10 December 
1991, Richardson files 876; Treasury BR No: 62; 20 May 1992, Richardson files 
295; CAB(92)M20/43, 25 May 1992, Richardson files 840; CAB(92)M46/9, 9 
November 1992, Richardson files 874). Although the strategies adopted helped to 
develop the understanding and shared commitment of ministers and to guide 
resource allocation, they were not widely understood (CAB(92)M46/9, 9 
November 1992, Richardson files 874). With the policy and fiscal strategies 
Box 5.1 Policy strategy and the Department of Justice 
In its election manifesto, the National Party promised both expenditure reductions and that it 
would increase police numbers by 900. In addition, it promised that, "The role of the private sector 
in the prison system will also be increased, particularly in the areas of prison escorts and remand 
facilities". This promise was consistent with a Strategos report, issued in July 1989 following a 
review of the Department of Justice, which proposed privately-owned and operated prisons and 
commercialisation of the department's registry functions.  
In early 1991, the Minister of Finance requested a briefing from the Minister of Justice on the 
case for privatisation of prisons and "your intentions in respect of our manifesto commitment to 
establish a Department of Corrective Services." The Officials Working Party on the Regulatory 
Environment for Foreign Investment in New Zealand, formed to remove barriers to foreign 
investment and to promote foreign investment in New Zealand, was extended to include 
Department of Justice representatives. 
Three Department of Justice functions were classified as role of the state issues: contracting for 
custodial services, in particular the use of the private sector for prison construction and 
management; computerisation of public registries; and prisoner escort and court-related custodial 
services. In late 1992, however, when the level of public disapproval of privatising initiatives was 
evident, the manifesto commitment was explained as intended "to provide an opportunity for new 
and innovative approaches to be introduced . . .  with a long term view of reducing re-offending; 
 . . . the possibility of achieving savings in the high costs of operating prisons;  . . . [and] to enable 
public prisons to measure themselves against non-state operators, which should encourage a higher 
standard of performance in both sectors, as well as providing evidence of the relative merits of 
state and non-state operation of prisons in the New Zealand context."  (Letter, R. Richardson to D. 
Graham, 10 January 1991, Richardson files 104; T91/500, 19 February 1991, Richardson files 631; 
CAB(91)M16/2a, 29 April 1991, Richardson files 868 ECC(92)96C, 7 April 1992, Richardson 
files 836; ECC(92)M12/2, 8 April 1992, Richardson files 1101; CSC(92)153, 13 October 1992, 
Richardson files 1105; CSC(92)M52/5, 28 October 1992. Richardson files 1105). 
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aligned, it appears that the developments planned under policy strategies could 
also be pursued under the expenditure reduction strategy. Events affecting the 
Department of Justice demonstrated that whichever strategy dominates determines 
which higher level committee and which advisers are involved (Box 5.2).  
Box 5.2 Strategy predominance: commercialisation or expenditure reduction? 
The government's election manifesto commitment to increase front line police numbers by 900, 
together with proposals to strengthen bail laws implied increased costs throughout both the police 
and the justice systems. The Department of Justice already faced difficulties "accommodating the 
existing prison population" and sought additional funding. A search commenced for alternative 
strategies to reduce costs, including the possibility of contracting out periodic detention centre 
management, remand institutions, transport of offenders and inmates, private security guards at 
courts, enforcement of fines, and the execution of warrants and documents. According to Treasury 
advice, US experience of private prisons brought efficiencies of 15%.  
In 1991, a scoping study of the Police and the Department of Justice examined both 
"machinery of government and expenditure control issues with a view to identifying substantial 
savings." It proposed decisive action to slow expenditure growth but recognised the considerable 
time, effort, and enabling legislation required. The Treasury advised that developments in the 
Justice portfolio should not be viewed simply as a "cost containing exercise", but proposed that 
progress would be assured by maintaining "a strong fiscal focus, which emphasises its importance 
and gives Treasury and State Services Commission a rationale for continued involvement". The 
adoption of a fiscal focus meant "it might be preferable for Strategy Committee to have 
Expenditure Control Committee take overall responsibility for the further work".  
After Cabinet "approved in principle the introduction of private sector contracting into the 
provision of the full range of prison services, including the management and operation of prisons", 
the Minister of Justice argued that "the introduction of private sector contracting into the prison 
system is a major development which was commenced in accordance with government policy and 
independent of the Police/Justice scoping study". He proposed that the previously-established 
reporting process to Cabinet through the Cabinet Social and Family Policy Committee be 
continued, with a copy of reports to the ECC. Following representation from Treasury to the 
Minister of Finance, which included documentation showing Cabinet sub-committee membership, 
the ECC directed the involvement of the Officials Committee on Expenditure Control and required 
"that future reports on private sector contracting in the prison system should be submitted to the 
Cabinet Strategy Committee, not the Cabinet Social and Family Policy Committee”. (ECC(90)1, 
19 November 1990, Richardson files 1029; Letter, P. East, Acting Minister of Justice to R. 
Richardson, 14 June 1991, Richardson files 104; CAB(91)M23/28h, 17 June 1991, Richardson 
files 869; ECC(91)302, 12 November 1991, Richardson files 1027; ECC(91)319, 18 November 
1991, Richardson files 1020; ECC(91)312, 18 November 1991, Richardson files 1027; T91/5197, 
29 November 1991, Richardson files 345; ECC(92)201, 25 May 1992, Richardson files 1052; 
ECC(92)M28/7, 26 May 1992, Richardson files 1101; T92/3228, 20 October 1992, Richardson 
files 345).  
Adoption of strategy: formal  
In 1993, the government issued a broad vision document which formalised a 
goal of economic growth and social cohesion, while the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
1994 with its principles of fiscal responsibility and requirements for any 
government to link its fiscal strategy with those principles formalised the 
government's approach to fiscal strategy and, in effect, required subsequent 
governments to adopt a similar approach.  
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Strategic results areas / key result areas 
From 1994 and 1995, the government's policy strategies were linked to 
government departments and their activities by identifying progressively lower 
level and more detailed targets to be met in pursuit of those strategies. Strategic 
result areas (SRAs) were developed to link the government's strategies with the 
contribution required from departments over a three to five year period; key result 
areas (KRAs) were devised to provide a shorter term focus for departments in 
striving to meet the SRAs and, at a lower level still, were milestones on the way to 
achieving the KRAs (State Services Commission, 1994).  
In 1999, a set of over-arching priorities was set above the SRAs and, following 
the 1999 election and a change of government, the SRAs were changed to key 
government goals. Regardless of changes in terminology or the different levels, 
the process of devising government strategy and then developing progressively 
lower level targets for departments to meet in pursuit of the strategy has 
continued. Given the 1990 election manifesto commitment and the view that 
aspects of prison operations were role of state issues, that private sector 
contracting for prison services was part of policy strategy rather than merely a 
cost savings development has long been evident (Box 5.3). 
Box 5.3 Privatisation and policy strategy 
In 1996, the strategic goals adopted by the newly-formed Department of Corrections included 
the "development of a contracting framework", and the "establishment of a contract-managed 
remand facility", but strategic goals were omitted from the 1997 annual report. From 1998, the 
department identified the Government's strategic result area relating to safer communities and 
included in its nine key results areas: KRA1, systems to ensure the security of offenders held in 
custody; KRA5 which "concerns the construction and management of the new Auckland Central 
Remand facility" for which the government had recently announced that its management and 
operation would be tendered; and KRA9, the implementation of a contracting framework. The 
strategic goals for 2001/2002, the first full year under the Labour-Alliance coalition government 
contain no references to contracting. (Department of Corrections, Annual reports years ended 30 
June 1996 - 30 June 2000; Statement of Intent 1 July 2001-30 June 2002). 
Fiscal strategy 
The Treasury's advice that the government adopt fiscal targets required 
recognition that while the fiscal targets should be simple, and easily understood 
and monitored, the narrow focus of such targets could impede decisions that make 
good policy sense. Alternative policy options, for example, could be fiscally 
neutral but, because the aggregate target focuses on a particular item, such as 
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expense, one policy alternative could affect the target while another does not, and 
this could distort decisions. Similarly, governmental control over some items may 
be minimal but could have a major impact on the aggregate target. The fiscal 
targets might, therefore, require some adjustment by excluding fiscally neutral 
items from counting against the targets and focusing on discretionary items 
instead of all items. At the same time, the need for "flexibility and minimising the 
damage done to credibility by missing a target" also required consideration 
(Treasury, BR No 62, 20 May 1992, Richardson files 295). 
Following implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, the fiscal 
targets adopted by the National government were the reduction of government 
operating expenses below 30% of GDP and the reduction of net debt below 20% 
of GDP, with that figure later reduced to 15% of GDP (Birch, 1995; Peters, 1998; 
Birch, 1999). In 1999, the Treasury noted that there was no "consensus amongst 
economists about the appropriate long-term objectives for net public debt and 
spending", but argued that high public debt levels were risky (Treasury, 1999, 
p.22-26). The Labour coalition government elected in late 1999 adopted fiscal 
targets for operating expenses to average 35% of GDP and for net debt to fall 
below 20% of GDP (Cullen, 2001).  
Summary 
This chapter notes that incentives developments to the financial management 
system were planned but not implemented when the National government took 
office in 1990. Those developments proceeded and, after the review of the state 
sector reforms, which acknowledged confusion over the direction and intent of the 
reforms, those developments strengthened. 
The incoming National government adopted the expenditure reduction and 
commercialisation strategies. It also structured its Cabinet sub-committees and 
devised their terms of reference largely in accordance with Treasury 
recommendations. The terms of reference of some committees immediately below 
the CSC supported the general privatising thrust suggested by the Chapter 4, with 
the STA’s responsibility for review providing scope for a systematic means of 
load-shedding, the ECC responsible for achieving expense reductions, while the 
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CEG was responsible for encouraging private sector development. Savas 
acknowledges that privatisation has more to do with politics than with economics, 
but he, and others, recognise public opposition to it as a role of government issue 
while privatisation for pragmatic reasons, such as efficiency and enhanced 
services, encounters less opposition (see Chapter 3). The examples drawn from 
the justice developments suggest that as overt privatising objectives foundered in 
New Zealand, they were translated into objectives that appear more pragmatic 
(Box 5.1) and pursued through the financial management system. 
The financial management system assumes a centralised direction-setting 
process, and the general approach to strategy became incorporated in the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, which requires specification of particular fiscal targets and 
comparison of those targets with the specified principles of fiscal responsibility, 
and in the manner in which strategies adopted are taken to lower levels with 
strategic goals and key results areas. Although this may suggest that each 
government may set its own direction and that the financial management system 
will accommodate that direction, this thesis argues that the expenditure reduction 
and commercialisation strategies, both of which are consistent with Savas’s 
strategies for achieving privatisation, are designed into the financial management 
system and that ongoing developments to the system are largely consistent with 
those strategies. The manner in which those strategies have been designed into the 
system will be explained in more depth in Chapters 7-9. First, however, Chapter 6 
provides an overview of those ongoing developments as pursued through 
incentives projects.  

  
 
6 Incentives projects 
The State Sector Act makes the State Services Commissioner responsible for 
the review of government departments and their operations, while the Public 
Finance Act makes the Treasury responsible for developing the financial 
management system which provides information used in such reviews and, 
therefore, provides monitoring criteria (Scott et al, 1990). The Public Finance Act 
merely provided a basic structure and an accrual accounting base for subsequent 
developments, and those developments commenced shortly after the passage of 
the Public Finance Act 1989 in a joint effort between the Treasury and the State 
Services Commission. These departments commissioned a report, Report on 
Departmental Incentives, which analysed and discussed incentives for application 
to departments (Treasury and SSC, 1989, Treasury files). That report seems to 
have provided a foundation on which several subsequent projects to incorporate 
incentives in the financial management system have drawn. This chapter outlines 
the contents of the Report on Departmental Incentives and then provides an 
overview of the ongoing set of incentives projects conducted to develop the 
financial management system, with those projects typically drawn together under 
a particular theme. 
Report on Departmental Incentives, 1989 
The Report on Departmental Incentives was a compilation of five project 
reports on different aspects of the new financial management system: a capital 
charge; output pricing, monitoring and payment; risk assignment for government 
purchases; accounting measures and issues; and incentives for chief executives. A 
sixth project, Project 0, attempted to understand departments' negative reactions 
when responding to the Public Finance Bill.19 A different team, each working 
under considerable time pressure, was responsible for each of the six projects 
(Treasury and SSC, 1989, Treasury files, p. 1, 12-28).  
                                                 
19 Some project reports contain multiple sub-reports, only some of which are page numbered. The full report 
contains no page numbering but it consists of 253 pages. For referencing purposes, the pages have been 
counted from the beginning of the report and page numbers added. 
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The overview of this report proposed a "set of sanctions and incentives" which 
would allow delegated decision-making, but would, at the same time, ensure that 
agents (departmental chief executives) make decisions that are in the principal's 
interests. This required identifying the desired performance and devising the 
appropriate combination of sanctions and incentives to prompt that performance. 
The Treasury sought incentives to "encourage efficient use of resources", while 
the State Services Commission sought, in addition, to determine the purpose of 
performance reviews and to identify key performance measures (Treasury and 
State Services Commission, 1989, Treasury files, p. 13-17). The 
commercialisation of departments’ activities was important and expectations were 
that the increasing "ability to specify and monitor both financial performance and 
the delivery of outputs" would support changes in pricing and payment practices 
away from the "arbitrary rules and restrictions" for mode B appropriations, to 
market conditions for mode C appropriations (p. 4-6). The reported findings of 
each project are presented in a composite table (Table 6.1) on p. 112. 
Project 0: Departmental problems with incentives 
Project 0 (p. 29-44) attempted to develop central agency understanding of 
departments' negative responses to the Public Finance Bill and to the eventual Act 
(p. 31). Some departments had argued that the Public Finance Bill contained 
disincentives for effective and efficient use of resources rather than incentives. 
The Public Finance Bill's proposal that all departments should pay a return to the 
Crown, that they could not earn interest on their surplus funds, and that mode B 
departments not be allowed to retain any operating surplus exemplified the 
concerns about disincentives (Submissions on Public Finance Bill, 1989, 
Parliamentary library).20  
This project report contained a schedule of 31 concerns identified by 
consulting a few departments, and comments on each of those concerns together 
with, when relevant, identification of which incentives project would address 
                                                 
20 Some time prior to promulgation of this bill, an arrangement had been made whereby departments were 
allowed to retain, or carry forward, underspending against appropriations. Evidently some viewed the 
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those concerns. An additional schedule reviewed the negative responses to the 
Public Finance Bill. The difference between departmental views and those of the 
project team was marked.  
Some departments saw a contrast between the Public Finance Act and the State 
Sector Act's "spirit of freedom" for chief executives and departments. This was 
regarded as departmental failure to understand the role and responsibilities of a 
departmental chief executive as opposed to those of a minister and parliament. 
Some departments argued that allowing them to retain interest earned from 
improved cash management, or savings generated by providing outputs at a cost 
less than the amount paid would be an incentive for improved management. This 
was regarded as an "attitude problem" because any savings should accrue to the 
departments' owner, the Crown, and not to the departments. "Good performance 
should not be rewarded by increased purchase of outputs or increased capital 
contributions." Departments would have incentives to compete for contracts 
(Treasury and SSC, 1989, Treasury files, p. 36-37, 43). 
Project 1: A capital charge for government departments 
Project 1 (p. 45-88) viewed capital as the government's ownership interest in a 
department and sought recognition of that interest by including an ownership 
contract in each department's corporate plan. It also sought to include in a 
department's operating costs, the costs related to that ownership interest by 
imposing on all departments a cost of capital (p. 50-53, 63).  
Two consultants advised on this project. One consultant had been asked to 
advise on a capital charge for government departments. He proposed that in the 
absence of market prices, output prices should be based on full costs including 
depreciation, tax and a capital charge, and that the capital charge should prompt 
"optimal investment and divestment" decisions (p. 76). He also advised that 
departments' asset valuations required consideration because those valuations 
would affect both the capital charge and the amount of depreciation, with both 
affecting the full costs of outputs. He argued that the capital charge would prompt 
                                                                                                                                     
prohibition on retention of operating surplus as a step backwards (Interview with former chief executive, 
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"optimal divestment decisions" if assets were revalued regularly to the greater of 
present value or sale value or, if neither of those is available, to replacement cost 
as a proxy for those values (p. 76). 
The other consultant had been asked about capital charge rates for mode B 
departments, which have an "objective function of cost minimisation rather than 
profit maximisation, since the department does not have a revenue function but 
has costs of production" (p. 57). He advised that there is no conceptual 
justification for imposing a capital charge on departments that lack external 
revenue streams and depend on government funding decisions. The goal to be 
achieved by imposing the capital charge would therefore help to determine the 
capital charge rates imposed (p. 71-85).  
Although the first consultant commented on optimal divestment decisions, both 
consultants assumed a goal of competitive neutrality and proposed that the cost of 
capital should equate to that of a private sector firm with comparable operations 
and with an "appropriate degree of financial leverage" (p. 72). 
The project report proposed a capital charge and, for consistency, interest 
charging or payment on bank account balances.21 It sought realistic valuations for 
long-lived assets, arguing that the capital charge would provide an incentive for 
departments to return surplus cash to the Crown (p. 64). 
The project report argued that the capital charge would allow a "more full 
costing of outputs" and the amounts paid to departments for output production 
should be increased by the amount of the capital charge (p. 50 - 60). Because the 
amounts paid for outputs would cover all expenses, departments would be able to 
accumulate cash approximately equivalent to the depreciation component of the 
output prices (p. 62). Chief executives should have discretion over minor asset 
purchases and routine replacements but not over expenditure "which affects the 
                                                                                                                                     
June 2001). 
21 Project 0, which seemed to be an afterthought, noted this recommendation for payment of interest. It pointed 
out that the Public Finance Act would require amendment for departments to be able to spend that interest, 
or that a capital injection appropriation would be required to allow departments to retain it. Alternatively, 
output appropriations could be reduced to offset the expected interest income (p. 36). 
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ability of a department to deliver outputs, or which may restrict future options" (p. 
62). 
For mode C departments, the capital charge would allow assessment of 
departmental and management performance, and, assuming that pricing of outputs 
is based on full costs, help to ensure that "pricing was competitively neutral with 
private sector industry participants". The capital charge for a mode C department 
should, therefore, equate to that for an analogous private sector firm. For mode B 
departments, the report proposed adopting the pragmatic recommendations of the 
second consultant assuming 50% debt and a beta of 1 (The Treasury and SSC, 
1989, Treasury files, p. 50). 
Project 2: Output pricing, monitoring and payment 
The authors of project 2 (p. 89-153) expected that the funding of outputs and 
the administration of regulations would become increasingly important forms of 
intervention while policy advice and service delivery would become less 
important. Government-funded outputs could be either private or public goods, 
both of which could be supplied under either contestable or non-contestable 
conditions. The outputs could be specified at three general levels: output type, 
output class, and output component (p. 97). The project report therefore identified 
the funding of outputs as "one of the two major types of intervention open to the 
government", and output specification as "central to the new system of financial 
management in the public sector".  
According to the project report, the financial management system hinged on 
ministers' ability to specify purchase decisions in terms of the "quantity, quality, 
source and recipients of outputs" and departmental chief executives' responsibility 
to deliver those outputs "which are to be supplied by departments". This implied 
that the government requires unit prices of outputs to decide which outputs to 
purchase, and to assess departmental operations. Departmental chief executives 
could be required to demonstrate that their prices are lower, or no higher, than 
those of alternative suppliers, thus placing "the onus on departments to prove that 
they offered value-for-money" (p. 102). The unit price information would also 
allow others to consider offering the same outputs at a lower price (p. 101). 
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The intended budget process would involve departments and their Vote 
Ministers proposing to the Cabinet the outputs they think the government should 
purchase (p. 131). Central agencies could advise by recommending prices and, 
where the price is non-contestable, efficiency dividends, with the eventual 
arrangement recorded in an output agreement between the department and 
purchasing ministers. This agreement would specify outputs in more detail than 
output classes (p. 133-134). Those departments making payments on behalf of the 
Crown (POBOCs) would also specify those payments by output class (p. 140).22 
Departments would develop corporate plans consistent with, but more detailed 
than the government's budget and estimates, with those plans containing the 
output agreement and a statement of ownership requirements (p. 98-100, 130). 
Parliamentary appropriations for outputs were regarded as "authorizations to 
the Executive to spend up to that limit for purchasing the output class identified" 
(p. 124). The level of contestability would dictate the pricing methods but, 
irrespective of the pricing methods used, detailed costing systems would be 
required to avoid limiting performance assessments to the "crude" measure 
provided by overall financial performance (p. 101, 144, 146). 
Opening markets to external suppliers or developing an internal market within 
government would allow the separation of output costs from prices and 
development of contestable, or market, prices (p. 102-106). Clear and detailed 
output specifications would be necessary to ensure price comparability and, 
because higher prices are unacceptable in competitive markets, this would 
motivate departmental efficiency improvements (p. 102-103).  
Most departmental outputs were considered non-contestable, but simple cost 
reimbursement was unacceptable. Instead, prospective pricing rules were 
proposed, with these devised by using benchmark prices, by applying a margin 
over the variable costs of a department's contestable outputs, or by using expected 
standard costs (p. 104-106-109). These pricing rules were to be applied in 
conjunction with enforcement of output delivery and the extraction of efficiency 
                                                 
22 Initially POBOCs were separately identified, but not by output class. The 1992 amendment to the Public 
Finance Act changed this to require identification by output class. 
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dividends to prompt productivity improvements (p. 105). The possibility of 
squeezing prices too hard was noted, as was the need periodically to check pricing 
rules against performance audits (p. 104, 106).  
Project 2 envisaged a transition from block funding in advance to output 
purchase arrangements with payment in arrears depending on output delivery. 
This required clear specification of outputs, quantities, quality, and prices (p. 
135). If funding were directed to consumers for them to purchase their own 
services, then they could determine for themselves the quality of services. This 
would allow administrative evaluation of output delivery to be minimised, with 
only the minimum information necessary to determine output delivery required (p. 
93, p. 134).  
Central agency judgements of departmental performance would focus on a 
department's financial performance with performance penalties "directed against 
the financial position of the department" to avoid penalisation of the beneficiaries 
of government-supplied outputs. These penalties would be connected to the 
incentives affecting the department's chief executive (p. 110, 126).  
Project 3: Risk assignment for government purchases 
The risk assignment project (p. 154-162) viewed the budgeting process as 
establishing the money available for output production. Because, from a 
departmental perspective, the budget sets both the maximum revenue and the 
maximum expenses a department may incur in output production, this project 
considered who should bear the risk of budget underestimations. The artificiality 
of allocating risks between the Crown and its departments was recognised. The 
Crown as purchaser, could increase the output appropriations paid to a department 
or, as owner, it could let the department incur a loss. The manner in which the cost 
is borne was considered likely to affect the amount of the cost involved. The 
report concluded that whichever party is best able to minimise the costs should 
bear the risk. The department was thought best able to bear all costs except for 
changes in output requirements which would be the purchaser's risk (p. 156-159).  
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Project 4: Accounting measures and valuation 
Project 4 (p. 163-214) identified the setting of accounting standards as "central 
to accounting developments affecting government departments" (p. 177). It 
included advice from consultants who considered the Public Finance Act's 
requirement for government financial reporting practices to be in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) recognised in New Zealand as 
appropriate for the public sector (p. 181).23 They urged attention to those practices 
and particularly to the public sector accounting concepts that had been developed 
in New Zealand two years earlier (p. 182-187). The concepts proposed different 
accounting treatments for those government entities undertaking commercial 
activities and those undertaking non-commercial, service-oriented activities. The 
consultants argued that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
activities was "conjectural" because the act intended a businesslike approach to all 
government activities, and therefore viewed all government activities as 
commercial (p. 184). 
The project report recognised that performance assessments in the newly-
decentralised environment would rely on financial reports, that financial reports 
are a function of the particular accounting policies adopted, and that without some 
restriction on the range of accounting policies available to departments, chief 
executives would select policies to benefit themselves (p. 188, p. 199-200). 
Accounting policies should, therefore, be restricted, and monitoring and auditing 
included in the assessment process (p. 202). 
Particular performance indicators were also considered. There was "no doubt" 
that "at least marginal efficiency savings can be made cumulatively and 
progressively, each year, for a considerable time". Arguably, such savings should 
be rewarded instead of imposing the traditional budget cuts, and it was proposed 
that departments be offered an incentive to produce a surplus (p. 168). The 
amount and state of fixed assets and the optimal use of working capital were 
                                                 
23 This was prior to the Financial Reporting Act 1993. 
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thought likely to help with performance assessment from the owner's perspective 
(p. 164-169).  
Project 5: Incentives for chief executives 
The question of how to motivate a chief executive was the topic of project 5 
which recognised that chief executives’ commitment to a particular service 
objective could mean that performance-linked compensation packages would not 
necessarily motivate them (p. 215-253). Such compensation was considered 
acceptable for chief executives in commercially-oriented departments where the 
financial objective was considered appropriate, but counter-productive for those in 
the non-commercially-oriented departments where services and ethics were 
important (p. 241). Three pre-conditions for linking chief executives' performance 
with their compensation were: that the performance be measurable; that the 
performance be under the control of the person concerned; and that the process of 
assessment and pay variation be perceived as legitimate (p. 224-227). 
Senior managers' review of the Report on Departmental Incentives 
Shortly after completion of the Report on Departmental Incentives, senior 
managers within Treasury met to consider the report's implications for system 
developments. The early intention for Mode B departments was that they would 
not receive the full amount of output appropriations, and that cash would be held 
centrally, but this was "partway between input controls and incentives on 
outputs". Movement in one direction or the other was considered necessary, with a 
preference for movement towards incentives on outputs (Treasury, "Minutes of 
meeting of senior managers, 10-30am Wednesday 22 November 1989", Treasury 
files). 
Output-contestability was considered desirable but it required detailed output 
specifications, pricing developments and a capital charge. At some distant point in 
the future, further specification detail would not be warranted, and it was noted 
that any technique, including accrual accounting, should not be pushed beyond its 
usefulness at an acceptable cost. Departments had already been required to absorb 
the cost of conversion to new systems and a recent increase in goods and services 
tax (GST), and they suspected that introduction of a capital charge would impose 
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further costs. Because the financial management system developments needed to 
be politically acceptable, departments had been told that they would soon receive 
proposals on incentives, and that interest would be included. The early 
introduction of the capital charge was desirable but, to avoid imposing excessive 
pressure, the other incentives would be introduced more slowly (Treasury, 
"Minutes of meeting of senior managers, 10-30am Wednesday 22 November 
1989", Treasury files). 
Surplus retention was a relatively minor issue because extraction of the capital 
charge amounted to a pre-determined dividend. Well-defined and appropriately 
priced outputs would limit any reported surplus to super-profits which would be 
small. A large reported surplus would reveal excessive prices which might, 
otherwise, remain invisible and allowing surplus retention would provide an 
incentive to reveal surpluses (Treasury, "Minutes of meeting of senior managers, 
10-30am Wednesday 22 November 1989", Treasury files). 
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Table 6.1 Summarised findings of projects 
 
Project 1: Capital charge 
1.1 Capital charge 
1.2 Realistic asset valuations 
1.3 Interest payments 
1.4 Output prices adjusted to include capital charge 
1.5 Use of departmental cash flows for minor and replacement asset purchases 
1.6 Detailed ownership contract to form part of departmental corporate plan 
Project 2: Output pricing, monitoring, payment 
Output definition 
2.1 Output types: policy advice, administration of regulations, administration of funding, service 
delivery 
2.2 Outputs specified in detail, unit prices and quantities, attributes, standards, performance 
measures  
Output pricing 
2.3 Price and cost separation ideally with contestable output pricing. Project 2.2 essential to this. 
2.4 Pricing rule when non-contestable: benchmarks, margin over variable costs, expected 
standard costs, efficiency dividends. Project 2.9 essential 
2.5 Regular performance audits to check pricing rules 
2.6 Detailed costing systems a priority 
2.7 Departments bear risk of controllable costs, ie most risks except government policy changes 
2.8 Long term contracts, multi-year appropriations where transaction-specific assets involved 
Contract enforcement 
2.9 Enforcement of output delivery 
2.10 Payment on delivery for amount of output delivered. Project 2.2 essential to this 
2.11. Departments and CEs penalised for failures rather than beneficiaries 
Budgeting processes and monitoring 
2.12 Department, vote ministers propose output purchases, provide disaggregated information 
2.13 Decentralised evaluation of outputs where possible, including self-monitoring 
2.14 POBOCs presented in estimates by output class 
2.15 Corp. plan consistent with budget, output agreement, ownership contract, business plan 
Project 3 Risk assignment for purchases 
3.1 Departments as providers bear risk of controllable costs 
3.2 Government as purchaser bears cost of changes in output requirements 
Project 4 Accounting measures 
4.1 Restrict accounting policies 
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus 
4.3 Ownership measures: Encourage optimal use of working capital, information about amount 
and state of fixed assets, productive efficiency, eg return on investment 
4.4 Auditing and monitoring 
4.5 Rejection of distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities 
Project 5 Incentives for chief executives 
5.1 Performance-pay link for chief executives appropriate in commercially oriented departments. 
5.2 Preconditions: unbiased performance measures without significant measurement error; 
performance under control of person concerned; legitimate assessment, pay variation processes  
 
Particular incentives projects 
Evidently, the Report on Departmental Incentives provided ideas for 
subsequent incentives projects but not for a recent project led by the State 
Services Commission. Four major Treasury-led incentives overviews drew 
together under a particular title, or theme, a series of ongoing smaller projects. 
These overviews indicate the general intent and role of the smaller projects. 
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The "incentives for departmental performance" theme (1989-1991) 
The project reports in the Report on Departmental Incentives link directly to 
the projects contained under the "incentives for departmental performance" theme. 
The individual projects were to be implemented in five phases, the first of which 
was development of the general incentives model, government approval, and its 
announcement to chief executives in December 1989. Apparently, the 
announcement proposed that "departments should be able to choose whether to 
retain any net surplus" and advised of the implementation phases, suggesting that 
surplus retention would be included in phase two (The Treasury, TC1990/13, 25 
October 1990, p. 4, p. 14).  
Phase two: interest payment/capital charge regime 
Phase two developed the interest payment and capital charge regimes, and 
reconsidered the retention of surplus. A project report was produced in April 1990 
and the proposed implementation of these incentives was announced in October 
1990, shortly before the general election. According to the project report, the 
financial management reforms implied that departments could hold money on 
which they might earn interest, but the Crown was a net borrower rather than a net 
investor. Unless the Crown had access to all public money, it would be forced to 
borrow while departments held cash reserves. The centralised cash management 
system therefore regarded "all the cash as the Crown's rather than a department's", 
but it was recognised that payment to departments of a "working capital bonus" 
would provide an incentive to departments and contribute towards competitive 
neutrality conditions because of private sector counterparts' ability to earn interest. 
The amount of any such working capital bonus would be an "administrative cost 
of FMR" (Treasury, 10 April 1990, Incentives project phase 2: capital 
charge/interest regime, position paper 4, p. 2, Treasury files). Departments were 
advised that they would receive interest on their surplus cash and reminded that if 
they wanted to spend that interest on outputs an appropriation would be required 
(TC 1990/13, 25 October 1990, Treasury files).  
Any capital charge rate was preferable to no capital charge, but there were 
three options for determining the capital charge rates. These ranged from a 
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different rate for each investment, which was the ideal, through a rate specific to 
each department, to a single rate applying to all departments. Competitive 
neutrality and comparability were important where competition was possible, but 
not an issue for "long term Mode B departments", those departments providing 
policy advice, administering transfers and government regulations.  
Competitive neutrality principles required consideration of the appropriate 
asset base on which the capital charge should be levied. Under generally accepted 
accounting practices (GAAP), reliance on historical cost reporting was noted, as 
was controversy over intangible assets. Although logic dictated that departments 
should report all assets, including intangible assets, at market values, such a 
valuation requirement imposed on departments would breach GAAP, prevent 
comparability with the private sector, and, potentially, bring the financial 
management reforms into disrepute. Implementation of the capital charge on a 
historical cost basis was proposed with later reconsideration of asset values 
(Treasury, 10 April 1990, Incentives project phase 2: capital charge/interest 
regime, position papers 1-3, Treasury files).  
Departments were advised that the capital charge for all departments would be 
imposed at a rate "appropriate to each department", the rate of a "private sector 
counterpart". They were also advised that they would be "funded for the full price 
of outputs supplied to the Crown, rather than only for the cash required to produce 
their outputs" (TC 1990/13, 25 October 1990, p. 7, 15, Treasury files).  
From the Crown's perspective, the capital charge would represent "the return 
available from an alternative investment of similar risk". After a capital charge, 
any operating surplus would be small but that too belonged to the owner, the 
Crown. If withdrawn automatically, managers might not report a surplus, whereas 
if reinvested in the department it would not prompt inefficient output production 
because "by definition retained surpluses are an investment by the owner and 
therefore must stay on the balance sheet (be used for working capital or fixed 
asset purchases)". The benefit of allowing surplus retention would be the positive 
behavioural response prompted but delaying surplus retention would be more 
beneficial by providing departments with an incentive to cooperate with phase 
three. The Treasury sought reassurance about the validity of any reported 
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operating surplus, arguing that the prices and costs of outputs should be separated 
before allowing departments to retain any operating surplus (Treasury, 10 April 
1990, Incentives project phase 2: capital charge/interest regime, position paper 6, 
p. 2, Treasury files). Departments were advised that allowing surplus retention as 
part of phase two was inappropriate because of the need to separate costs and 
prices (TC 1990/13, 25 October 1990, Treasury files). 
With the implementation of accrual accounting and the introduction of 
appropriations for outputs, all departments received mode B output appropriations 
for all outputs. The project report proposed that departments could adopt the 
capital charge and interest regime quickly, but that any department using the 
default rate should not be allowed to progress to mode C appropriations. 
Intentions were that departments could not shift from mode B appropriations to 
mode C until their operations met several criteria, including detailed specification 
of outputs, a determinable date of delivery of outputs to establish both revenue 
recognition and payment date, a rigorous cost accounting system, and output 
prices which allow a department to achieve breakeven after the capital charge, but 
stated on a unit price basis (Treasury, 24 October 1990, An overview of Mode C, 
Treasury files). 
The announcement of the phase two development contained advice that phase 
three, which was underway, was the separation of the price and cost of outputs, 
departments paid the price on delivery, instead of being advanced amounts with 
which to incur costs, and detailed output specifications. In addition, subject to 
Ministerial agreement, departments would be allowed to retain surpluses. The 
fourth and fifth phases were incentives to reward chief executives and their staff 
for good financial performance, and incentives for the good management of 
transactions on behalf of the Crown, such as payment of benefits (TC1990/13, 25 
October 1990, Treasury files). Table 6.2 summarises the projects contained within 
the incentives for departmental performance theme, with the numbers referring to 
the numbers in the Table 6.1 summary of the Report on departmental incentives. 
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Table 6.2 Projects contained within the Incentives for Departmental Performance Theme  
 
Phase 2: Capital charge and interest regime 
1.1 Capital charge 
1.2 Realistic asset valuations if necessary 
1.3 Interest payments 
1.4 Full price of outputs to be paid to departments 
Phases 3, 4, 5 
2.2 Outputs specified in more detail than output class, including quantities, attributes, standards, 
performance measures  
2.3-2.4 Separation of output price and cost  
2.10 Payment on delivery for amount of output delivered, 
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus (retention of surplus with agreement of responsible minister) 
5.1 Performance pay link for all chief executives 
New: Incentives related to receipts, payments, assets and liabilities managed by departments on 
behalf of the Crown 
 
Change of government, review of reforms and a new incentives project 
Following the 1991 review of the State Sector reforms, the Logan report made 
40 recommendations about the reformed public sector, some of which related to 
the incentives projects. These included strategic aspects such as the need for 
centralised direction-setting in the newly de-centralised environment 
(recommendations 4 and 5); suggestions for developing the contractual 
relationships between ministers and department chief executives through formal 
performance agreements, departmental operations agreements containing the 
output agreement and ownership agreement, and some way of recognising the 
collective interest (recommendations 6 and 8). 
Recommendations about the capital charge regime and the budgeting process 
covered concerns about implementation of the capital charge regime and the 
method used to calculate the charge (recommendation 31); and the need for 
coordination of the budget process, including criteria and standards for assessment 
of departmental expenditure, a resource allocation process for the government's 
capital investment decisions, and guidelines for departments on their capital 
expenditure decisions (recommendation 29).  
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The Logan report noted disputes between departments and the Treasury over 
specifications of outputs and output classes.24 Departments sought a clearer 
process involving the chief executive and minister. The report recommended that 
the Treasury convene a working party, which would include some chief 
executives, to establish the principles for "defining output classes at an 
appropriate level of aggregation, developing associated performance attributes and 
specifying outputs at lower levels of aggregation". It also recommended the 
development of guidelines for the "process of negotiating the output 
specifications, particularly the negotiation of changes to output class structures 
and associated attributes" (recommendation 28). The report also recommended 
further, faster development to departments' cost allocation systems 
(recommendation 30), and the delay of further changes to the existing incentives, 
such as allowing departments to retain operating surpluses, until completion of the 
work on output specifications and pricing (recommendation 32). Table 6.3 
summarises the relevant projects contained within the Logan report, with the 
numbers referring to the numbers in the Table 6.1 summary of the Report on 
departmental incentives.  
Table 6.3 Logan report recommendations 
Logan committee recommendations  
1.1 Capital charge (implementation and calculation concerns) 
1.5 Guidelines for departments on capital expenditure decisions 
1.6 Statement of departmental intent containing output agreement and detailed ownership 
contract as part of departmental corporate plan 
2.2 Output specification - clarification of output and output class definitions and processes to 
change them 
2.6 Detailed costing systems: faster development 
2.12 Coordination of budget process 
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus (withheld until completion of output definitions and price and 
cost separation 
5.1: Chief executive performance agreements 
New Recognition of collective interests 
New: Centralised direction setting, including collective interest 
Following the Logan report, reference to incentives for departmental 
performance ceased, as did reference to financial management reforms. The 
Treasury, the State Services Commission and the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, in their response to the Logan report's findings, adopted a 
                                                 
24 This dispute was noted earlier. The Treasury viewed its role as negotiating “correct technical specification of 
output classes”, while departments opposed the Treasury’s attempts to obtain information at a sub-class 
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"forward looking" stance, seeking to "put Ministers back in the picture of what 
departmental management under the new public sector framework is all about". 
They presented the ongoing work as change management, and used the term 
departmental management in preference to financial management reforms 
(Treasury, "Strategy for refinement of departmental management", 19 October 
1992, p. 2, Treasury files). The ongoing collection of incentives projects, together 
with additional tasks recommended by the Logan report, became known as 
"departmental management initiatives" (Treasury, "Strategy for refinement of 
departmental management", 19 October 1992, Treasury files; T92/3696, 4 
December 1992, Richardson files 804). 
Departmental management initiatives (1992-1994) 
The departmental management initiatives report explained that the reformed 
public sector management system was still developing. It identified several 
projects being developed jointly by the Treasury, the State Services Commission, 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Particular work intended 
to assist with that development and in progress at the time included (Treasury, 
T92/3696, 4 December 1992, Richardson files 804): 
• output specification (and pricing) particularly the use of purchase agreements; 
• purchase advisors to provide support to Ministers; 
• improved CE performance specification and assessment process for departmental 
management; 
• management development programme; 
• cost allocation; 
• capital expenditure review; 
• capital charge refinements; and  
• treatment of surpluses and deficits. 
All of these projects were important and interrelated but two, the development 
of output specifications and pricing, and the chief executive performance 
specification and assessment, were particular priorities, while accelerated progress 
on cost allocation was also necessary. 
The prioritised tasks were progressing. Output specification improvements and 
the introduction of purchase agreements were intended for the 1993 budget round. 
Improvements in pricing, or the ability to compare costs, would complement those 
                                                                                                                                     
level (T90/N12, 7 November 1990, Richardson files 758, p. 4). 
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developments. The improved information would allow inter-organisational 
comparisons of similar outputs, or application of pricing formulae. A pilot project 
to review the specification and pricing of policy advice was recommended 
(Treasury, T92/3696, 4 December 1992, Richardson files 804). 
Specification and assessment of chief executives' performance would enhance 
chief executives' motivation to produce the required quantity and quality of 
outputs at the least cost, while the refinement of cost allocation systems would 
help to integrate this new system of departmental management. Recent Audit 
Office comment about departments' costing systems was considered to provide 
support for the development of standardised cost accounting in the public sector. 
Proposed programme 
The report on departmental management initiatives recommended that the 
overall work programme be noted, but that "robust output specification and 
pricing and an improved chief executive performance assessment process" be 
prioritised. These priorities would be advanced by restricting the focus on output 
pricing to phasing in "on a case by case basis where this represents a cost effective 
opportunity for getting better value from purchasing for Government" and then 
developing during the 1993/94 budget round a "recommended approach for 
pricing policy advice outputs"; devising specification and assessment procedures 
for chief executive performance; and undertaking a work programme on 
standardisation of cost accounting practices, aiming for full implementation in 
June 1994 (Treasury T92/3696, 4 December 1992, Richardson files 804; STA 
(92)258, 8 December 1992, Richardson files 1013; STA(92)M42/3, 9 December 
1992, Richardson files 1011; ECC(92) 428, 11 December 1992, Richardson files 
955; ECC(92)M55/19, 15 December 1992, Richardson files 956; 
CAB(92)M52/16q, 21 December 1992, Richardson files 875). Table 6.4 
summarises the projects contained in the departmental management initiatives 
summary, with the numbers referring to the numbers in the Table 6.1 summary of 
the Report on departmental incentives.  
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Table 6.4 Departmental management initiatives project summary 
Departmental management initiatives  
1.1 Capital charge (refinements, including pilot of department-specific rates) 
1.5 Use of departmental cash flows for asset purchases 
2.1 -New Purchase advisers (part of policy advice, as described) 
2.2 Output specification - detailed - priority 
2.3-2.4 Output pricing - pilot project on policy advice - priority 
2.6 Detailed costing systems: standardisation - priority 
2.15 Use of purchase agreements 
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus (treatment of surpluses and deficits) 
Project 5 Incentives for chief executives: performance specification and assessment: priority 
New Management development programme 
Financial management initiatives - next steps (1994-1995), and efficiency 
and innovation (1995-96) 
Following a close general election result in 1993, Ruth Richardson was 
replaced as Minister of Finance and the government softened its earlier approach 
to privatisation as a role of government issue. That approach had been associated 
with her (Scott, 2001). Several months prior to that election, the Treasury had 
proposed developing a “more sophisticated approach” to its advice on expenditure 
and departmental performance (T93/233, 10 February 1993, Richardson files 
1093). Arguing that “achieving the Government’s economic and fiscal strategy 
requires both macro stability and a competitive enterprise economy” (p. 1), the 
Treasury argued that the Government needed to focus on (p. 1): 
Improving the continuing serious fiscal situation; 
Improving public sector performance, including the quality of expenditure and 
services provided by the public sector; 
Improving the effectiveness of expenditure control and improving decision-making 
about expenditure priorities; and 
Managing fiscal risks through the use of the financial management tools that have 
been developed. 
Although the achievements of the financial management developments to date 
were considerable (p. 2): 
regardless of the fiscal situation, there is an ongoing need  to ensure high quality 
government expenditure. This will require improving the quality of public sector 
expenditure decisions and ensuring departments deliver the services demanded by the 
public at significantly reduced costs. Achieving both of these objectives will require 
increasingly sophisticated analysis and argument by both the Treasury to the Ministers 
and by the Minister of Finance within Cabinet. 
The Treasury argued that the minister’s ability to impose fiscal restraint 
required more a more sophisticated strategic approach to the Treasury’s vote 
analysis function which the Treasury argued was core business for any finance 
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advisory ministry. This proposed development, which was “at the forefront of 
public sector management” did not imply a “return to centralised input controls, 
though we may need to examine inputs in our analysis” (p. 5). Although 
departments’ chief executives were responsible for decisions about departmental 
management, the Treasury’s advisory function was defended as within the 
Treasury’s mandate with the argument that the Treasury is “in the business of 
providing a second opinion to the Minister of Finance, Ministers collectively, and 
sometimes to the Responsible Minister, on the options put forward by the chief 
executive and his or her performance” (p. 6, emphasis in original). A common 
vocabulary was required for this development (p. 6).  
Incentives projects around this time seemed to be centred within the Treasury 
and conducted at a less formal level, without the announcements to departments 
that characterised the earlier projects. The developments of 1994-1996 under the 
financial management initiatives theme exemplify this. The Crown financial 
reports for the year ended 30 June 1994 reported a surplus for the first time. One 
of the project papers under this theme commented that until then, attention had 
been focused on expenditure control achieved by imposing across-the-board 
expenditure cuts and financing any new initiatives by reprioritising existing 
expenditure. The reported surplus brought "suggestions that the focus should 
shift" away from cost reduction and revealed differing views within Treasury 
about the nature of the financial management system and appropriate 
developments (Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, FM/2/19, 
Treasury files; Gorringe, 1995a; 1995b). (This opposing view is considered in 
more depth in Chapter 8).  
The view which predominated "postulated" that the financial management 
system was intended to impose "downward pressure on spending", to prompt the 
identification of expenditure priorities thus allowing existing expenditure to be 
reallocated to high priority areas, and to protect the Crown's ownership interests 
(Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, FM/2/19, Treasury files). 
Continued pursuit of these intentions while the Crown reports operating surpluses 
required retention of the existing controls and incentives, and four improvements 
to the "Government's managerial leverage" (p. 3): improved purchase decisions; 
more focused monitoring; enhanced chief executive performance contracting; and 
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surplus retention (Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, FM/2/19, 
Treasury files). 
Improved purchase decisions 
"Better output specification and more reliable departmental costing systems" 
would improve both purchase decisions and performance assessment, while the 
introduction of pricing and payment for outputs only on proof of delivery would 
further improve the system. By devising "standard specifications for particular 
generic outputs at the lowest level of detail", which is the "activity", or 
"intermediate output" level, increased "purchase pressure between ministers and 
departments" could be achieved. These detailed specifications would support cost 
benchmarking and competitive bidding, thus driving "efficiency from within the 
department" and allowing reductions in "intrusive" central agency monitoring 
(Treasury, 09/95, "Coopers & Lybrand 1995 review of costing systems and user 
charges", p. 8, Treasury files; Treasury, 30 October 1995, Financial management 
initiatives - the next steps FM/21, p. 2-3). 
The proposal to introduce pricing for application to both final outputs 
(ministers' purchases) and intermediate outputs required the use of departments' 
cost information in price negotiations between the Treasury and departments 
(Treasury, 12 November 1993, FM/2/13, Treasury files; Treasury, 24 October 
1995, FM7/4, Treasury files). Because all departments received mode B output 
appropriations for costs, the proposed price negotiations conducted within the 
appropriations implied that prices could not exceed costs but could be less than 
costs. A pilot pricing project with the Customs department was under way, and 
further pricing/benchmarking pilots conducted over two or three years, and 
focused on large scale processing-type transactions and investigatory work such 
as auditing and surveillance, were recommended (Treasury, 30 October 1995, 
FM/21, p. 2-3; Treasury files).25 Payment on delivery was also tested with some 
target departments and the recommendation made that all government 
departments be paid in arrears (Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, p. 
                                                 
25 Evidently the pilot project stalled, with fractious relationships developing between those involved (Treasury, 
Output pricing/baseline reviews, Treasury files). 
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4-5, Treasury files; Treasury, 21 November 1995; Vote analysis: priorities over 
the next two years, Treasury files). 
Actual competition, demonstrating a credible intention to award contracts to 
the most efficient supplier, was proposed. This would be easiest for standard 
services, and practical, but more difficult, for professional services. Success in this 
development required preventing departments from defining or grouping outputs 
in ways likely to discourage alternative suppliers, and prompting ministers and 
departments to purchase from the cheapest source. This development would raise 
ownership issues because loss of contracts would cause financial problems for 
departments, and reduce their future ability to perform those functions (Treasury, 
24 October 1995, Efficiency and innovation in the public sector, FM/7/4, p. 5, 20, 
Treasury files).  
Enhanced chief executive performance agreements 
Chief executive cooperation with this purchasing development would be 
obtained through "more powerful, and more effective, rewards and sanctions" for 
chief executives, including increased financial rewards, together with more 
comprehensive Treasury input into chief executives' performance assessments. 
Despite acknowledgment of the questionable political acceptability of personal 
financial incentives, this was proposed as further work for the State Services 
Commission (The Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, p. 6, Treasury 
files). 
More focused monitoring 
The 1993 proposal for more focused and more sophisticated monitoring sought 
strategic assessments, purchase agreement assessments, including ministers' 
purchase options, and ex-post assessments of departments' performance in relation 
to purchase, ownership and financial management obligations, thus allowing more 
comprehensive Treasury input into chief executive performance assessments. 
Arguably, the improved monitoring and assessment would generate savings but it 
required ministerial support because of departmental opposition to intrusive 
monitoring and to the Treasury’s involvement “in issues where we have no 
mandate" (T93/663, 24 March 1993, Richardson files 815).  
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The 1994 and 1995 proposals for more focused monitoring again promised 
savings, with maximum leverage achieved by shifting the "burden of proof" onto 
departments. Purchase-related monitoring would include benchmarking and 
checking alignment between departments' key result areas and the government's 
strategic result areas. Ownership monitoring would focus on the "long term 
demand for departmental outputs; the overall level of Government investment in 
each department; the organisational structure of departments; management 
capability; long term resource requirements; and ownership risks" (Treasury, 30 
November 1994, Surplus retention, p. 5, Treasury files). This monitoring would 
be “enhanced by the use of internal bench-marking practices” (p. 5). Special 
project teams within Treasury would target large balance sheet departments and 
focus on the "management efficiency of assets", "examine the risks of owning 
departmental assets, and minimising that risk where possible . . .  [thus providing] 
vote teams better levers to move a number of these risks outside of the Crown" 
(Treasury, 21 November 1995, Vote analysis priorities over the next two years, 
Treasury files, p. 3-4). 
These proposals caused some concerns because the Treasury lacked sufficient 
skilled analytical staff. This left monitoring and analysis to the Treasury's 
relatively junior, unskilled vote analysis staff who were difficult to retain. Despite 
recognition that the "legislative framework and existing systems/products provide 
a number of tools and a considerable amount of information", departmental 
financial managers were "increasingly sophisticated" while the Treasury's vote 
analysis credibility was doubtful. Consequently, the key issue was the Treasury's 
ability to use the information available from the financial management system. 
Once again, the recruitment of more experienced staff, and creation of a project 
team to "update the financial profile and analysis of each vote and establish a 
regular and probing monitoring regime based around agreed key indicators" was 
proposed (Treasury, 12 December 1995, Vote Analysis: a strategy for lifting our 
game, p. 2-4, Treasury files).  
Retention of surplus 
Partial surplus retention was proposed to help the Crown "achieve advantages 
it would not achieve through the continued use of existing management tools" 
132 Incentives projects Chapter 6 
 
 
 
(Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, p. 8, Treasury files). Those 
departments receiving payment for their outputs either on delivery or in arrears 
could retain a portion of interest earned.26 This would require reducing their 
budget baselines by the amount of their forecast interest and allowing the 
difference between forecast and actual interest, whether positive or negative, to 
remain with those departments. Departments might also retain a percentage of 
their reported surplus, with the "surplus eligible for retention" excluding "other 
expenses and ownership gains" but including "interest income, profits on sale of 
fixed assets and realised revaluation gains" (Treasury, 23 February 1995, Surplus 
management, p. 6-7, Treasury files).  
Internal Treasury consultation revealed scepticism about this surplus retention 
scheme in the absence of "significant improvements in output specification and 
performance monitoring". Some portion of a department's surplus could reward 
departmental staff but preconditions for surplus retention were "adequate 
specification of outputs, monitoring of delivery of outputs (including payment on 
delivery), and demonstration of value for money in the pricing of outputs". 
Treasury senior management were not convinced that these preconditions could 
be met by all departments and required system developments to focus on 
incentives for chief executives and other enhancements to the existing system 
(Treasury, 7 December 1994; Surplus management, Treasury files; Treasury, 
Surplus management, 23 February 1995, Treasury files; Treasury, 27 February 
1995, Minutes of senior management meeting, Treasury files). Table 6.5 
summarises the projects contained in the financial management initiatives 
summary, with the numbers referring to the numbers in the Table 6.1 summary of 
the Report on departmental incentives.  
                                                 
26 At the time of this proposal, only four departments received payment on delivery or in arrears. Although all 
departments received interest on surplus cash as part of the 1991 capital charge development, at the end of 
each financial year they were required to repay to the Crown the full amount of any interest revenue. This is 
explained in Chapter 9. 
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Table 6.5 Financial management initiatives summary 
Financial management initiatives - next steps 
2.2 Output specifications: further improvements 
2.3 Separation of price and cost: contestable output pricing through competitive tendering. 
2.4 Controls over departments' access to resources (via efficiency dividends) 
2.4 Pricing rule for non-contestable pricing, price separated from cost, benchmarks  
2.10 Payment on delivery for amount of output delivered 
2.15 Use of purchase agreements (for benchmarking, prioritisation) 
2.15 ownership requirements  
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus (allow departments to retain if achieved advantages for 
Crown) 
Project 5 Incentives for chief executives: chief executives and assessment 
New Tailored monitoring: alignment of KRAs and SRAs 
New: Focus on management accounting information 
 
CAP project (1998- ) 
The State Services Commission-led CAP (Capability, Accountability and 
Performance) project resulted from concerns expressed by the State Services 
Commission about departments' reducing capability, and the desire of the Minister 
of State Services for a balanced appraisal of departments. It involved the State 
Services Commission as the lead agency, working jointly with the other two 
central agencies, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  
The Minister of State Services argued that the attention paid to purchase 
interests left an institutional gap in relation to the ownership interests: ministers 
did not understand their ownership responsibilities and lacked analytical support; 
departments were subjected to continuous extraction of efficiencies without any 
assessment of expected future demand or their capability requirements; and there 
was no "coherent ownership strategy for the core state, but a tendency to tinker at 
the margin without really knowing the implications for organisational capability" 
(T98C/2349, 17 July 1998, Treasury files; STR(99)153, 13 July 1999, FM/2/12/8, 
Treasury files; STR(99)M17/12, 14 July 1999; Treasury files; CAB(99)M20/15, 
23 August 1999; Treasury files). 
This development led to the debate over capability and the financial 
management system which prompted this research (see Chapter 1). The Treasury's 
contribution to the debate argued that the "basic public sector management 
framework is sound, but there need to be some major changes in the way that it is 
implemented". According to the Treasury, the perceived problems result from 
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misperceptions of the system and may be addressed by "adopting a more 
sophisticated or flexible view" of how the system should operate (Treasury, 30 
March 2000, "It's information Jim, but not as we want it!” p. 4, Treasury files). 
The State Services Commission, however, was dissatisfied with the system's 
operation. The introduction of output price reviews in 1996 brought the State 
Services Commissioner's role to review the machinery of government into the 
financial management system but, by late 1998, the Commission argued that the 
output price review process, although "used as a means for intensive assessment 
and remedy of critical ownership risks within departments", generally resulted in 
recommendations to reduce business scope, reduce low priority outputs, and 
divest physical assets to allow funding of investments in human resources and 
business infrastructure. The Commission argued that options presented to 
ministers should not necessarily require such reductions (State Services 
Commission, 11 December 1998, "Future Application of output pricing reviews: 
incentives, options and strategies" Treasury files).  
The State Services Commission also disagreed with the Treasury's view that 
the basic system is sound, arguing instead that the system provides only weak 
support for goal-setting; is focused on prior, overly-detailed specification of 
outputs; and focused on financial performance issues with little attention to 
whether non-financial performance, that is, effective delivery of outputs occurs. In 
summary, the system is over-wired because "changes have been built onto what is 
current, and very little has been taken down", thus obscuring and weakening "the 
essential architecture", and it may contain "deeply inherent flaws" (State Services 
Commission, 2000, "Response to the Treasury working paper of 30 March 2000: 
"It's information Jim, but not as we want it!” p. 3, State Services Commission 
files).27 Acknowledging a growing awareness that the Treasury's "starting point 
for analysis" differed from its own, the State Services Commission disputed the 
principal-agent model, which expects unprincipled behaviour in a system that 
should promote principled behaviour.  
                                                 
27 Stated examples of the flaws in the system included the focus on outputs, the preoccupation with prior 
specification of contracts and inattention to delivery, excessive detail and excessive focus on financial 
matters, and connotations of the language such as apparent indiscriminate use of cost, expense and price, 
with price, which "supports the 'free market' analogy" predominating. 
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The State Services Commission proposed re-interpreting the system, partly by 
changing the language to make it "comparatively neutral", and by realigning the 
biases currently favouring outputs and purchasing, quantifiable information, short-
term imperatives and documentation. Shifting the emphasis would unravel the 
owner-purchaser distinction, allowing its replacement with a plain English 
temporal one, viz. the current and capability distinctions proposed by the 
Controller and Auditor-General in 1999 (State Services Commission, 2000, 
"Response to the Treasury working paper of 30 March 2000: "It's information Jim, 
but not as we want it!” p. 9, State Services Commission files).  
The CAP project attempted to develop an alternative "high level analytical 
framework" within which "the interaction of [departmental] strategy, capability 
and performance" is the central concern. It seemed to focus on changing the 
documentary and reporting processes to reduce "the clutter and cost of the present 
accountability system" and, following the findings of a report it commissioned on 
capability problems and the budget system, the State Services Commission agreed 
that the “CAP project does not need to seek modifications to the Budget process”. 
This was because the budget system contains processes to inject capability, 
including “output price reviews, capital bids, or other capability-based resource 
bids” (STR(99)242, 4 October 1999, FM/2/12/8, Treasury files; State Services 
Commission, 29 February 2000, The ownership interests of ministers, and the 
State Services Commission's role, FM/2/12/8, Treasury files; State Services 
Commission, 7 December 2000, CAP Analytical Framework; State Services 
Commission files; Ferguson, 28 June 2001, "Capability problems and the budget 
system", State Services Commission files; State Services Commission, August 
2001, "State Services Commission view on capability problems and the budget 
system, State Services Commission files).  
Earlier differences between the two central agencies over the financial 
management system appear to have been reconciled. In late 2001, the chief 
executives of all three central agencies — the Treasury, the State Services 
Commission, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet — reassured 
the government that the public management system “as it stands today provides a 
reasonable platform to work from” for the government to achieve its objective of 
maintaining and strengthening the public sector (Advisory Group, 2001. p. 4, 10).    
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Value-for-money (1998- ) 
The Treasury's current incentives development also seems to have commenced 
in 1998 when the government devised a set of over-arching goals to which it 
sought to align its strategic results areas (SRAs). One of those SRAs related 
directly to the financial management system, aiming to "encourage the contestable 
supply of resources and services in areas of public sector responsibilities". This 
SRA required the development of principles to guide public sector decisions and 
open opportunities for private sector supply", and "pricing policies for public 
sector". The decision to encourage the contestable supply of services required the 
development of principles of competitive neutrality and the idea of price 
competition between sectors (T99C/305, 23 February 1999, Treasury files). 
When the government changed in late 1999, the Treasury outlined its 
involvement in projects, all of which were intended to improve value-for-money 
in the public sector. In this context, value-for-money was explained as a function 
of four key dimensions: efficient cost management focusing on least cost 
production; effective purchasing of outputs intended to achieve the government's 
aims; robust capability to continue producing the most effective outputs; and 
innovation through new outputs and new ways of delivering them (T99/61, 20 
December 1999, Treasury files). Within this value-for money theme the earlier 
criticism of the system was acknowledged: 
In our view the key issue is not whether the system needs another round of 
fundamental reform. We do not think it does. More progress is necessary, but will go 
further and faster if it builds on the solid foundation provided by the current system. 
The key issue is what needs to be done within the current framework to ensure sustained 
improvements in performance. (T99/61, 20 December 1999, p. 5, Treasury files).  
Ten projects were listed: a review of accountability documentation; a crown 
entity initiative; shared services/ outsourcing/ smart purchasing; E-government; 
Public Audit Bill; capability pilots (with the State Services Commission); 
competitive neutrality; efficiency and effectiveness initiative; budget process 
design; and a review of departmental incentives. The last five of those are 
considered here.  
The Treasury argued that notwithstanding acknowledged measurement 
difficulties, "maintaining capability is a core responsibility of every Chief 
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Executive. Capability is a function of management performance as much as it may 
also be a function of output prices and resourcing" (T99/61, 20 December 1999, p. 
7, Treasury files). 
Competitive neutrality, the efficiency and effectiveness initiative and budget 
process design may be viewed as part of the budgeting/purchasing process. The 
Treasury proposed re-orienting competitive neutrality towards value-for-money 
and explained the other two projects as initiatives intended to enhance value-for-
money. The budget process design would provide "incentives and opportunities 
for ministers to consider the value-for-money in the use of both existing and new 
resources". This would involve a limit on new resources through a counting 
framework, and collective review mechanisms designed into the budget process. 
The efficiency and effectiveness initiative seemed to represent the nature of the 
collective review mechanisms. This initiative sought to put "the onus of proof on 
departments rather than central agencies in resourcing disputes" and to develop 
techniques for "departments to better quantify and evaluate the value of the 
outputs they produce". Collaborative work between the Treasury and pilot 
departments was in process (T99/61, 20 December 1999, Treasury files). 
The Treasury acknowledged the need for alignment of the incentives designed 
into the financial management system with the system's "external objectives" and 
sought to refine the existing incentives (T99/61, 20 December 1999, Treasury 
files). This review project was eventually called the departmental incentives for 
good financial management project. The overview of this project explained that 
only the first phase of the 1989/90 incentives for departmental performance set of 
projects was ever implemented. Development stopped because "the quality of 
departmental output specification, pricing and monitoring of delivery never 
reached the standards contemplated by the general incentives model. 
Notwithstanding this, many departments still regard this, and particularly the lack 
of a surplus retention policy, as unfinished Treasury business" (p. 9). Lack of 
progress with surplus retention resulted from the difficulty of differentiating 
"between genuine efficiency gains and under-delivery or cost-shifting. There were 
also concerns that any surplus would tend to be put to low value uses" (p. 9). 
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The overview also explained that the range of rules which limit the amount and 
use of resources available to departments are intended to help the Crown protect 
its financial interests. Many of those rules are "relatively blunt instruments" and 
potentially dysfunctional (The Treasury, 30 June 2000, T2000/1361, p. 2). 
Examples of dysfunctional behaviour prompted by the rules included departments' 
tendencies to spend available resources at the end of the financial year, to hold 
more capital than necessary, and to over-recover costs from third parties (p. 5). 
That dysfunctional behaviour may be reduced by reconsidering the surplus 
retention policy, revising the capital charge, allowing departments to offset their 
capital charge with interest earned, increasing the use of multi-year 
appropriations, allowing some form of overdraft or early access to funds to 
resolve timing issues, and reconsidering the manner in which cost over- and 
under-recoveries operate. Work on this aspect of the departmental incentives 
project is ongoing. The surplus retention and interest proposal are similar to those 
of 1995: identification of a portion of reported operating surplus that may be 
retained subject to conditions on use; and a deduction from departments’ budget 
baselines of a normalised level of interest earnings, and subsequent adjustment of 
any difference between that normalised interest and the actual interest adjusted 
against the capital charge (Treasury, 11/00, "Better working capital management 
consultation document", Treasury files). Table 6.6 summarises the projects 
contained under the value-for-money theme, with the numbers referring to the 
numbers in the Table 6.1 summary of the Report on departmental incentives.  
Table 6.6 Value-for-money summary 
1.1Revision to capital charge 
1.3 Reconsideration of interest: use to offset capital charge 
2.8 Multi-year appropriations  
2.15 Development of earlier ownership requirements through cost effectiveness and capability 
dimensions 
4.2 Incentives to produce a surplus 
New Overdraft or early access to funds to address timing issues. 
New Cost over- and under-recoveries 
New Budget process design 
Chapter summary 
This chapter has outlined the contents of an ongoing series of incentives 
projects conducted either jointly by Treasury and the State Services Commission, 
with the involvement of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or 
separately by the Treasury or the State Services Commission. In the early stages 
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of the reforms the work was clearly joint, deriving from the jointly-commissioned 
Report on Departmental Incentives and leading to the projects encompassed under 
the incentives for departmental performance theme and the departmental 
management initiatives theme with the addition in the latter theme of some 
developments proposed by the Logan report. 
In 1993, the Treasury seemed to be working alone in seeking to adopt a “more 
sophisticated” approach to its work, particularly its analytical work and second 
opinion advice function. This analytical work was expected to result in negative 
reactions from departments and could, conceivably, be perceived as encroaching 
on the State Services Commission’s review function. The timing of this 
development, however, is interesting because it occurred when it became obvious 
that the electoral system would change, thus resulting in more loosely bound 
governments, and the unpopularity of the privatisation agenda pursued since 1984 
could no longer be ignored. 
The projects under the "financial management initiatives - next steps" and 
"efficiency and innovation" themes of 1994-1996 seemed to be largely 
concentrated within Treasury and seemed to be unannounced, even though the 
ownership monitoring and chief executive performance aspects of this work 
clearly traced into the State Services Commission’s review function and implied 
some joint work with the State Services Commission. At its commencement, the 
State Services Commission-led CAP project seemed opposed to the Treasury’s 
views about the soundness of the financial management system but, by late 2001 
had reversed that position, while the Treasury's value-for-money projects have 
proceeded on the basis that the system is basically sound. Today, these two central 
agencies seem agreed that the system is sound. 
Although when the government changed in 1990, the incentives projects were 
said to result from the desire of departmental managers for departments to be 
allowed to earn interest and retain   operating surpluses, (see Chapter 5), that 
aspect of the incentives projects is minor and as revealed in the latest value-for-
money project overview has never been developed. Instead the major focus of 
these ongoing incentives projects has been the development in the financial 
management system of a commercialised approach to departmental operations 
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and, in particular, the development of the idea of the Crown purchasing outputs 
from departments, with departments’ output costs determined on the basis of full 
costs including both depreciation and a capital charge. From 1994, that idea was 
taken to a lower level with the proposals for costing and benchmarking output 
components, and the idea that chief executives should make increased efforts to 
achieve efficiencies. As was evident from comments about departments 
encountering financial difficulties, the use of full costing and the treatment of 
output costs as if they are fully variable seems likely to have negative financial 
effects on departments at both the output purchase level and the output component 
level.  
The various reports of these projects indicate intentions but they are merely 
discussion and proposals. They have little or no effect unless traced through into 
the rules and procedures actually applied to departments and it is the actual rules 
and procedures developed that are the subject of the next three chapters.  
  
 
7 Expenditure reduction and budget baselines 
The Treasury's briefing to the incoming government of 1990 had recommended 
two processes to reduce expenditure, both of which were used for the 1991/92  
budget process. The first drew on more traditional budget allocation mechanisms 
to control the amount of resources available, while the second used the 
information derived from the new financial management system, in particular the 
information about outputs, to decide how those resources should be used 
(Treasury, 1990, p. 80 - 81). This chapter focuses on the first process, budget 
allocation, beginning with the 1991/92 budget and the government’s fiscal 
strategy. It then explains the development of that process into a budget baselines 
management regime, and the manner in which macro-level fiscal strategy has 
since been aligned with that regime. Examples drawn from the Department of 
Statistics, the Inland Revenue Department and the Department of Corrections 
illustrate particular points. 
Fiscal strategy 1991/92: expenditure reductions 
Shortly before the 1990 general elections, departments were instructed to 
prepare forecasts for the 1991/92 financial year on the basis of the true costs of 
their services. The result of this exercise was forecasts which projected massive 
cost increases, and a “loaded gun” passed to the incoming Minister of Finance of 
the new National government. The extent to which the budget was re-balanced 
with reductions to social services was at least partly concealed by the size of the 
budget cuts subsequently made (Interview with former chief executive, June 
2001).  
For the 1991/92 budget, the CSC sought expenditure reductions of 
approximately $2 billion in relation to those earlier budget projections, and 
required the ECC to identify expenditure-reducing changes in policies, structures 
and outputs and, in consultation with vote Ministers, to review their use of 
resources and scrutinise departmental outputs to ensure value-for-money. The 
ECC's first step was to use budget allocation mechanisms to set the amount of 
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resources available for departmental operations. It devised a set of relatively 
simple rules with which departments were required to comply.  
Departments were required to begin with the budget projections, but to re-set 
all non-demand-driven outputs at "the lower of their 1990/91 appropriation or 
estimated outturn"; to update demand-driven outputs noting that they would be 
subject to close scrutiny in the review of budgets; to do the same for payments on 
behalf of the Crown (POBOCs), except where the level of payment had been pre-
determined by contract or by government decision; to assume no capital injections 
unless specified exceptional circumstances applied; and to fund any new policy 
through budget reallocations. After these adjustments, the total amount remaining 
set the upper limit of the amounts that each department could spend on the 
production of outputs, and this upper limit was known as a baseline. With the 
introduction of the capital charge regime, the baselines were increased for the 
capital charge content in outputs supplied to the Crown (November 1990, Terms 
of Reference of Committees, Richardson files 1171; CSC(91)3, 12 February 1991, 
Terms of Reference, Cabinet Strategy Committee, Richardson files 989; 
CAB(90)M8/12, 4 March 1991, Richardson files 867; ECC(91)M15/9,10, 16 
April 1991, Richardson files 1190; CSC (91) M 10/1, 2, 3, 17 April 1991, 
Richardson files 988). After the establishment of these baselines, the expenditure 
reduction process changed to adopt the purchasing focus which is considered in 
more depth Chapter 8.  
Locking-in the expenditure reductions 
The procedures adopted for the 1991/92 budget process were judged a success, 
especially given the involvement and commitment of senior ministers in the 
process, and the comprehensiveness of the budgeting process which dealt with all 
votes. The Treasury recommended that continuation of that approach into future 
budget rounds would lock-in the reduced expenditure (ECC(91)212, 15 August 
1991, Richardson files 999). A further attraction of the budget baselines process 
was that it would reverse previous biases against expenditure restraint by forcing 
departments and their responsible Ministers, when seeking additional resources, to 
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the budget baseline. Not only would a tough 
line towards arguments for baseline increases prevent expenditure creep, the use 
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of baselines would allow across-the-board savings to be made by extracting 
efficiency dividends from those baselines (T91/3479, 8 August 1991, Richardson 
files 719).  
For the 1992/93 budgeting round, the ECC required departments’ 1992/93 
expenditure forecasts that had been produced as part of the 1991/92 budget 
process to be assessed, modified as necessary by the Officials Committee on 
Expenditure Control (OCEC), and to have two percent deducted as an efficiency 
dividend. Any department unable to achieve the required efficiencies was required 
to provide detailed output specifications for review by the OCEC and the ECC, 
and those committees would recommend savings options to the vote minister 
concerned (CAB(92)M23/12, 15 June 1992, Richardson files 840; Treasury, 
Unreferenced letter to the Minister of Finance, 30 November 1992, Richardson 
files 305).  
The budget baselines were then extended to cover three years, the budget year 
and the following two years, and thus to create a rolling budget baselines system. 
The baselines were subjected to cuts of between 1% and 5% each year, with the 
cuts continuing through to the 1995/96 year following which nominal dollar 
budget baselines were maintained. Even nominal dollar baselines, however, 
achieved savings because they forced "real saving in departmental spending each 
year equivalent to the rate of inflation" (Barnes and Leith, 2000, p. 2; see also 
ECC(91)M64/3, 11 December 1991, Richardson files 1024; Treasury BR No: 9, 9 
October 1992, Richardson files 305; CAB(92)M51/21; 14 December 1992, 
Richardson files 306; Treasury, FM/2/19, 6 July 1995).  
In effect, the budget baselines gradually reduced departmental expenditure, 
forcing a continued process of re-allocating expenditure to stated priorities 
(Treasury, FM/2/19, 6 July 1995) (Box 7.1). According to Cullen (2001) after the 
change of government in late 1999 the new government committed significant 
amounts to restore some baselines.  
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Box 7.1 Expenditure reductions and the growth and employment strategy 
The Department of Statistics is required under the Statistics Act 1975 to produce a range of 
statistical information "required by the Executive Government of New Zealand, Government 
departments, local authorities and businesses for the purpose of making policy decisions and to 
facilitate the appreciation of economic, social, demographic, and other matters of interest to the 
said Government, government departments, local authorities, businesses and to the general 
public." In 1989, a machinery-of-government review of the department concluded that the role and 
function of the department was appropriate and that restructuring was unnecessary. Instead, 
imposition of financial and management discipline was proposed by requiring the department to 
earn third party revenue sufficient to cover 25 percent of its operating costs. 
For the 1991/92 budget process, the first using the new financial management system, after 
determination of the department's budget baseline, attention turned to the use to be made of the 
budget baseline resources. Deregulation of the economy had affected, and in some cases removed, 
data sources for the department and the need for improvements in official statistics was recognised 
as was the increased costs involved. Treasury advice to the Minister of Finance concentrated on 
macro-economic statistics, the need to improve them, and the resource implications for the 
department. Treasury argued that the improvements could be made without additional taxpayer 
funding by requiring the department to increase its charging for other existing services and to 
make savings by reducing the costs of statistical series other than macroeconomic statistics and 
through productivity improvements.  
Following ECC review, savings were made by reducing purchase prices and reducing or 
ceasing altogether the production of some statistical series: the inter-industry study changed from 
five yearly to seven yearly and the agricultural census from yearly to biennially; the quarterly hire 
purchase survey, collection of justice statistics, the monthly retail trade and overseas orders 
surveys were all discontinued; the size of the household labour force survey was reduced; and the 
funding of a Maori statistics unit rejected. For the 1991/92 financial year, these changes saved 
$700,000, with $640,000 of that re-allocated to improve the macroeconomic statistics. 
Commenting on the discontinued justice statistics, the Government Statistician argued that, "In 
most other developed countries, such statistics are viewed as fundamental social indicators, 
essential for monitoring the health of the nation and the performance of the justice system"  
(T91/819 12 February 1991, Richardson files 640; ECC(91)M27/7, 22 May 1991, Richardson files 
1189; T91/2306, 2 June 1991, Richardson files 688; ECC(91)156, 4 June 1991, Richardson files 
1199; ECC(91)M32/4, 5 June 1991, Richardson files 1188; CAB(91)M23/28n, 17 June 1991, 
Richardson files 869; CAB(91)M24/5x, 24 June 1991, Richardson files 870; Report of the 
Government Statistician for the years ended 30 June 1990, 1991, 1992).  
Budget baselines guidelines 
The budget baselines rules devised in 1991/92 and 1992/93 eventually were 
formalised in guidelines which have been revised regularly. These guidelines 
describe the objectives of the baseline management regime and the requirements 
for scrutiny of baseline changes, particularly for baseline increases (BR No 62, 20 
May 1992, Richardson files 295, p. 3; CAB(92)M22/8a, 8 June 1992, Richardson 
files 840; CAB(92)M40/10, 5 October 1992, Richardson files 843; ECC(93)224, 
17 May 1993, Richardson files 972; CAB(93)336, 21 May 1993, Richardson files 
890; CO(93)11, 27 August 1993, Richardson files 1005).  
The budget baselines management regime aims to "ensure that each vote and 
department remain within the baselines", and to minimise expenditure proposals 
outside the main budgeting process. By providing a fast-track minimal scrutiny or 
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no scrutiny approval process for those budgets which comply with the baselines, 
the budget baselines regime encourages departments and vote ministers to refrain 
from requesting additional resources. Early versions of the guidelines for the 
budget baselines management regime stated that the baselines allow: 
Vote Ministers, advised by Chief Executives, to reprioritise within the baselines 
approved in each Budget baseline update (consistent with the overall strategy adopted 
for that Budget), on the basis that this reprioritisation is consistent with the 
Government's broad policy objectives and will not run down the Crown's assets or 
increase its liabilities in any one year or over time. (CAB(94)M44/11, 14 November 
1994, Treasury files; CO(95)10, 15 September 1995, Treasury files) (emphasis added).  
Later versions of the guidelines reveal some changes to the stated objectives. In 
1998, the prohibition on running down assets or increasing liabilities when 
reprioritising expenditure was replaced with a requirement that repriorisation 
"provide better value for money"  (CO(98)17, 24 November 1998). More recently, 
following the 1999 change in government, the budget baselines guidelines are less 
explicit about the objectives, commenting that the guidelines are "a critical part of 
the Government's overall financial management framework” (CO(00)12, 23 
November 2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). The baselines ease 
decision-making by providing a common process and allowing Cabinet to 
prioritise. They have also been integrated with fiscal policy to assist with 
maintenance of overall fiscal control.  
Integration of fiscal targets with budget baselines  
By 1994, after three years of this budget baselines regime, pressure from 
departments for increased resources was evident (Treasury, 30 November 1994, 
Surplus retention, FM/2/19, Treasury files). The Fiscal Responsibility Act and the 
idea of fiscal targets provided scope to apply top-down counter-pressure to that 
growing bottom-up pressure for expenditure increases (Treasury, 1996, p. 128). 
The Treasury proposed a three-year budget strategy, with three-year plans for key 
indicators such as overall spending, revenue and operating balance, but achieving 
the required counter pressure required some means of integrating the fiscal targets 
with the budget process. A "system of three-year fiscal limits, with associated 
rules for counting to these limits" was devised to do this (Barnes and Leith, 2000).  
The fiscal limits, or provisions, are determined by beginning with the fiscal 
targets adopted, in this case operating expenses and debt expressed as a 
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percentage of GDP. Applying the desired percentages against the projections for 
GDP allows dollar amounts to be estimated for maximum total operating expenses 
and total debt. The amounts available for new expenses and debt may then be 
deduced. This results in provisions, one of which is for new expenses and is 
known as the expense provision, while the other is for new debt, and is known as 
a capital provision. These provisions cap the amount of money available for the 
three-year term of government. The provisions were recommended to 1999's 
incoming government as a "tool for managing individual decisions so that they 
match aggregate intentions" (TC1997/2, 14 February 1997, BU/2/4/1, Treasury 
files; Treasury, 1999, p. 22-23).  
Associated with the provisions is a set of rules intended to link the provisions 
with the government’s budgeting decisions. This set of rules is known as the 
counting framework, and it tracks the expenses and capital expenditure balances 
remaining available. More recently, the budget baselines guidelines have been 
revised to show how the counting framework rules translate into the budget 
baselines guidelines. The budget baseline guidelines, however, remain based on 
earlier principles. Although the provisions are derived from GDP projections, and 
they therefore change with changes in inflation, departments' budget baselines 
remain fixed and nominal.  In addition, although the counting framework allows 
some expense and capital expenditure items without them counting against the 
provisions, allowing such items to adjust a department’s baseline does not mean 
that the department will receive additional resources. Instead, the principle is that 
departments should be forced to "bid for any compensation for the loss in real 
resources" because that will allow any bid for compensation to be scrutinised in 
light of current and new budget initiatives (Barnes and Leith, 2000, p. 4). 
Although the fast track minimal scrutiny process for budgeting encourages 
compliance with the budget baselines regime, that regime is also intended to force 
full reviews when departments can no longer cope with the resources provided.  
Counting framework rules for operating expenses 
The counting framework rules for operating expenses update the expense 
provision "for all changes to the operating balance resulting from Government 
decisions to introduce a new policy initiative or change the fiscal cost of existing 
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initiatives". Those rules currently ignore "forecasting changes, the recognition of 
existing liabilities, and costs arising from natural disasters and civil emergencies" 
or for changes in the capital charge, expense transfers that are fiscally neutral 
between periods, or changes in carrying values, including gains or losses on sale 
of assets (CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; TC2000/2, 24 February 2000, Treasury 
files; CO(00)12, 23 November 2000; Barnes and Leith, 2000, p. 12).  
The distinction between policy changes (which do count) and forecasting 
changes (which do not count) is acknowledged as unclear (Barnes and Leith, 
2000, p. 12). The explanation of these changes is that forecasting changes arise 
from government policies which require an automatic change in funding in 
response to changes in the general environment. Examples given of forecasting 
changes include changes in debt servicing costs when interest rates change or 
changes in the payment of benefits indexed to the consumers' price index (CPI). 
They involve no change in the policy itself and Cabinet approval is merely a 
rubber-stamping exercise. In effect, the manner in which a policy is stated would 
determine whether a change in expenses is a policy change or a forecasting 
change. For example, a policy decision to accept costs of a particular dollar 
amount would mean that acceptance of any cost changes amounts to a policy 
change, while a policy decision to accept costs determined in accordance with a 
particular formula or index would mean that any cost changes are forecasting 
changes. 
The commentary on the recognition of existing liabilities suggests that the 
existence of these liabilities may have been acknowledged, perhaps in the 
statement of commitments or the statement of contingent liabilities, but that they 
had not been recognised in the financial reports as liabilities. The recognition 
point for liabilities is, therefore, the key and any liabilities incurred, but which do 
not have to be recognised immediately, do not count against the provisions. 
The commentary on changes in carrying values states that the only changes in 
carrying values that count are those that result from a specific government 
decision, such as a decision to introduce competition and reduce prices. All other 
changes in carrying values, including revaluations and gains or losses on sale of 
assets, do not count because "they are a direct function of the carrying value, 
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which could vary substantially depending upon factors such as accounting 
policies, revaluation policies and timing of cyclical revaluations. Accordingly, the 
gain or loss may be considered subjective (and potentially manipulable)".28  
The focus of attention in this counting framework is on what may be controlled 
in the short-term, while accepting that "the wider fiscal balance will be influenced 
by cyclical variations and valuation changes" (Barnes and Leith, 2000, p. 12). 
The budget baselines guidelines classify proposed baseline changes into 
technical changes that do not count against the fiscal provisions and therefore 
require only minimal scrutiny, and substantive proposals that do count against the 
fiscal provisions or have policy implications and therefore require close scrutiny 
and must jump the high hurdle of a separate spending initiatives process. As noted 
above, however, the budget baselines guidelines remain based on earlier 
principles that departments should not automatically receive compensation for any 
losses in real resources, but should be forced to bid in order to recover such losses 
(Barnes and Leith, 2000; CAB(91)1129, 13 December 1991, Richardson files 
876; ECC(91)360, 10 December 1991, Richardson files 876; CAB(96)M46/17; 
CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars).  
Budget baseline changes for which scrutiny may be minimised 
The budget baselines guidelines identify a variety of technical changes which 
"generally result in no additional resources being required and, in particular, do 
not reduce resources available within the fiscal provisions". Provided these 
technical changes do not count against the provisions, raise no significant policy 
issues and involve no transfers between different types of output class (such as 
between departmental and non-departmental outputs), then the baseline changes 
may be approved by the relevant vote Minister and the Minister of Finance if they 
agree on those changes. These technical changes, which change the baseline but 
not the amount of money provided to a department, consist of expense and/or 
                                                 
28 It seems that increased depreciation expense following revaluations does "count" even though the amount of 
depreciation reported is a "direct function of the carrying value" which is well known for varying 
"substantially depending upon factors such as accounting policies, revaluation policies and timing of cyclical 
revaluations".  
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capital transfers, fiscally neutral adjustments, forecasting changes, recognition of 
existing Crown liabilities, return of savings to the Crown (which may increase the 
resources available within the provisions), and technical accounting adjustments. 
Expense and/or capital transfers 
Expense and/or capital transfers arise when the delivery of outputs or capital 
projects either cannot be achieved within the timeframe of the appropriations, or 
when the vote minister decides to defer the expenditure concerned. The resources 
may be transferred from the current financial year to the next financial year "with 
no change in the output purchased, or the fiscal provisions." Initially, these 
transfers did not extend to bringing forward projected expense or capital items 
from future years, and the current wording still implies that this is the case.29 
Expense or capital transfers are not used to carry forward under-expenditure. They 
apply either under circumstances beyond the department's control or following a 
vote minister's decision (CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; CO(00)12, 23 November 
2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). 
Fiscally neutral adjustments 
Fiscally neutral adjustments involve a "reallocation of resources within a single 
financial year with no impact on the fiscal provisions." They are fiscally neutral 
because the adjustments must have "no overall impact on the Crown's accrual 
operating balance, Crown balance (net worth) or net cashflows from operating and 
investing". Fiscally neutral adjustments may be made either within a department's 
baseline, between departments, or between departments and the Crown.  
The major focus of adjustments within a baseline relates to the concept of a 
Minister as a purchaser of outputs which implies some freedom for the Minister to 
decide what to purchase. The hierarchical arrangement of Cabinet sub-committees 
means that just a few senior ministers determine the total amount of a budget 
baseline, a decision over which particular vote ministers may have little or no 
influence. The vote minister, however, may influence decisions on the use of 
150 Expenditure reduction and budget baselines Chapter 7 
 
 
 
resources available. Ministers' reprioritisation decisions must be consistent with 
the government's policy objectives, but a minister may choose to stop purchasing 
lower priority outputs and purchase instead higher priority outputs consistent with 
the government's strategy. 
Another form of adjustment within a department's baseline relates to the 
revenue expected from selling outputs to third parties. Departments must include 
in their budget baselines an amount for any such revenue. If third party revenue is 
less than budgeted, departments must make fiscally neutral adjustments to ensure 
that financial results fall within the budget baseline. In other words the department 
must reduce expenses to offset the revenue shortfall (CAB(92)M40/10, 5 October 
1992, Richardson files 843; CO(92)16, 23 October 1992, Richardson files 1005; 
CO(93)11, 27 August 1993, Richardson files 1005; CO(95)10, 15 September 
1995, Treasury files). The Department of Statistics' experience reveals that 
although these adjustments are fiscally neutral for the Crown, they may have 
significant financial implications for a department (Box 7.2).  
Box 7.2 Fiscally neutral adjustments and third party revenue 
The 1989 machinery of government review of the Department of Statistics concluded that the 
department did not require restructuring but that financial and management discipline would be 
imposed by requiring the department to generate from third parties sufficient revenue to cover 25 
per cent of its gross expenses. The 1991/92 budget process increased the direct funding for macro-
economic statistics but discontinued the direct funding of some statistics used by other government 
departments. The departments concerned were expected to purchase the statistics they required 
from within their own baselines, but those other departments were also under pressure to reduce 
costs.  
The Department of Statistics restructured and developed an information marketing unit. 
Businesses were "receptive to the concept of increasing their use of statistical information" but the 
department encountered increased staffing difficulties as staff moved to higher paid positions 
mainly in other, less financially-constrained government departments. Delivery "delays for 
business datasets resulted in as many as one in four customer orders being cancelled." The 
department engaged in several interdepartmental initiatives to improve or expand the range of 
official statistics but failed to generate sufficient third party revenue to meet the revenue targets 
and was forced to make offsetting expense savings.  
From 1993, the third party revenue targets were reduced following Treasury acknowledgment 
that those targets were "arbitrary, being set without market analysis and any actual experience", 
but the budget baseline remained unchanged and the department was still required to make 
offsetting expense reductions to stay within that baseline. In 1991/92 it saved $2.5 million by 
reducing expenditure on the 5-yearly population census statistics but the cost-cutting measures 
also affected the quality of outputs and impaired the department's ability to "maintain the statistical 
systems". It received capital injections as partial compensation for that revenue shortfall because 
                                                                                                                                     
29 Treasury advise that expenditure for future years may now be brought into the current year under some 
circumstances (email, Treasury to S. Newberry, 2 November 2001). 
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Treasury advised that it was "inappropriate for shortfalls in third party revenue to impact on 
outputs supplied to the Crown". 
 Year  Revenue shortfall  Capital injection 
 1991/92  $2.725 million   Nil 
 1992/93  $2.736 million   $2 million 
1993/94  $2.592 million   $2.592 million 
 1994/95  $2.908 million    $1.573 million 
1995/96  $1.193 million   Nil 
In 1996 the Government Statistician reported that, "Despite continued efforts, Statistics New 
Zealand has been unable to achieve the very high third-party revenue targets set by government. 
This has impacted on working capital, and requires periodic injections of capital to adjust for the 
resultant deficits. The department is struggling with the current revenue to continue producing 
existing core official statistics. Efforts to find acceptable output cuts and reductions have now 
reached a point where there would be significant impact for major policy advisory agencies". In 
1997, following the first output price review, a "major change" noted was the "recognition that 
third-party revenue targets had been unrealistic and were creating perverse incentives for the 
department". (T91/819, 12 February, 1991, Richardson files 640; T91/1223, 28 March 1991, 
Richardson files 652; T91/2306, 2 June 1991, Richardson files 688; ECC(92)M16/8, 5 May 1992, 
Richardson files 1101; CAB(92)M21/10aa, 2 June 1992, Richardson files 840; T92/3683, 3 
December 1992, Richardson files 804; ; T92/3762, 10 December 1992, Richardson files 805; 
ECC(92)432, 14 December 1992, Richardson files 955; ECC(93)M2/2, 16 February 1993, 
Richardson files 912; CAB(93)M5/6b, 22 February 1993, Richardson files 910; Report of the 
Government Statistician for the years ended 30 June 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996,1997).  
Fiscally neutral adjustments between a department and the Crown involve off-
setting arrangements and currently the most prominent of these relates to the 
capital charge regime. On implementation of that regime in 1991, departments 
received increased output appropriations and money to compensate for their 
increased expense in relation to the outputs provided to the Crown (see also 
Chapter 6 and the senior managers’ review of the Report on Departmental 
Incentives).30 They were advised that irrespective of changes in the capital charge 
rate, "the appropriation would not be reduced other than to reflect changes in the 
quantity or quality of outputs, or to reflect efficiency gains in their production." 
An increased capital charge would force departments to reduce other costs and 
therefore represent cost savings to the Crown, while a decreased capital charge 
implied either that departments would report an operating surplus, or that they 
could increase other output expenses while remaining within their output 
appropriations. A decreased capital charge therefore represented potentially 
                                                 
30 They received no compensation in relation to third party outputs. They were required either to increase their 
prices to the third parties or to absorb the increased expense but prohibited from offsetting losses from 
competitive supplies against other gains (CAB(91)M20/8, 27 May 1991, Richardson files 868). This limited 
absorption of the expense to reductions in taxpayers' funds, and the possibility of recovering the loss by 
charging higher prices on competitive outputs in future years (T92/2618, 25 August 1992, Richardson files 
794; STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, Richardson files 963). 
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increased costs to the Crown and after the first year of operation, a recommended 
reduction in the capital charge was declined (STA(91)68, 21 May 1991, 
Richardson files 1033; STA(91)M15/6, 22 May 1991, Richardson files 988; 
CAB(91)M20/8, 27 May 1991, p. 1, Richardson files 868; TC1991/4, 7 June 
1991, p. 3, Richardson files; STA(91)172, 1 October 1991, Richardson files 1036; 
STA(91)M33/10, 2 October 1991, Richardson files 934; T92/520, 21 February 
1992, Richardson files 809; T92/611, 28 February 1992, Richardson files 809; 
Treasury, 28 February 1992, FM2/2, Treasury files; STA(92)35, 10 March 1992, 
Richardson files 958; CAB(92)M10/10, 23 March 1992, Richardson files 837; 
Correspondence 8 May, 1992, 27 May 1992, Treasury files; T92/2618, 25 August 
1992, Richardson files 794; STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, Richardson files 
963; CAB(92)M38/7f, 21 September 1992, Richardson files 843). 
The following year, interest rates on which the capital charge is based had 
fallen further. The proposed reduction to the capital charge implied increased 
costs for the Crown of $205 million, and the previously-announced policy that 
appropriations would not change to offset changes in the capital charge rate was 
reversed because the windfall gain to departments was an "inappropriate incentive 
to managers". Following advice that the government should not be exposed to 
such a financial risk, the new policy adopted was that "revenue Crown paid to 
departments will be increased or decreased consistent with increases or decreases 
in capital charge rates." Changes in the capital charge were, therefore, brought 
within the scope of fiscally neutral adjustments (CAB(92)M43/12, 27 October 
1992, Richardson files 874; The Treasury, T92/3467, 13 November 1992, 
Richardson files 802; ECC(92)451, 14 December 1992, Richardson files 955; 
ECC(92)M55/13 15 December 1992, Richardson files 956; CAB(92)M52/36, 21 
December 1992, Richardson files 875; CAB(94)M44/11, 14 November 1994, 
Treasury files). 
The policy for changes in the capital charge is about to change again 
(EXG(00)M20/1, 13 December 2000, Treasury files; CAB(00)M42/11, 18 
December 2000, Treasury files; TC2000/16, 21 December 2000, Treasury files). 
From 2002/03 onwards (TC2000/16, 21 December 2000, p. 2, Treasury files): 
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for most departments, the presumption will be that baselines will not change as a 
result of changes in the capital charge but, if warranted, the department or Treasury can 
seek a baseline change through the normal budget process; and  
For a small number of capital-intensive departments meeting specified criteria, 
Treasury will support an automatic baseline change to reflect future changes in capital 
charge payable (emphasis in original). 
As was evident from the initial policy, if a department's baseline is not adjusted 
to offset any change in the capital charge, then the change in the charge is not 
fiscally neutral. An increase in the charge represents cost increases to departments 
and savings to the Crown, while a decrease represents the reverse. The procedures 
proposed to obtain a baseline change differ for the capital-intensive departments 
as compared with the others. Consistent with the intent of the budget baselines 
regime, that departments must bid for any increase in real resources and undergo 
close scrutiny, the capital-intensive departments must satisfy Treasury that their 
use of inputs in the production of outputs is efficient, and this will require 
evidence that the departments are conducting "an active and well-managed 
programme of identifying and selling surplus assets and ongoing self assessment 
of the level of fixed assets required" (p. 8). The other departments must make a 
case to ministers demonstrating their efficient use of inputs and, as part of this 
process Treasury will assess: how their existing baselines were set; whether 
offsetting savings may be made elsewhere; whether the assets underlying the 
capital charge are integral to the department and could be rationalised; evidence 
that the department has implemented an asset management and review plan; 
whether less expensive alternative options such as leasing are available; and 
whether the baseline is reasonable against price benchmarks. Further, any baseline 
changes sought will be considered as part of the collective initiatives phase of 
budgeting and will therefore be "assessed against other competing priorities 
within the department and the Government as a whole" (p. 9). Clearly, changes in 
the capital charge will no longer necessarily be fiscally neutral and will fall into 
the category of change requiring close scrutiny should departments seek a baseline 
change and resources to compensate.31 The type of scrutiny involved is covered in 
                                                 
31 One of the justifications for undertaking the latest changes to the capital charge regime was that departments 
had incentives to hold more capital than necessary (Treasury, 30 June 2000, T2000/1361, Treasury files). 
The possibility of adjusting appropriations for rate decreases but not for rate increases was considered 
earlier. Possible rationalisations for such a policy included, “Appropriations should be reduced when the rate 
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more detail in the explanation of the output price review process in Chapter 9 
(CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, dpmc web-site; TC2000/16, 21 December 2000, 
Treasury files). 
Forecasting changes 
The changing policy towards the capital charge regime as outlined above 
illustrates the lack of clarity noted earlier about the distinction between 
forecasting and policy changes. The implications of the pending changes to the 
capital charge regime are that a reduction in the capital charge rate indicates a 
forecasting change while an increase in the rate indicates a policy change. If a 
budget baseline change results from a forecasting change then it is viewed as a 
technical adjustment (CO(00)12, 23 November 2000; Barnes and Leith, 2000).  
The budget baselines management regime began with tightly defined 
requirements for acceptable changes. Unavoidable and uncontrollable expenses 
were defined as those costs that could not be contained within the total 
appropriations by altering the "quality, quantity or cost of the outputs in the 
current year" (CO(92)16, 23 October 1992, Richardson files 1005). These 
unavoidable and uncontrollable expenses included the costs arising from natural 
disasters and civil emergencies, but later they were extended to include expenses 
linked to particular indices such as the consumer price index, interest rates or 
foreign exchange movements where exposure is unavoidable, and became known 
as forecasting changes. Although the budget baselines may be changed to 
incorporate forecasting changes, close examination is required to consider 
whether the costs involved may be accommodated, even partially, by making 
savings elsewhere ECC(92)M55/13, 15 December 1992, Richardson files 956; 
CO(95(10), 15 September 1995, Treasury files; CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; 
CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/).  
                                                                                                                                     
falls to avoid ‘windfall gains’ to departments. However, if there is a rate increase then a relative price change 
has occurred, ie capital is more expensive relative to other inputs. In this event appropriations should not be 
increased, to induce a cash ‘crisis’ which provides the incentive for departments to substitute away from 
capital” (Treasury, 1992?, Lally: Adjusting appropriations for capital charge rate changes, p. 3).    
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Recognition of existing Crown liabilities 
Existing Crown liabilities must be recognised because "the Crown has no 
option but to recognise its liabilities when they arise" (emphasis in original). 
These pre-existing liabilities were initially included in the category of unavoidable 
and uncontrollable expenses which are now viewed as forecasting changes. 
Although the need to recognise the liabilities is noted, meeting those obligations 
will not necessarily result in a baseline increase or a resource increase because 
Ministers must first consider whether offsetting savings may be found in other 
areas of the vote concerned (CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, 
www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). 
Return of savings to the Crown 
The budget baselines guidelines try to restrict the budget process to one time of 
the year but savings may be returned to the Crown at any time. These savings, 
such as the return of a portion of a department's capital, count positively against 
the provisions (CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, 
www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). 
Technical accounting adjustments 
The idea of technical accounting adjustments was foreshadowed following the 
speedy implementation of accrual accounting, when departments were encouraged 
to adjust their opening balance sheets if, for example, initial asset valuations were 
subsequently found incorrect. These valuation adjustments required baseline 
adjustments and appropriations but they had no current year cash effect. Although, 
since the 1993/94 financial year these particular adjustments have been excluded 
from the list of acceptable baseline adjustments, the idea seems to have given rise 
to technical accounting adjustments which have no current year cash impact, such 
as downward revaluations and accounting policy changes. Departments are 
required if possible to contain the amount of the adjustment within existing 
appropriations by reducing other costs. If an appropriation is necessary, it is 
tagged to ensure that it cannot be used for other output expenses if the full amount 
of the appropriation is not taken up. Such an appropriation does not result in any 
increase in money provided to a department, that is, there is no increase in a 
156 Expenditure reduction and budget baselines Chapter 7 
 
 
 
department's revenue Crown (CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; CO(00)12, 23 
November 2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars).  
Appropriations for other expenses 
Until 1995, and the issue of a Treasury circular which limited the category, 
departments reported a number of costs as other expenses including all losses on 
realisation of assets. Now, following that circular, other expenses include 
restructuring expenses, losses arising from the write-down or sale of surplus assets 
when those assets are not related to current production, and extraordinary items as 
defined by GAAP (Treasury, T91/4462, 8 October 1991, Richardson files 750; 
TC1995/8, 9 August 1995).  
Other expenses may involve cash payments, for example redundancy 
payments, or they may be accrual adjustments, for example the write down of 
assets purchased earlier. Shortly after the establishment of the other expenses 
appropriation, specific funding was sometimes provided to departments but, from 
1994, when rules for capital contributions were devised and added to the budget 
baselines guidelines, the policy adopted for other expense appropriations was that 
departments must use their own resources to cover other expenses. A department 
seeking specific funding for an other expense must, in addition to the other 
expense appropriation, apply for a capital contribution appropriation which will be 
assessed on the criteria normally applied to capital contribution requests 
(TC1995/8, 9 August 1995). Restructuring expenses and the recognition of pre-
existing liabilities are significant examples of other expenses, and provide some 
idea of the costs departments must absorb  (Table 7.1).  
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Table 7.1  Other expenses 
Year Nature of other expenses  Department of Statistics 
$'000 
IRD
$'000
1993 Restructuring 1,150 
1994 Implement taxpayer audit review  4,585
 Organisational review  1,424
1995 Revaluation losses 187 
 Establish retirement provision 428 
 Implement taxpayer audit review  1,480
 Organisational review  3,943
1996 Implement taxpayer audit review  557
 Organisational review  42,381
1999 Discounted net present cost of long 
service leave 
1,979 590
 Total 3,744 54,960
Budget baseline changes involving close scrutiny 
The fast-track minimal scrutiny process applies provided no funding increase is 
sought, and allows ongoing funding amounts without reconsideration of the need 
for the particular outputs. The fast-track process has built into it resource-eroding 
tendencies because baseline increases approved do not carry with them increased 
funding, and the extent of that resource erosion is apparent from the fiscally 
neutral adjustments required of the Department of Statistics and the other 
expenses incurred by both the Department of Statistics and the Inland Revenue 
Department. Clearly, the intention of this fast track process is not only to 
encourage departments to accept gradual resource erosion (described by one 
departmental interviewee as creeping death), but also eventually to force 
departments to bid for increased resources simply to continue current operations 
and a bid for a baseline increase will require close scrutiny. Budget baseline 
changes may also count against the provisions or imply significant policy change 
and these, too would require close scrutiny.  
The bidding process provides an opportunity to scrutinise the outputs produced 
within the baseline and to reassess those outputs against the government's strategy 
and new budget initiatives (Barnes and Leith, 2000; Cullen, 2001). Since 1996, 
two processes have been established to review baselines. The first process was an 
output price review which could be prompted either by the Treasury or a vote 
minister, or by a department's chief executive who believes that the department 
can no longer manage the cost of output production from within the department's 
budget baseline. For an output price review (OPR), the Cabinet decides on the 
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scope, timing, and any resource issues related to the review (CO(98)17, 24 
November 1998; CO(00) 12, 23 November 2000, 
www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). The second process, endorsed by Cabinet 
in 2000, is a value-for-money (VFM) review which examines the existing 
spending and any opportunities available to re-prioritise that spending. 
Departments conduct a VFM review, while the Treasury provides a second 
opinion. Both forms of review scrutinise the outputs produced, consider the need 
for continued production of those outputs, and consider whether departments 
should produce those outputs. A similar process, but on a smaller scale, applies to 
new or expanded activities requiring increased funding. Ministers and 
departments must submit a proposal which explains the financial effects of the 
proposal, identifies the output reductions to be made if the proposal were to be 
funded from within the baseline, and be justified "in terms of the guidelines for 
changes to baselines". The proposal is assessed by the Minister and Treasury. 
These baseline reviews will be considered in more detail when considering the 
processes of monitoring and review in Chapter 9 (CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; 
CO(00)12, 23 November 2000, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). 
Counting framework rules for the capital provision 
The capital provision is derived from a calculation which determines the 
amount available for new debt. According to the Treasury, at a macroeconomic 
level, the “level of new capital investment does impact on the Government’s 
borrowing programme. It also provides signals of future Government spending 
intentions and the likely future role of the Government in the economy” 
(T99C/213, 11 February 1999, Treasury files, p. 3). At a public sector 
management level, however, the link implies that all capital expenditure increases 
debt and that debt is incurred only for the purpose of capital expenditure.32  
The Treasury distinguishes between capital and operating expenditure, arguing 
that “investment commits resources now in the promise of future benefits. One of 
the key benefits of the shift from cash to accrual accounting was that it allowed 
                                                 
32 Confusion over accounting concepts, especially in relation to concepts of capital, has been noted from the 
time of the Public Finance Bill (see Chapter 4 and Table 4.1). 
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discrimination between investment and current consumption” (T99C/213, 11 
February 1999, Treasury files). The counting framework rules for the capital 
provision attempt to capture all such investment decisions by the government, 
including: 
all capital injections to departments and SOEs and Crown entities, purchase or 
development of capital assets by the Crown, and advances;  
[offset by] any new capital withdrawals, decisions to reduce existing baselines for 
purchase or development of capital assets by the Crown or reduce existing baselines for 
advances . . . (TC2000/2, 24 February 2000, Treasury files). 
Three ideas underpin the capital provision and its associated counting rules. 
The provision imposes an overall limit on capital expenditure and so it is likely to 
encourage Ministers to prioritise capital expenditure proposals and to fund any 
capital expenditure either from within current budget baselines or from within 
departmental balance sheets. Secondly, the provision helps with management of 
capital expenditure to ensure its consistency with the Crown's policy goals; and 
thirdly, for risk management purposes, “it is sensible for there to be some overall 
management of capital investment to ensure the Crown is not unduly exposed to 
financial and operational risks” (p. 4).  
With capital expenditure by the government capped through this provision, the 
Treasury advised of the availability in the private sector of alternative financing 
sources which it refers to as “private sector capital investment”, thus suggesting 
that it cannot also be public sector capital  investment. The use of funds raised 
from this financing source does not count as capital expenditure by the 
government: "Private financing can serve the dual purposes of reducing the 
borrowing requirements of the Crown and also introduce stronger monitoring 
disciplines on Crown agencies", although the considerable related risks are 
acknowledged (T99C/213, 11 February 1999, Treasury files).  
The counting rules for the capital provision are recognised as not convincing 
for "assessing or controlling capital spending" (Barnes and Leith, 2000). One 
obvious problem is the idea that capital contributions to departments count as 
capital expenditure, while another obvious problem relates to exactly what is 
meant by debt.  
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Appropriations for capital contributions 
The counting framework counts capital contributions to departments as capital 
expenditure. The 1991/92 budgeting round paid little attention to capital 
contribution appropriations. Departments were advised that capital contributions 
should not be assumed and would be provided only under specified exceptional 
circumstances. The Logan report recommended for the 1992/93 budget cycle 
some form of "resource allocation process for capital investment decisions by the 
Government" (1991, p. 101, recommendation 29(iv)). Evidently, the Logan 
report's recommendation was interpreted as departments' expenditure on assets 
(capital expenditure), rather than the Crown's capital injections to departments 
(ECC(92)39, 2 March 1992, Richardson files 836; ECC(92)M5/12, 3 March 1992, 
Richardson files 1101). 
The permanent appropriation allowed to departments under s. 11 of the Public 
Finance Act 1989 is subject to a delegations limit originally set in 1989 by 
CO(89)22, and increased in 1998. Chief executives now have discretion up to $7 
million ($5 million from 1989 to 1998), and responsible ministers have discretion 
up to $15 million ($10 million from 1989 to 1998) (ECC(92)39, 2 March 1992, 
Richardson files 836; ECC(92)M5/12, 3 March 1992, Richardson files 1101; 
CAB(98)M47/9D(4), 14 December 1998, Treasury files). Departments' proposed 
expenditure on assets (capital expenditure) for the 1992/93 financial year totalled 
approximately $620 million, but departments, apparently relying on section 11, 
sought from the budgeting cycle capital contributions for approximately $125 
million. The scrutiny of capital expenditure applied to those departments 
operating within section 11 involved examination of the processes used to 
"develop and manage capital expenditure plans", and examination of all capital 
expenditure projects exceeding $5 million either uncompleted or planned up to the 
1995/96 financial year. The information obtained from this scrutiny was thought 
likely to assist with capital expenditure management in future, and to provide an 
opportunity to discuss "links between the Government's priorities and capital 
expenditure plans". Development of an ownership phase involving budget 
scrutiny of "a number of long term elements of departmental management, of 
which one is capital expenditure" was proposed (CAB(92)M2/2, 27 January 1992, 
Richardson files 837; ECC(92)39, 2 March 1992, Richardson files 836; 
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ECC(92)M5/12, 3 March 1992, Richardson files 1101; ECC(92)304, 21 
September 1992, Richardson files 1052; ECC(92)M45/2, 29 September 1992, 
Richardson files 1101). 
The 1993/94 ownership phase included a review of capital expenditure in those 
departments with the largest capital expenditure budgets, and development of a 
"process for evaluating any requests for capital injections." Evidently, the 
assumption was that capital contributions to departments were for the purpose of 
capital expenditure because departments seeking capital contributions were 
"required to demonstrate adequate management of capital expenditure . . . and 
why it is in the Crown's interest to invest further in the department." This 
assumption continued into the subsequent budget baselines guidelines documents. 
Although the 1998 version of the budget baselines guidelines acknowledges that a 
capital contribution may be sought for purposes other than capital expenditure, for 
example, to restore depleted working capital, most discussion of capital 
contributions assumes that such a contribution enables a department to invest 
either in particular assets or in a project (ECC(92)304, 21 September 1992, 
Richardson files 1052; ECC(92)M45/2, 29 September 1992, Richardson files 
1101; CAB(92)M40/9, 5 October 1992, Richardson files 843; CO(98)17, 24 
November 1998; CO(00)12, 23 November 2000). In the very early stages of the 
financial management system, capital contributions made to the Department of 
Statistics and the Inland Revenue Department were for investment in fixed assets 
but subsequent capital contributions were provided for a variety of reasons (Table 
7.2). 
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Table 7.2 Capital contributions 
Year Explanation of capital contribution  Department 
of Statistics 
$'000 
IRD 
 
$'000 
1991 Investment in fixed assets 1,984 62,906 
1992 Investment in fixed assets  48,202 
1993 Other expenses: (Restructuring) 1,150  
 Partial compensation for revision to 3rd party revenue 2,000  
 No explanation  1,300 
1994 Compensation for expected operating deficit 263  
 Partial compensation for revision to 3rd party revenue 2,592  
 Remedy negative working capital of $3.2 m from 1989 2,000  
 Repayment of capital to Crown  -5,000 
 No explanation  1,611 
1995 Information technology upgrade 13,590  
 Partial funding for census of population and dwellings 75  
 Partial compensation for revision to 3rd party revenue 1,573  
 Establish retiring leave provision 428  
 No explanation  96 
1996 Information technology upgrade 4,430  
 Partial funding for census of population and dwellings 377  
 Return of capital repaid to Crown  2,500 
 No explanation  209 
1997 Partial funding for census of population and dwellings 40  
 Restructure balance sheet 4,000  
 Return of capital repaid to Crown  2,500 
1999 No explanation  120 
2000 Repayment of capital to the Crown  -1061 
 No explanation  277 
 Total 34,502 113,360 
 
The budget baselines guidelines were extended to include capital contributions 
in 1994. These guidelines state that a capital contribution from the Crown to a 
department will be provided only as the last resort source of finance after a 
department has exhausted other possible sources. Those other sources include any 
cash accumulated by a department, including that accumulated by receiving 
payment for the full cost of outputs when some of the output costs, such as 
depreciation, are non-cash expenses; the sale of existing assets; the use of 
operating leases instead of owning assets; and improved working capital 
management through improved debt collection and slowed creditor payments. 
(Scott, 1996, p. 65 citing ECR(94)162 and (94)M26/1 2 August 1994; Treasury, 
1998, FM/2/4 Vol 4, Treasury files; CO(98)17, 24 November 1998; CO(00)12, 23 
November 2000). The explanation of this use of cash requirement is that, "the 
provision of depreciation and pricing to cover this charge will generate free cash 
which may be used to finance other capital expenditure.  . . . GAAP does not 
require that accumulated cash be attached to specific assets or accumulated in 
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sinking funds" (The Treasury, 1998, Capital contributions, FM/2/4 Vol4, p. 10, 
Treasury files). 
In 1998, the stated objective of the capital contribution requirements was to 
ensure that departments' investments are consistent with the government's 
strategic direction. Consequently all capital contribution requests must be 
accompanied by a sound business case which is consistent with the department's 
longer term strategic business plan (CO(95)10, 15 September 1995; CO(98)17, 24 
November 1998; The Treasury, 4 December 1998, T98C/4002, FM/2/4 Vol 4; 
EXG(98)190, 8 December 1998, Treasury files FM2/4; CO(00)12, 23 November 
2000).  
Capital contributions for 3rd party outputs 
Over time the pricing of third party outputs has been the subject of 
considerable attention. Third party outputs may be supplied on a contestable basis, 
in which case the department receives Mode B net appropriations, or on a non-
contestable basis, in which case the department receives Mode B gross 
appropriations. Mode B net appropriations provide departments with a permanent 
appropriation to spend up to the amount of trading revenue earned on the 
production of those contestable outputs. 
Departments are required to price all outputs, including third party outputs, on 
the basis of full cost, and they are expected to neither overcharge (charge more 
than full cost), nor undercharge, nor subsidise losses on third party outputs (see 
for example, The Treasury 1999, Guidelines for setting charges in the public 
sector). Especially when the outputs are contestable, any losses on those 
contestable outputs must be borne by reductions in taxpayers' funds. Any recovery 
of those losses must come from higher prices in future years. Those departments 
providing outputs on a contestable basis are now required to operate notional 
memorandum accounts to ensure full cost recovery over time (Treasury, 28 
February 1992, Report of the Officials Group to monitor the implementation of 
the capital charge, FM2/2, Treasury files; TC1995/10, 11 September 1995).  
The operation of these notional memorandum accounts is independent of a 
department's formal accounting system and the recording of accumulated 
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surpluses or deficits in the notional accounts is simply the copying of information 
accumulated during each year in the department's formal general ledger and 
reported as part of its financial performance. The actual surplus or deficit on these 
outputs would therefore be incorporated each year in a department's reported 
financial results and dealt with under the repayment of surplus rules. The 
accumulated balances in the notional accounts, which are outside the general 
ledger system, provide the information required for long-run price setting to 
ensure cost recovery over time.  
Until 2000, provided earlier over-recoveries had been earned on these outputs, 
deficits arising from the under-recovery of costs in any year could be funded by a 
capital contribution from the Crown. Departments were required, however, to 
meet all of the requirements for a capital contribution, evidently including the last 
resort requirement. Given the prioritisation process applied to all capital 
contribution appropriations, even if a department did meet all the requirements, it 
would not necessarily receive a capital contribution. From late 2000 the 
requirements were eased for situations where deficits followed earlier over-
recovery of costs and the memorandum account contains a positive balance 
(TC2000/18, 21 December 2000, Treasury files).  
What is meant by debt 
The counting framework provision for capital expenditure is derived from a 
calculation which determines the amount available for new debt. One implication 
is that the nature of debt is known and settled. Although departments are 
prohibited from raising loans, they are required to exhaust other sources of funds 
before they can expect a capital contribution, and such alternative sources include 
the sale and leaseback of assets, and other operating leases. The Treasury extends 
this idea by recommending arrangements it refers to as private financing, but the 
idea of private financing must, surely, imply debt regardless of whether a private 
financing arrangement must be reported in the financial reports as a liability.33  
                                                 
33 Under GAAP, there are no specific requirements to report these arrangements as liabilities on a balance 
sheet. Nevertheless, the obligations arising from such agreements are encompassed within the definition of 
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Evidently departments have increasingly used private financing in the form of 
operating leases and non-cancellable contracts for goods and services to obtain the 
use of assets and to contract out some services. With effect from 30 June 1999, the 
delegations limit for the purchase of fixed assets was extended to include 
operating leases for the use of fixed assets, implying that those operating leases 
are equivalent to capital expenditure (CAB(98)M47/9D(4); 14 December 1998, 
Treasury files; CO(99)7, 30 June 1999, www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars). 
Over time, both the Department of Statistics and the Inland Revenue Department 
have reduced their accommodation lease commitments and capital commitments 
and increased their entry into other non-cancellable leases and non-cancellable 
contracts for goods and services (Table 7.3).  
Table 7.3 Commitments 
 Department of Statistics Inland Revenue Department  
Type of commitment 1991 1995 2000 1991 1995 2000
Accommodation leases 31,021 14,037 9,213 284,657 212,017 105,932
Other non-cancellable leases 0 592 533 1,981 81,870 60,700
Non-cancellable contracts for 
goods and services 
0 1,374 2,387 1,627 1,045 6,105
Capital commitments 629 123 0 135,566 14,578 17,847
Total 31,650 16,126 12,133 423,831 124,416 190,584
The Treasury’s explanation of capital expenditure, that it “commits resources 
now in the promise of future benefits” could equally be applied to commitments. 
Such trend changes in commitments raise questions whether the Treasury's advice 
that private financing reduces borrowing requirements and, therefore, does not 
count against the fiscal targets encourages decisions that fail to make good policy 
sense, especially because subsequent recognition of these arrangements as 
liabilities would not count either (see the counting framework requirements for 
recognition of existing liabilities, and Treasury, BR No 62, 20 May 1992, 
Richardson files 295). Some commitments involve sizeable amounts  (Box 7.3).  
                                                                                                                                     
liabilities as set out in the conceptual framework. They are not future liabilities, as suggested by the Act, 
they are existing liabilities for which settlement is in the future. 
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Box 7.3 Fiscal targets and commitments: operating expenses or debt? 
From the time of its formation as a separate department, the Department of Corrections has 
engaged in commitments classed as operating commitments for an increasing range of goods and 
services.  
 1996  1997   1998  1999   2000 
$52,119,000 $29,764,000 $44,889,000 $36,017,000 $146,464,000 
In 1996, these commitments consisted of $27,958,000 for operating lease commitments which 
included "premises, computer equipment, telephone exchange systems, facsimile machines and 
photocopiers". In addition the department had entered "non-cancellable contracts for computer 
maintenance, building services and other contracts for services" which totalled $24,161,000. In 
2000, the operating lease commitments included the same list of items subject to operating leases 
but did not separately itemise the amounts involved. In addition, the annual report explained that 
the department had entered into non-cancellable contracts and explained the increase in operating 
commitments as "largely due to a contract entered into with Australasian Correctional 
Management, who have obtained the management contract of Auckland Central Remand Prison". 
This contract, excluded from commitments in 1999, but reported as negotiated in that year, was for 
$102,000,000 over five years. Of that amount, $53,000,000 related to the provision of correctional 
services and the remainder was not explained. In the 1999/2000 financial year, a total of 99 
contracts with external providers were negotiated, all of which exceeded $5,000. (Department of 
Corrections, Annual reports for years ended 30 June 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). 
Chapter summary 
In 1991, the National government pursued its fiscal policy to achieve 
expenditure reductions by devising a budget baselines regime which subsequently 
was extended and institutionalised in budget baselines guidelines. The fast-track 
minimal or no scrutiny process is intended to act as an incentive for departments 
and vote ministers to comply with the resource restrictions of the budget baselines 
regime, although it seems contrary to the idea that expenditure should be targeted 
to align with the government’s policy objectives. The extraction of efficiency 
dividends and then the maintenance of nominal dollar baselines which have a 
gradual and acknowledged resource-eroding effect force some examination of 
expenditure in order to re-prioritise, but other resource-eroding mechanisms have 
also been built into the budget baselines regime. These are all of the accepted 
budget baseline changes which departments are required to absorb by using 
departmental resources. Even if an appropriation is provided for some of these 
adjustments, that appropriation is not accompanied by money. To the extent that 
these appropriations are for outputs, this seems to be a departure from the policy 
announced earlier, that departments would be funded for the full price of outputs 
(TC1990/13, 25 October 1990, Treasury files).  
That this resource-eroding effect is intended is acknowledged, as is the purpose 
of this process. The effect is that the expenditure reduction strategy adopted in 
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1990 was designed into the budget baselines regime, but with further 
developments to that regime, the resource-eroding effect has been accelerated. 
Eroding departments’ resources forces them, eventually, to seek additional 
resources at which point the full amount of the budget baseline will be reviewed, 
raising the potential for this review process to function as an institutionalised clear 
the decks procedure of the type proposed by the Treasury (1984) (see Chapter 4). 
That this may be the case was suggested in Chapter 6 by the State Services 
Commission’s comment on the output price review process. The capital  
contribution requirements implemented since 1994 suggest application of a 
similar review process of departments’ assets. The policy that departments would 
receive capital contributions only as a last resort of finance after the use of all 
available cash contradicts the earlier idea that paying departments an output price 
to cover full costs allows them to accumulate sufficient cash to replace their 
assets. The nature and operation of the baseline review processes are considered in 
more depth in Chapter 9. 
The development of the fiscal targets and provisions reinforces the budget 
baselines regime and also extends to all government expenditure, not merely to 
departments’ budget baselines. Possibly, the muddled ideas evident from the fiscal 
targets and the counting framework are a result of the difficulties arising from a 
set of principles which failed to adapt to accrual accounting the cash-based ideas 
from which they are derived. The original cash-based expenditure targets, if 
applied to operating expenses and capital expenditure, might be thought to capture 
all that is intended. Regardless of the absurdity of the principles of fiscal 
responsibility, and some of the rules developed in the counting framework, both 
that and the budget baselines regime clearly impose considerable downward 
pressure on expenditure. Given this downward pressure, it might seem curious 
that the commitments loophole in the Public Finance Act, identified in Chapter 4, 
should be opened even wider with the counting framework, and even more 
curious that the means of escape from the expenditure constraints, through 
leasing, commitments and other private financing arrangements, would be 
highlighted and encouraged. Arguably, if the intent were to achieve the stated 
objectives of the Public Finance Act and, in particular, to safeguard public assets 
by controlling the issue of securities, this loophole would be closed rather than 
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advertised. The effect is to promote a particular form of debt financing 
arrangement which escapes the counting framework and escapes prior 
parliamentary scrutiny. This issue will be considered in more depth in Chapter 10.  
The budget baselines regime merely determines the amount of resources to be 
made available to departments. The use of the resources supplied for the purchase 
of outputs is considered in the next chapter. 
  
 
8 Commercialisation and purchasing 
The budget baselines regime covers all appropriations affecting departments 
but, for output appropriations, the amount established as a department’s budget 
baseline is only the first step of a two-step budgeting process. The second step, 
which is the subject of this chapter, is to determine exactly which outputs will be 
produced within the budget baseline (Treasury, 1990, p. 80-81). Just as the budget 
baselines regime has developed over the years since it was first implemented, so 
too has the commercialised output purchasing model developed over time.  
This chapter explains the way in which the budget baseline resources made 
available are used to obtain outputs either from departments or from alternative 
providers. The National government of 1990 pursued a commercialisation strategy 
which supported this purchasing idea and the chapter begins by explaining the 
manner in which this commercialisation strategy affected the specification and 
costing requirements for outputs. This was expected to result in a competitive 
contracting environment in which price would determine which provider should 
be awarded a contract for output provision. When this intended competitive 
environment failed to achieve the results apparently anticipated, and when public 
opposition to the idea of privatisation was evident, this commercialised regime 
was taken down to a more detailed, but less visible, level. This development 
resulted in some controversy within the Treasury over the nature and 
appropriateness of the commercialised financial management system. The chapter 
includes illustrative boxes showing the effect of the commercialising process on 
the Department of Corrections and the Department of Statistics.  
Policy strategy 1991/92: Commercialisation, growth and 
employment 
Chapter 7 explained how, for the 1991/92 budgeting round, the ECC 
determined the amounts of departments’ baselines. Once that first step was 
completed, the budgeting process changed to adopt a purchasing focus. The ECC 
required departments to specify clearly their intended outputs and the full cost of 
those outputs. At this point, recognition was required that those outputs could be 
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the responsibility of more than one vote minister. Departments' budgets therefore 
had to be analysed into the various votes, and the idea presented was that the 
budgeting process related to each vote's expenditure base. Vote ministers are cast 
as purchasers of departments' outputs and, provided those purchasers use the vote 
resources to pursue the government's strategy, their use of resources may reflect 
their own preferences. Departments' outputs were scrutinised, with the process 
changing to decisions about which outputs the government should purchase in 
light of the adopted strategy. Those outputs identified as low priority in relation to 
the growth and employment strategy were either reduced in quantity or eliminated 
(TC 1990/13, 25 October 1990, p. 15, Treasury files; ECC (91)212, 15 August 
1991, Richardson files 999; Kidd, 30 July 1991, ECC Schedule of expenditure 
decisions, Richardson files 1157). 
Although the budgeting process adopted for the 1991/92 budgets was judged a 
success, its weaknesses largely related to this second purchasing step which was 
intended to allow the specific targeting of expenditure. Those weaknesses 
included the difficulty of making decisions using broad output specifications, and, 
following decisions to save costs by not purchasing particular outputs, 
departments’ ability to defeat at least some of those savings by respreading their 
costs over other outputs. The specification and examination of outputs at a more 
detailed sub-output level was proposed (ECC(91)212, 15 August 1991, 
Richardson files 999; Treasury, BR No. 62, 20 May 1992, Richardson files 295). 
This use of budget baseline resources to purchase outputs revealed two other 
matters requiring consideration: the manner in which the reduced resources 
available after extracting efficiency dividends from departments’ baselines could 
be applied at the purchasing stage; and Vote ministers’ ability to act as 
discriminating purchasers of outputs.  
Efficiency dividends and the purchasing phase 
The extraction of efficiency dividends from budget baselines required 
accommodation of those expenditure reductions in the purchasing phase of the 
budget process. Two expenditure-reducing options were identified: price 
reductions and output quantity reductions. Price reductions, acknowledged as a 
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blunt instrument, were rationalised at the time because inflation was low and 
therefore scope existed for "reductions in unit output prices paid by the Crown 
without unacceptable effects on the quality or quantity of outputs delivered, 
through departments achieving improvements in productivity" (ECC(91)M64/3, 
11 December 1991, Richardson files 1024). 
Output quantity reductions were achieved using a process which drew on the 
government's strategic objectives, but also required Cabinet identification of lower 
priority votes or expenditure areas. Vote ministers decided on output quantity 
reductions by aligning proposed expenditure with the government's priorities. 
They then identified their remaining "lowest priority 5, 10 or 15% 
outputs . . . ranked in order of priority and the extent to which those savings could 
be readily obtained". Vote ministers decided which outputs to purchase within the 
reduced resources available, while the low-ranked outputs were “tucker-boxed” 
for possible further savings as part of a later collective review phase 
(CSC(91)M24/4b & c, 19 June 1991, Richardson files 988; BR No 9, 9 October 
1992, p. 7, Richardson files 305). The impact of this purchasing phase on the 
Department of Statistics reveals the effect of the policy strategy adopted, and the 
influence of those closely involved in development and operation of the financial 
management system compared with the reduced influence of those without such 
strong links to the ECC (Box 8.1). 
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Box 8.1 Purchasing and expenditure reductions 
In 1992, the Government Statistician commented "only in the Balance of Payments and 
National Accounts areas has any explicit funding been provided to maintain the capability of 
the department in its statistical operations." According to the Treasury, this was because the 
department's priorities had been refocused on the provision of "high quality economic 
statistics", although gaps in those statistics still caused difficulties for macro-economic 
monitoring. For the 1992/93 budget round the department sought an additional $266,000 to 
reinstate the retail trade and overseas orders survey and the justice statistics, $1.5 million to 
improve the macro-economic statistics, and funding to implement a time use survey. Treasury 
advice to the Minister for discussion with the Minister of Statistics acknowledged the 
importance of social statistics and the Treasury's focus on finance portfolio interests. The 
reinstatements were declined, the resources for macro-economic statistics approved, and the 
funding of the time use survey considered the responsibility of those departments interested in 
it. Because the social policy reforms and wider social and economic changes implied a need 
for new official statistical information, the Government Statistician was directed to establish a 
standing review committee to assess priorities for social and population statistics. During the 
1992/93 year, "following representations from private and public sector users, a number of 
organisations contributed to the one-off costs of reinstatement [of the retail trade and overseas 
orders surveys], and the Government Statistician agreed to reinstate them on a monthly basis 
from cost savings within the department." Following the decision that New Zealand host the 
1995 Commonwealth Statisticians Conference, the department was required to meet the costs 
involved from within its baseline. 
The 1993/94 budget required savings of 4%, plus contingency savings of 2%. The ECC 
categorised the savings offered into three tiers. It supported the first two tiers which included 
deferral of the work required to implement some recommendations from the macro-economic 
statistics review, closure of the Dunedin office, cancellation of statistics on deceased estates, 
cancellation of scheduled revisions to the Mining and Quarrying price index, cancellation of 
some publications, and productivity savings from information technology developments, but 
noted that some of those savings were "not robust". The contingency savings in the third tier 
mostly related to the remaining recommendations from the macro-economic statistics review 
and the ECC opposed these savings because they risked "undermining the quality of the 
department's statistical outputs with potentially significant flow-on effects to the users of 
those outputs, including social policy and macroeconomic policy advisers." Further reductions 
of 1.5% in the 1994/95 and 1995/96 financial years were to be absorbed by price reductions 
and, in the 1994/95 year, deferral of the biennial agriculture census, and reduced requirements       
to implement recommendations from the review of macro-economic statistics. 
In 1996, after outlining the increasing difficulties facing the department, the Government 
Statistician commented that "although there is an increase in the demand for more complex 
measures, an unchanging funding base has meant that, once efficiency gains have been 
achieved, either fewer statistics in total can be produced, or their quality 
reduced . . . Management capability and the development of the skill base for the new 
environment have been constrained by inadequate funds for training needs . . . without 
additional funding, explicit cuts to major statistical services will be signalled before the end of 
the 1996/97 financial year  . . . a case for analysing and addressing the perceived under-
pricing of statistical outputs has several hurdles before it is able to be put forward"(T92/914, 
27 March 1992, Richardson files 809; ECC(92)111, 21 April 1992, Richardson files 836; 
ECC(92)M14//1, 22 April 1992, Richardson files 1101; CAB(92)M15/10h, 27 April 1992, 
Richardson files 838; ECC(92)M16/8, 5 May 1992, Richardson files 1101; ECC(92)M21/4k, 
13 May 1992, Richardson files 1101; CAB(92)M20/24n, 25 May 1992, Richardson files 840; 
CAB(92)M30/16, 3 August 1992, Richardson files 842; ECC(92)324, 2 October 1992, 
Richardson files 1052; ECC(92)M46/9, 6 October 1992, Richardson files 1101; 
CAB(92)M41/5h, 12 October 1992, Richardson files 843; T92/3683, 3 December 1992, 
Richardson files 804; T92/3762, 10 December 1992, Richardson files 805; ECC(93)93, 23 
March 1993, Richardson files 971; ECC(93)M9/5, 24 March 1993, Richardson files 912; 
CAB(93)130 (Part 2) 26 March 1993, Richardson files 1016; CAB(92)M10/23k, 29 March 
1993, Richardson files 910; Report of the Government Statistician for the year ended 30 June 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). 
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Purchase advisers to assist ministers 
With vote ministers expected to act as purchasers of outputs, the idea was that 
vote ministers would consider proposals for the supply of outputs from potential 
suppliers, either departments or other suppliers. They would also consider the 
costs involved and the contributions those outputs would make to achieving the 
government's desired outcomes. Vote ministers could then decide which outputs 
to purchase and, following executive approval, the proposed purchases would be 
summarised into Estimates for parliamentary appropriation. Purchase agreements 
could then be issued to successful suppliers, and each supplier's compliance with 
the purchase agreement monitored (Logan, 1991, recommendation 28, p. 97-98; 
CAB(92)M2/2, 27 January 1992, Richardson files 837; STA(92)20, 10 February 
1992, Richardson files 958; CAB(92)M6/12, 24 February 1992, Richardson files 
837; ECC(92)M50/2, 10 November 1992, Richardson files 1101).  
The Treasury had already proposed support for Ministers in this purchasing 
process (T90/12N, 7 November 1990, Richardson files 758). Similarly, the Logan 
review recognised that Ministers did not necessarily have the skills, the 
experience, or the resources to act as the discriminating purchasers of outputs 
required to operate the reformed financial management system and this forced 
them to rely on departmental chief executives for advice about contracts and 
performance problems (Logan, 1991, p. 64). The working party on output 
definitions recommended the use of independent purchase advisers and, after 
consideration of the constitutional implications, the Treasury was directed to 
develop further this recommendation (T91/5246, 3 December 1991, Richardson 
files 834; ECC(92)353, 30 October 1992, Richardson files 955; ECC(92)M50/2, 
10 November 1992, Richardson files 1101).  
The process adopted for employment of an independent adviser required a 
purchase agreement for the advice, with that agreement signed by both the vote 
minister and the chief executive of the department concerned. The cost of the 
adviser must be charged against the vote about which advice is sought, and the 
adviser is accountable to the vote minister. Although these advisers were referred 
to as purchase advisers, the idea of an independent adviser was extended to 
include advice about ownership (STA(93)M5/2, 3 March 1993, Richardson files 
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1014; CAB(93)M7/4a, 8 March 1993, Richardson files 910; CO(93)9, 6 August 
1993). Some Ministers used purchase advisers initially and the opportunity 
remains to use them, but the practice has largely ceased (CO(93)9, 6 August 1993; 
Discussion, State Services Commission and Treasury, March 2001). 
Commercialisation 
The commercialisation strategy adopted by the 1990 National government 
allowed development of Treasury’s (1990, p. 86) advice to the incoming 
government that ministers' purchasing decisions would be improved if 
departments' outputs were made to resemble goods and services available in the 
private sector, and if both the public and the private sectors faced comparable 
costs.  
Outputs like those available in the private sector 
The Treasury had already proposed that system developments required detailed 
output specifications (T90/N12, 7 November 1990, Richardson files 758). 
Experience from the first budgeting round in 1991/92 resulted in the Treasury 
recommending again, and with support from  the Logan committee report, that 
both output specifications, and the size of some outputs and output classes should 
be reviewed. Consistent with the Logan report recommendations, which noted 
disputes between departments and the Treasury over output specifications and 
classes, the Treasury established a working party on output definitions to devise 
principles for defining output classes, for "specifying outputs at lower levels of 
aggregation", and a negotiation process for output specification and changes in 
output class structures. The working party also recommended the adoption of 
purchase agreements (T91/3451, 7 August 1991, Richardson files 719; 
ECC(91)212, 15 August 1991, Richardson files 999; Logan, 1991, p. 97-99; 
STA(92)20, 10 February 1992, Richardson files 958; CAB(92)M6/12, 24 
February 1992, Richardson files 837; T92/931, 30 March 1992, Richardson files 
809; STA(92)63, 6 April 1992, Richardson files 959; T92/3253, 20 October 1992, 
Richardson files 800; ECC(92)353, 30 October 1992, Richardson files 955; 
ECC(92)M50/2, 10 November 1992, Richardson files 1101). 
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Output class structures 
The working party equated output classes to product lines and proposed that 
the purchaser's perspective should dominate decisions about those output classes. 
It devised universally-applicable organising and aggregating principles to 
structure output classes. The organising principle assumed continued separation of 
policy advice, administration of payments, and service delivery, and proposed that 
an output class should "comprise only those outputs which are able to be 
meaningfully specified together (including by using common performance 
measures), from the purchaser's perspective". The aggregating principle assumed 
that any large output class should be reduced, with large defined as more than $50 
million for an output class which is greater than 30% of the appropriations for a 
department's output classes or POBOCs (ECC(92)M50/2, 10 November 1992, 
Richardson files 1101). Application of these principles to determine and change 
output class structures required a consultative process between departments and 
the Treasury with disputes referred to the Vote Minister and the Minister of 
Finance. Structural, output class and output specification changes made in the 
Department of Justice reflected pursuit of the commercialisation strategy and the 
National government’s election manifesto commitments to private sector 
involvement in the prison system (Box 8.2).  
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Purchase agreements 
The working party on output definitions recommended the issue of purchase 
agreements for all outputs purchased by the Crown, with each agreement 
specifying outputs "at a sufficiently detailed level for the parties concerned to 
identify and assign responsibility for the risks and obligations associated with 
delivery". Minimum specifications would describe the outputs and their cost, the 
terms of the agreement, performance measures, standards and procedures for 
assessment, reporting requirements, rewards, sanctions and processes for dispute 
resolution, and procedures for amending the agreements (ECC(92)353, 30 
October 1992, Richardson files 955; ECC(92)M50/2, 10 November 1992, 
Richardson files 1101). Ministers were advised that the purchase agreements 
would allow them to: 
Box 8.2 Commercialisation strategy and output class changes 
The introduction of private sector contracting into the prisons system commenced with two sets of 
developments intended to achieve: entry into "contractual arrangements with private sector 
companies, or, more likely, consortia of companies to finance, design, build, own and operate a 
350 bed medium security prison in South Auckland and a 250 bed remand facility in central 
Auckland"; and contract arrangements for prisoner escort and court-related custodial services. For 
both, in addition to legislative changes, structural and output class changes were required. 
Structural changes 
Two new management positions were created in the Department of Justice: General Manager 
Criminal Justice Development, "with responsibility for the development of policy applications in 
the field of criminal justice and the development of contracted corrections services; and General 
Manager Corrections Operations with responsibility as the provider of the public sector corrections 
services". From 1 October 1995, the Department of Justice was split into three, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Department of Corrections and the Department for the Courts. The Department of 
Corrections was "responsible for providing corrections services, managing the corrections systems 
and contract management. A separate agency, responsible only for delivering corrections services 
may be set up in a few years time." From the time of its establishment the Department of 
Corrections included in its organisation structure a contracts management group. 
Output class changes  
Examination of the Department of Justice and the Department of Corrections annual reports 
reveals regular change in all output classes. From 1991 until 1993 under two broad output classes: 
custodial remand services to courts, and administration of court sentences of imprisonment 
including corrective training, the range of prison services such as re-integrative programmes and 
provision of information about inmates were included. While the differentiation between remand 
and sentenced prison services was maintained, from 1994, the custodial aspect of imprisonment 
increasingly was separated from other aspects of imprisonment by creating new output classes for 
those other aspects, such as an information services class, while a sub-class of both sets of 
custodial services was the development of contract management services. In 1995, the custodial 
aspect was further segmented into different levels of security: maximum, medium and minimum. 
From 1996, a new output class was created which separated from the custodial services, escort and 
custodial supervision services to courts and, from 1998, another output class, contract management 
services was created. (CSC(92)153, 13 October 1992, Richardson files 1105; CSC(92)M52/5, 28 
October 1992. Richardson files 1105; ECC(93)153, 6 April 1993, Richardson files 972; 
ECC(93)M13/6, 7 April 1993, Richardson files 912; CAB(93)M12/17e, 13 April 1993, 
Richardson files 910; Department of Justice, Annual reports for the years ended 30 June 1991 to 
30 June 1996; Department of Corrections, Annual reports for the years ended 30 June 1996 to 30 
June 2000). 
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choose the mix of individual outputs we wish to purchase and ensure that these are 
consistent with the Government's strategy; 
ensure that the individual outputs are value for money by comparing the outputs 
offered by a department with those from other sources; and  
ensure that the outputs we are paying for are actually supplied. (T93/434, 4 March 
1993, Richardson files 817). 
The ability to compare departments' outputs with those from other sources was 
enhanced by amending the Public Finance Act to require a purchase agreement 
between the Crown and any output provider, and to require reporting payments 
made to external suppliers by output class (T93/1752, 8 July 1993, Richardson 
files 355; ECC(93)M27/6, 27 July 1993, Richardson files 912; Public Finance 
Act; Treasury, 2 June 1999, "Purchase agreements for non-departmental output 
class appropriations" FM/3/5, Treasury files).34 
Departments, with Treasury assistance, developed the purchase agreements, 
while the Treasury also devised a technical review process and evaluated the 
implementation (Treasury, February 1993, "Purchase agreements background 
information, p. 2, Treasury files; Treasury, 9 February 1993, Guidelines for 
preparing and assessing purchase agreements, p. 9, Treasury files). According to 
the Treasury this initial technical review process was largely constructively-
received (T93/2510, 29 September 1993, Richardson files 1094; Treasury, 12 
November 1993, FM/2/13, Treasury files).  
The ongoing technical reviews were intended to assist departments but, 
apparently as part of its more sophisticated approach to advising the Minister of 
Finance, the Treasury also expected that the information obtained from these 
reviews would allow it to give second opinion advice on low-priority outputs by 
assessing the extent to which ministers' purchasing is "consistent with the 
government's strategic objectives and priorities"; to assist with helpful information 
when departments cannot accommodate cost reductions; and to assess both 
efficiency and alternative sources of supply (T93/233, 10 February 1993, 
Richardson files 1093; T93/2951, 17 December 1993, FM/2/13, see also Chapter 
6 and the financial management initiatives incentives theme). The dual purpose of 
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this technical review process is evident from the different reports issued on the 
technical review process (Box 8.3). 
Eventually the role of the technical review process became "uncertain" and 
ceased after the 1996/97 budgeting round. The stated reason for this was that the 
technical quality of purchase agreements had improved, although quantity 
measures, quality measures and output class structures were considered risk areas 
(Treasury, 1997, Technical review panel (TRP) update; Discussion Treasury staff, 
August 2001).  
Comparable output costs 
The commercialisation objective required that departments and private sector 
output providers faced similar costs. The Public Finance Act required that 
departments' output costs be measured by full production cost (sections 2, 4), 
                                                                                                                                     
34 In 1993/94 payments for outputs to non-departmental suppliers amounted to approximately 25%, or $8.9 
billion of government expenditure (T93/1752, 8 July 1993, Richardson files 355). 
Box 8.3 Purchase agreements and technical reviews 
The Department of Justice reported in its annual report for the year ended 30 June 1993 that, 
"Recent and ongoing state sector and departmental reforms mean that existing prisons are in a 
good position to compete with the private sector. The performance of each will be measurable and 
hence comparable. . . . [and this] should enhance performance in both privately managed prisons 
and publicly managed prisons. The department is currently developing contracts for the 
management of two prisons in the Auckland area. At the same time the department is developing 
contracts for the management of some prisoner escort services from prisons and police stations to 
courts, and for court related security services." 
The technical review of the 1993/94 purchase agreement between the Department of Justice and 
the Minister of Justice resulted in two assessment reports, one for the department's chief executive, 
the Secretary for Justice, and the other for the Minister of Finance. The assessment issued to the 
Secretary for Justice proposed, in relation to the custodial administration of court sentences output 
class that "consideration should be given to further disaggregation of this output, for example, 
separate outputs for minimum, medium and maximum levels of security." 
The assessment for the Minister of Finance noted the proposed introduction of private prisons, the 
department's internal restructuring to split its purchase and provision roles, and the planned work 
to revise output classes. It assessed the agreement using three broad tests: description of services; 
choice of services; and measurability. The assessment of choice required consideration of whether 
"the document highlight[s] opportunities for alternative providers. One area where this is imminent 
is private prisons". It sought separation of the costs of inspection, contracting and monitoring 
prisons; "unit costs for different levels of prisoner security . . . if a fair comparison is to be made 
for a particular facility", and noted a conceptual problem which was not applicable in the case of 
prisons, "that careful treatment is required of fixed costs to make explicit the avoidable costs of 
private provision". While praising the data in the purchase agreement because it allowed unit cost 
calculations, revision to output specifications was thought likely to improve the potential to 
introduce alternative suppliers of other activities: "the purchase agreement should highlight where 
alternative forms of provision are or might be considered"  (Treasury, 21 May 1993, FM/2/13, 
Treasury files; Treasury, 28 September 1993, FM/2/13, Treasury files). 
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which, according to the Treasury was important because in the absence of 
contestable prices, "where possible, the price charged should be based on full 
cost-pricing, including depreciation and a return on capital" (T91/22, 8 January 
1991, Richardson files 780). The significant costs faced by the private sector and 
from which departments previously had been exempted were depreciation, finance 
costs in relation to both debt and equity, and taxation. The finance costs and 
taxation were incorporated in a capital charge designed to approximate those 
expenses, while asset valuations were important to determine the amount of both 
the capital charge and depreciation.  
Asset valuations 
Generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) allows reporting entities the 
choice of either historical cost or modified historical cost for reporting on assets, a 
point noted by those responsible for developing phase 2 of the incentives for 
departmental performance as significant for competitive neutrality principles 
(Treasury, 10 April 1990, Incentives project phase 2: capital charge/interest 
regime, Treasury files). 
Treasury instructions issued under s.80 of the Public Finance Act require all 
government departments to adopt modified historical cost for their valuation base, 
using net current value for land and buildings, and for intangible assets, 
depreciated replacement cost for specialised assets as determined by the Treasury, 
and historical cost for the remaining assets. This requirement to adopt the 
modified historical cost base automatically means that regular revaluations are 
required because of the provisions of applicable financial reporting standards 
(ICANZ, SSAP28; FRS3). The financial reporting standards require revaluations 
at least five-yearly, but the Treasury instructions require them at least three-
yearly. Treasury instructions also require departments to revalue any purchased 
identifiable intangible assets and, while noting the Public Finance Act's 
interpretation of contingent liabilities is narrower than that in GAAP, prohibits 
departments from recognising contingent liabilities (Treasury instructions, 
www.Treasury.govt.New Zealand/instructions/html).  
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Capital charge  
Early discussion of the capital charge assumed a goal of competitive neutrality, 
proposing that a capital charge be set at a rate appropriate to each department 
which would be the rate of a "private sector counterpart" (see chapter 6). From the 
Crown's perspective, the capital charge would represent "the return available from 
an alternative investment of similar risk" and would be based on adjustments to 
the 5-year rate for government bonds. Although the idea of an alternative 
investment makes no sense in the public sector, this discussion carried through 
into early announcements of the capital charge and departments were advised of 
the process required to negotiate their capital charge rate (TC1990/13, 25 October 
1990, p. 7, Treasury files). 
The Labour government in power until late 1990 had agreed that those 
departments without a private sector counterpart would be subjected to one of two 
alternative default rates related to the level of risk involved. These rates were to be 
set by the Minister of Finance but early in 1991, the default rates the Treasury 
proposed were so high that some ministers queried the charge. Whereas the 
interest rate on which the capital charge was based was 12%, the capital charge 
rates proposed were 20.5% and 17.8%. This prompted the review of the state 
sector reforms (Chapter 6) but, in addition, the Cabinet established a working 
group to make recommendations on "a capital charging regime for government 
departments which is tailored to the particular objectives and requirements of 
Government" (TC1990/13, 25 October 1990, p. 9, Treasury files; T91/71, 15 
January 1991, Richardson files 783; CEG(91)M9/4, 12 March 1991, Richardson 
files 936; CAB(91)M13/11, 8 April 1991, Richardson files 867; T91/1525, 18 
April 1991, Richardson files 663).  
The report of the working group viewed the overall objectives of the capital 
charge regime as "consistent with the Government's broader objective of getting 
improved departmental performance", and identified two specific objectives. The 
first of these was "to make clear the full costs of goods and services produced by 
departments" (emphasis in original). This was further explained as assisting 
"ministers to make decisions which are not consistently biased in favour of 
departmental production", and, where competition is limited, "to make more 
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informed choices on the basis of the full costs of the goods and services needed to 
achieve their policy objectives", with value-for-money more likely to be achieved 
by removing the bias in favour of capital-intensive outputs. The second specific 
objective was "to provide the information and incentives needed for efficient 
management of the Crown's investment in departments". Departments would 
receive output appropriations which cover all costs including the capital charge, 
but if departments were to reduce their net assets and return capital to the Crown, 
they would have "the flexibility to apply that capital charge amount to other 
inputs" (STA(91)68, 21 May 1991, p. 3-4, Richardson files 1033). 
This report stated that in principle the capital charge rates should be "agreed for 
individual departments based on the costs of capital and expected future growth 
for private sector counterparts", but proposed for the first year that a "single 
standard rate of capital charge be applied to all departments". Following some 
adjustment to the calculation process, the standard rate proposed was 13% based 
on an interest rate of 10% (STA (91)68, 21 May 1991, Richardson files 1033).35 
This was agreed and announced to departments, although this rate was also 
considered high. The Treasury was instructed to convene an officials group to 
monitor implementation of the charge and chief executives were advised that they 
would need to negotiate a capital charge rate for the following year. The media 
announcement of the capital charge regime stated that the charge "represents the 
return the Government might expect to obtain from an investment of similar risk" 
(STA(91)M15/6, 22 May 1991, Richardson files 988; CAB(91)M20/8, 27 May 
1991, Richardson files 868; TC1991/4, 7 June 1991, Richardson files 868; 
T91/2940, 6 July 1991, Richardson files 704; STA(91)108, 8 July 1991, 
Richardson files 1034; T92/2843, 15 September 1992, Richardson files 796). 
The officials group made several recommendations for further development of 
the capital charge regime, including that it should be based on the revalued 
amount of assets, and methods for incorporation of the charge in departments' 
                                                 
35 The first calculation process included an adjustment for expected future growth of private sector counterparts 
and a tax adjustment at the full tax rate of 33%. This was changed to an adjustment for inflation and to 
recognise that the effective tax rate approximated 20%. The high charges proposed which prompted the 
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output costs. It also made two proposals which the chairman of that group and the 
Minister of Finance opposed: a reduction in the standard capital charge rate for the 
1992/93 year, and a pilot scheme to establish department-specific rates.36 The 
Minister of Finance was requested to establish a process for setting department-
specific rates, and a pilot group of departments tested this process (T92/520, 21 
February 1992; Richardson files 809; T92/611, 28 February 1992, Richardson 
files 809; STA (92)35, 10 March 1992, Richardson files 958; CAB(92)M10/10, 
23 March 1992, Richardson files 837; T92/2618, 25 August 1992, Richardson 
files 794; STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, Richardson files 963; 
CAB(92)M38/7f; T92/2843, 21 September 1992, Richardson files 796; 
CAB(92)M43/12, 27 October 1992, Richardson files 874). 
The Treasury advised the Minister of Finance that department-specific capital 
charge rates would ensure that departments' activities are neither subsidised thus 
"crowding out possible private sector suppliers" nor charged out at "too high a 
price", and that they would encourage the use of relevant private sector 
performance indicators and techniques (T92/3403, 6 November 1992, Richardson 
files 802; STA(92)224, 10 November 1992, Richardson files 1012; 
STA(92)M38/2, 11 November 1992, Richardson files 1011). The department-
specific rates devised were "generally lower than the standard rate", thus 
supporting earlier assertions that the standard rate of 13% established in the first 
year was high in relation to private sector operations. The need to review the 
parameters for setting the standard rate was noted, as were the implications of 
applying the standard rate to derive third party charges: 
The client is faced with a charge that has built into it a rate of return that is perceived 
to be much higher than that prevailing in the industry. This problem may be general to 
the supply of non-contestable outputs to third parties (e.g., Justice registries). 
(ECC(92)451, 14 December 1992, Richardson files 955, p. 3). 
A further report on issues related to the establishment of department-specific 
capital charge rates was requested in time for the 1994/95 budgeting round, but no 
documentation has been found and no other departments received department-
                                                                                                                                     
review were based on an underlying interest rate of 12%, but this was reduced to 10%, with that change 
attributed to falling interest rates and the passage of time.  
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specific rates for their capital charge (ECC(92)M55/30, 15 December 1992, 
Richardson files 956; CAB(92)M52/36, 21 December 1992, Richardson files 
875). The pilot departments continued with department-specific rates, but those 
rates were abolished from 1 July 2001. Maintenance of department-specific rates 
"required considerable input from departmental finance staff as well as Treasury 
vote teams and Ministers" and therefore had "an associated compliance cost" 
(email from Treasury to S. Newberry, 2 November 2001). 
The parameters of the standard rate continued unchanged but more recently the 
Cabinet approved a modified formula for calculation to take effect from 1 July 
2002 (TC2000/16, 21 December 2000, Treasury files). This modified formula is 
based partly on recommendations made in 1997, but combined with changes in 
the method of determining the interest rates to reduce annual fluctuations (Lally, 
October 1997, www.treasury.govt.nz/costcapital; CAB(00)M42/11, 18 December 
2000, Treasury files)37. The parameters used in this revised capital charge suggest 
that the standard capital charge rate remains biased high in relation to private 
sector operations. Although the impact of this biasing was acknowledged for third 
party outputs, what was not acknowledged was its effect on outputs for supply to 
the Crown and the effect of decisions which ignore the effect on the Crown as a 
whole. Both were noted in a review of the capital charge regime (Box 8.4). 
 
                                                                                                                                     
36 There was disagreement within the group over the capital charge regime and its implications. The effect of 
changes in the capital charge rate was explained in the previous chapter. 
37 This recommendation followed the development of capital charge parameters for Crown companies and 
implied an increase in the capital charge rates determined. The comparison of the Crown company model's 
parameters and those applying to the capital charge regime is inconsistent with the actual application of the 
capital charge regime. Lally (1997) states that the capital charge regime applies a rate of 6.5% above the 
government stock rate. This 6.5% is an average of the high and low rates used (9% and 4%), but the 
method of applying the parameters does not result in a single rate of 6.5% and Lally's claim that the 
proposed changes are fundamental only in relation to taxes is incorrect. 
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Costing standards and guidelines 
The need for rigorous costing systems was argued on several bases and the 
promulgation of costing standards and costing guidelines was agreed. Following 
agreement to the proposed programme for the departmental management 
initiatives (Chapter 6), the Treasury devised cost accounting standards, which are 
incorporated in the Treasury instructions issued under s.80 of the Public Finance 
Act. These costing standards took effect from 1 July 1994. They require that all 
operating costs, whether direct or indirect, be assigned to outputs but that other 
expenses not be assigned to outputs.38 They also specify requirements for the 
documentation and disclosure of cost accounting policies, including policies on 
the assignment of direct and indirect costs, and consistency in applying those 
policies (Treasury, 24 October 1990, An overview of Mode C, Treasury files; 
                                                 
38 Depreciation and the capital charge are classed as operating costs. Other expenses are expenses that 
cannot be attributed to outputs and which require a separate appropriation. According to Treasury 
instructions other expenses are those expenses not related to the current production of outputs such as 
major restructuring expenses, asset write-offs and redundancy costs (TC1995/8). 
Box 8.4 Full production cost: asset valuations and the capital charge 
In 1993, Price Waterhouse reported on a survey of the benefits and current issues relating to 
the capital charge regime. The report noted that departments were considering renting assets as an 
alternative to owning them. "Renting assets would of course free up surplus capital and reduce 
both depreciation and the capital charge. On the other hand, the owner of the assets presumably 
needs to obtain a rent which is economic and covers the owner's costs of holding the assets . . . A 
particular reason which may make leasing more attractive than owning is the opportunity the 
lessor has to deduct depreciation for tax purposes. While this may result in a saving to the 
department there would possibly be a net loss of revenue to the Crown through reduced taxes of 
the lessor" (p. 14).  
Price Waterhouse also commented that, "The Justice Department will be required to compete 
with private sector providers of prison services. Justice Department prisons are likely to be older 
and less suitable for modern rehabilitation methods. Their value on a replacement basis (and 
therefore the capital charge) is also likely to be higher than the value (and target returns) of new 
purpose built prisons provided by the private sector. The higher cost of capital for Justice 
Department is compounded by higher operating costs. It will be necessary for Justice Department 
to understand the economics of alternative service providers and to develop an appropriate 
response. The subsidy involved in maintaining very old prisons may need to be isolated" (p. 20). 
From 1991 until 1993, the Department of Justice reported prison buildings on the basis of 
depreciated replacement cost. In its 1993 annual report, it adopted a specific in-use market value 
basis and revalued the prison assets. In combination with a general fall in property values, the 
effect was a downward revaluation of $111.689 million which also affected the future capital 
charge and depreciation expense. (Price Waterhouse, Capital charging regime for Government 
Departments - survey of benefits and current issues, August 1993; Department of Justice, Annual 
report for the year ended 30 June 1993, (ECC(93)318, 6 September 1993, Richardson files 911; 
ECC(93)M33/6, 7 September 1993, Richardson files 912; CAB(93)670, 10 September 1993, 
Richardson files 1246; CAB(93)M36/14ad, 27 September 1993). 
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Logan, 1991, recommendation 30; STA(92)46, 17 March 1992, Richardson files 
958; STA(92)M7/1, 18 March 1992, Treasury files; STA(92)147, 13 July 1992, 
Richardson files 961, p. 2; CAB(92)M28/8d, 20 July 1992, Richardson files 841; 
T92/2805, 11 September 1992, Richardson files 796; STA(92)258, 8 December 
1992, Richardson files 1013; STA(92)M42/3, 9 December 1992, Richardson files 
1011; ECC(92)428, 11 December 1992, Richardson files 955; ECC(92)M55/19, 
15 December 1992, Richardson files 956; CAB(92)M52/16q, 21 December 1992, 
Richardson files 875; Treasury, Cost Accounting Policy Parameters, Treasury 
instructions, www.Treasury.govt.NZ/instructions.html). 
The Treasury issued a booklet of costing guidelines in 1994. This booklet, 
which is guidance rather than an instruction under s. 80 of the Public Finance Act, 
recognises that costing systems in both the public and private sectors provide 
internal management information but that, in addition, the costs derived from the 
public sector system are used to determine the price of outputs, provide the legal 
limit for appropriation, and are externally-reported (Treasury, 1994, Improving 
output costing: guidelines and examples).  
Pricing 
The need to separate prices from costs of outputs was identified in the Report 
on Departmental Incentives, included in phase 3 of the first departmental 
incentives project, and then pursued as part of the departmental management 
initiatives project. Contestability, where possible, was considered the best way of 
achieving this but, in the absence of contestability, the use of pricing rules was 
advocated, examples of which were benchmarks based on the costs of a 
hypothetical efficient provider, or using the provider's prospective costs (Treasury 
and SSC, 1989, p. 17, Treasury files; T90/N12, 7 November 1990, Richardson 
files 758).  
Although "pricing (or cost comparisons)" were intended to complement the 
improved output specifications and be phased in over several budget rounds, the 
Treasury preferred prices set using the previous year's costs reduced by an 
efficiency dividend, arguing that the resulting resource pressure would force 
innovation and prompt improved quality. This cost-based rule was retained for all 
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outputs, but alternative output pricing methods would be "phased in on a case by 
case basis where this represents a cost effective opportunity for getting better 
value from purchasing for Government". The pilot project to devise a pricing rule 
suitable for pricing policy advice outputs resulted in a proposal for the use of 
benchmark prices independent of any individual provider's costs but the 
benchmark prices were not used for payment purposes (T91/2578, 17 June 1991, 
Richardson files 695; ECC(92)47, 9 March 1992, Richardson files 836; 
CAB(92)M9/20, 16 March 1992, Richardson files 837; T92/3696, 4 December 
1992, Richardson files 804; STA(92)258, 8 December 1992, Richardson files 
1013; STA(92)M42/3, 9 December 1992, Richardson files 1011; ECC(92)428, 11 
December 1992, Richardson files 955; ECC(92)M55/19, 15 December 1992, 
Richardson files 956; CAB(92)M52/16q, 21 December 1992, Richardson files 
875; T93/346, 24 February 1993, Richardson files 355; T93/367, 25 February 
1993, Richardson files 355; T93/1555, 21 June 1993, Richardson files 355; 
T93/1947, 28 July 1993, Richardson files 356; ECC(93)272, 2 August 1993, 
Richardson files 911; T93/2029, 6 August 1993, Richardson files 911; 
ECC(93)M29/1, 10 August 1993, Richardson files 912; T93/2111, 13 August 
1993, Richardson files 356; CAB(93)M30/8, 16 August 1993, Richardson files 
1018; ECC(92)306, 30 August 1993, Richardson files 911; ECC(93)M32/5, 31 
August 1993, Richardson files 912; T93/2490, 24 September 1993, Richardson 
files 356; Treasury, 30 October 1995, Financial management initiatives: the next 
steps, p. 4, footnote 7, Treasury files). 
A booklet of guidelines for setting charges in the public sector was issued in 
late 1997 and reissued in 1999, following the government's decision to encourage 
contestability. The booklet addresses user charging for outputs provided by the 
public sector, but proposes prior consideration of alternatives to public sector 
provision: whether the provision of particular outputs could be made contestable; 
whether the outputs should be out-sourced from the private sector; whether 
provision should be left to the private sector; and whether technology changes 
might affect cost recovery options. The booklet then identifies four types of 
goods: public goods, club goods, private goods and merit goods, but notes that 
merit goods combine elements of public and private goods. It sets out a 
framework to consider the charging options available, omitting merit goods from 
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the framework (p. 11-15). As with the costing guidelines, compliance with these 
pricing guidelines is not compulsory, although departments are likely to be 
required to show that they have followed them when (Treasury, 1999, "Guidelines 
for setting charges in the public sector", p. 5): 
legislation enabling the recovery of costs is reviewed; 
capital injections are sought for capital expenditure related to outputs whose costs are 
recovered;39 and  
approval is sought for a significant change in charges. 
These guidelines aim for full cost recovery and, although intended for services 
for which monopoly conditions exist, are not limited to those services (p. 3): 
COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY 
Although the guidelines focus on setting charges for public sector outputs, they are also 
intended to foster alternatives to public-sector provision of services by requiring some 
consideration of alternative sources of provision. By requiring the recovery of full costs 
in most cases, the guidelines also provide a means by which the costs of public 
provision can be assessed against private sector alternatives.  
The continued application of these guidelines to government departments was 
confirmed in 2000 (www.Treasury.govt.New Zealand/publicsector). 
The commercialisation strategy 
In the early stages of the financial management reforms, indications were that 
through commercialisation, competitive neutrality would be achieved. The 
introduction of depreciation and the capital charge were crucial to this 
commercialisation process. The competitive neutrality aspect of 
commercialisation, however, became blurred from 1991 and this blurring affected 
the costs introduced as a part of the commercialisation process. For example, early 
proposals that the capital charge should be consistent with the return from other 
investments of the same risk changed, less than a year after implementation of the 
capital charge regime, to a suggestion that the rate should be consistent with the 
rate earned by other government investments, with the expected return to be 
earned from the monopolist electricity-generating SOE presented as a comparison. 
                                                 
39 An explanation of this point was that the use of full costs recovers current costs which include depreciation 
over the life of an asset but that the government provides the initial financing of that asset. The possibility 
was raised that when there is a "high degree of overlap between current users and the future users" those 
initial capital costs could be recovered early through higher charges (p. 19). 
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Similarly, early discussion of the asset base for imposition of the capital charge 
and depreciation acknowledged that requiring assets to be reported at market 
values could remove "comparability with the private sector", while subsequent 
developments required particular revaluation policies, some of which later were 
taken up controversially in financial reporting standards. In addition, Treasury 
instructions require more frequent revaluations than do the financial reporting 
standards as well as revaluation of purchased intangibles (Treasury, 10 April 
1990. Incentives Project Phase 2: capital charge/interest regime, Treasury files; 
STA(92)35, 10 March 1992, Richardson files 958; TC92/3467, 13 November 
1992; ICANZ, FRS3).40 
Early proposals for introduction of the depreciation and the capital charge 
sought competitive neutrality and a "fair comparison between private sector and 
public sector service providers" but, after initial introduction, further 
developments were justified on the basis that departments should not be "given an 
unfair advantage of a lower cost of capital, forcing private sector participants out 
of the market". Having initially proposed the removal of any bias between the 
public and private sectors as a part of the commercialisation process, these 
developments, the non-development of department-specific capital charge rates, 
the continued application of the standard rate knowing that it was high, and the 
imposition of particular revaluation requirements for assets, might, arguably, 
ensure application of charges that look like those faced in the private sector, but 
those charges are high, thus implying the reversal, rather than the removal, of the 
earlier bias (T91/1229, 30 March 1991, Richardson files 653, p. 1; STA(92)35, 10 
March 1992, Richardson files 958; T92/3467, 13 November 1992, Richardson 
files 802; T94/54, 21 January 1994, Treasury files FM/2/2; T96/3632, 6 December 
1996, Treasury files; T98C/3430, 13 October 1998, FM/2/2 Treasury files).41 
                                                 
40 The requirement for revaluation of purchased intangibles is consistent with an international accounting 
standard which restricts revaluations by not allowing the revaluation of self-created intangibles. Prior to the 
issue of this standard departments were required to value their intangibles if possible.  
41 Draft documentation preceding these official rationalisations argued that the standard capital charge rate was 
“intended to: ensure that departments do not undertake activities in competition with the private sector. This 
happens when departments are given an unfair advantage of a lower cost for capital in their investment 
decisions” (Treasury, October 1992, Officials’ meeting, capital charge standard rate for 1993/94 and budget 
process to deal with a change in the capital charge rate, p. 4, Treasury files).   
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These commercialising developments were part of a regime in which 
comparative prices were expected to determine Ministers' resource allocation 
decisions without the need for direct intervention to force private sector 
involvement as had occurred in the United Kingdom. In other words, 
commercialisation would not necessarily create a competitively neutral regime, it 
would instead support privatising initiatives by disadvantaging public sector 
operations. Later comment and developments, however, suggest that 
commercialisation and competitive neutrality are the same or, as revealed in the 
pricing guidelines, that competitive neutrality has been achieved. For example, 
when the government adopted as a strategic priority a commitment "to encourage 
the contestable supply of resources and services in areas of public sector 
responsibilities", "indifference by Government as to whether the supplier of 
outputs is from the public or private sector" was an important part of this 
contestability strategy. The Treasury advised that a competitively neutral 
environment would allow "prices to signal how resources should be allocated and 
specifically to identify whether suppliers of inputs or outputs should be public or 
private sector agencies" (T92/2652, 29 September 1992, Richardson files 794; 
T93/434, 4 March 1993, Richardson files 817; Treasury, 1997, "Setting charges in 
the public sector", p. 3; Treasury, T98C/3994, 1 December 1998, Treasury files; 
Treasury, T99C/305, 23 February 1999, Treasury files).42 Public announcements 
of that contestability strategy stated that it would: 
encourage innovation and efficiency in both the public and private sectors. [The 
government] is developing new principles to open up opportunities for private sector 
supply in areas of public sector responsibility where this is in the interest of New 
Zealanders. (Birch, 1998, Budget Policy Statement 1999). 
To ensure the best use of taxpayers' money, the Government will continue to 
scrutinise the quality and effectiveness of its spending. This may mean that the 
Government funds private sector organisations to provide services where they can give 
better value for money. (Birch, 1999, Budget speech and fiscal strategy report 1999). 
                                                 
42 The Treasury's 1999 advice to the government about competitive neutrality did not claim that a competitively 
neutral environment existed, but the Treasury's pricing guidelines certainly suggest that that is the case. 
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Possibly, if a department's costs are biased high, privatisation may be 
politically acceptable if pursued as an expenditure reduction strategy, and if it 
appears to reduce costs (Box 8.5). 43   
                                                 
43 In the Report on Departmental Incentives one of the consultants involved had proposed that imposition of the 
capital charge on revalued assets would prompt optimal divestment decisions but, in phase two of the 
Incentives for departmental performance project, it was acknowledged that requiring revaluations would 
prevent comparability with the private sector and possibly bring the financial management reforms into 
disrepute (see Chapter 5). That consultant, in a publication, proposed that the capital charge regime was 
intended to encourage departments to sell surplus assets and return funds to the Crown, and to discourage 
departments from seeking capital contributions. Although the model is similar to that found in the private 
sector, "the adjustment is conservative in that it is biased against rather than in favour of government 
investment" (Lally, 1993, The cost of capital for government entities: an evaluation of the New Zealand 
Government's capital charge model, Treasury files). 
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The contestability strategic priority was dropped following the change of 
government late in 1999 and references to competitive neutrality died, with the 
terminology reverting to value-for-money.44 Evidently, the Treasury's competitive 
                                                 
44 Treasury documentation is clear that "competitive neutrality" and "value-for-money" may be viewed as 
synonyms, although the value-for-money focus suggested in late 1999 proposed that the term 
encompassed four dimensions (see Chapter 6 and T99/61, 20 December 1999, Treasury files). According 
Box 8.5 Privatisation: political strategy or expenditure-reducing fiscal strategy? 
Work commenced on the privatisation of aspects of the prison system as early as July 1989 
when the Strategos report was issued. The National Party's 1990 election manifesto stated its 
commitment to increase the role of the private sector in the prison system. From 1990 to 1993, the 
period covered by Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson's archives, considerable efforts were made 
to pursue this commitment: Justice officials' involvement in opening services to foreign 
investment; the pursuit of legislative changes; and departmental restructuring and revisions to 
output classes and output specifications.  
Although the building and operation of prisons and provision of escort services were classified 
as role of the state issues, the project was pursued as an expenditure reduction project. The 
inevitable cost increases arising from the conflicting manifesto commitments to both considerably 
increase police numbers and reduce government expenditure evidently provided a rationale for 
urgency, pursuit under the expenditure reduction strategy, and the ECC's involvement. Authorised 
public announcements stated that the "contracting process will allow costs savings and improved 
comparison of service delivery options".  
The Penal Institutions Act required amendment before contracting arrangements could be 
commenced and this was achieved in 1994, followed by penal institutions' operational standards 
which came into effect in 1999. Essential to the contracting process was the need to show that, 
"the successful tenderers won their contracts purely on merit." This required "systematic 
evaluation by a group of independent experts, the seeking of Cabinet committee approvals at each 
critical stage, and with the final decision being made by Cabinet." In 1998, "the Government 
announced that it intends to build and contract out the management of a new remand prison in 
Auckland". In 2000, after competitive tendering processes, Australian Corrections Management 
was operating the new Auckland Central Remand Prison under contract, while Chubb New 
Zealand Ltd was the provider of escort and courtroom custodial services in the Auckland and 
Northland areas. (T91/500, 19 February 1991, Richardson files 631; letter, R. Richardson to D. 
Graham, Richardson files 104; T91/610, 26 Feb 1991, Richardson files 634; CAB(91)M16/2a, 29 
April 1991, Richardson files 868;letter, P. East, Acting Minister of Justice to R. Richardson, 14 
June 1991, Richardson files 104; CAB(91)M23/28h, 17 June 1991, Richardson files 869; 
T91/4246, 23 September 1991, Richardson files; ECC(91)302, 12 November 1991, Richardson 
files 1027; ECC(91)319, 18 November 1991, Richardson files 1020; ECC(91)312, 18 November 
1991, Richardson files 1027; T91/5197, 29 November 1991, Richardson files 345; T92/470, 18 
February 1992, Richardson files 756; T92/731, 12 March 1992, Richardson files 809; T92/955, 1 
April 1992, Richardson files 345; ECC(92)96A, 7 April 1992, Richardson files 836; ECC(92)96B, 
7 April 1992, Richardson files 836; ECC(92)96C, 7 April 1992, Richardson files; 836; 
ECC(92)M12/2, 8 April 1992, Richardson files 1101; ECC(92)201, 25 May 1992, Richardson files 
1052; ECC(92)M28/7, 26 May 1992, Richardson files 1101; T92/2527, 18 August 1992, 
Richardson files 345; CSC(92)M37/6a&b, 26 August 1992, Richardson files 1105; CSC(92)153, 
13 October 1992, Richardson files 1105; CSC(92)M52/5, 28 October 1992. Richardson files 1105; 
T92/3228, 20 October 1992, Richardson files 345; CAB(93)M15/25, 3 May 1993, Richardson files 
1018; CSC(93)M29/10; 14 July 1993, Richardson files 1019; CAB(93)536, 16 July 1993, 
Richardson files 1245; CAB(93)M26/14, 19 July 1993, Richardson files 1018; CSC(93)M29/11; 
14 July 1993, Richardson files 1019; CSC(93)M29/11, 14 July 1993, Richardson files 1019; 
Department of Justice, Annual report for years ended 30 June 1993 -30 June 1996; Department of 
Corrections, Annual report for years ended 30 June 1996 - 30 June 2000). 
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neutrality developments were re-aligned to focus on value-for-money, along with 
the other developments occurring under the value-for-money theme (see Chapter 
6). The Labour coalition government has stated that it wishes to “maintain and 
strengthen the public sector” (Advisory Group, 2001, p. 10). It does recognise, 
however, that it is attempting to deliver services within constrained resources and 
identifies improvements in value-for-money as one possible source of funding for 
new initiatives because expenditure reductions achieved will enable the 
redirection of spending (Cullen, 2001, Budget Policy Statement). 
Increased detail and more sophisticated monitoring 
The idea of the output purchasing model assumed competition, and that the 
existence of competition would help to improve efficiency. The removal of 
"biases toward government provision" of outputs, combined with assumptions that 
departments could control all of their costs, requirements that departments use an 
explicit output costing system, and prohibition on them from cross-subsidising 
outputs would allow "effectiveness and efficiency of resource use" assessments by 
comparing outputs with those available in the private sector (Ball, 1993a, p. 5; 
Ball, 1993c; 1995; Scott and Ball, 1993, p. 6; Scott and Gorringe, 1989, p. 87). 
Similarly, the compilation of financial reports by output class would allow debate 
about the particular output classes purchased, the prices paid for those outputs, 
comparisons with the private sector, and assessment of departments' effectiveness 
in producing those outputs (Scott and Ball, 1993). 
The biases toward government provision of outputs had been reversed by 1993 
and the departments required to incorporate the increased costs in their output 
costs. Following the proposal for more sophisticated monitoring (Chapter 6), both 
purchase agreements and technical reviews of those agreements were introduced, 
with a dual reporting process adopted for the technical reviews (see Box 8.3). The 
                                                                                                                                     
to the Treasury, value-for-money is not defined in any legislation and so there is no single “right” definition 
(email, Treasury to S. Newberry, 12 November 2001). From the commencement of the reforms, most 
comment on value-for-money has suggested that price comparisons between public sector providers and 
alternative providers will help to achieve value-for-money, and  this is evident from quoted documentation 
presented earlier in this chapter. A recent explanation states that "reliable value for money assessments 
can only be made if costing decisions are based on information that reflects the full cost of providing a 
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same proposal for more sophisticated monitoring argued the need to ensure that 
departments deliver the required services at reduced costs, suggesting that 
achieving this through the vote analysis function would not imply reversion to 
centralised input controls  (T93/233, 10 February 1993, Richardson files 1093). In 
its briefing to the incoming government after the 1993 election, the Treasury 
proposed in-depth reviews of departments' activities, with those reviews 
conducted outside the budget cycle by Treasury, the State Services Commission 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. These reviews would 
consider alternative policy instruments, such as regulatory intervention instead of 
expenditure, focus "on achieving better quality service and cost-effectiveness", 
and would allow ministers to deal with more strategic matters such as 
determination of policy goals and outcomes instead of these day to day matters 
(Treasury, 1993, p. 19, 28, 97; 1996, p. 15). 
The 1994-95 incentives developments received support from Coopers and 
Lybrand’s report on their review of departments' costing systems which  proposed 
that the Treasury encourage departments to develop good costing techniques. 
Those techniques, which identify costs "at a more detailed level than output", 
would allow production of that more detailed costing information to underpin 
purchase agreements. This would require a focus on output components, called 
intermediate outputs, and allow increased application of pressure on departments 
through competitive bidding, cost benchmarking, and, for high volume outputs, 
the negotiation of variable funding within the budget appropriation (Treasury, 30 
November 1994, Surplus retention, Treasury files; September 1995, Coopers and 
Lybrand pp 6-8, p. 38, Treasury files).45 The negotiation of variable funding 
within the output appropriations was called the separation of price and cost. 
Because a departments' output appropriations set a maximum amount for its costs, 
the separated price for outputs could only be less than those costs given that 
exceeding the appropriated amount would be illegal. With departments' output 
                                                                                                                                     
service. The capital charge is an important mechanism to help achieve this". (TC2000/14, 20 October 2000, 
p. 7, Treasury files).  
45 Coopers and Lybrand’s review was one of an ongoing series of good practice reviews intended to assess 
departments' financial management systems and to provide departments with examples of good financial 
management systems (Coopers and Lybrand, 1995). 
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costs viewed as variable when compared with other providers of outputs and 
intermediate outputs, the likely effect of these developments was recognised. 
Departments were likely to experience financial difficulties, especially because 
they were constrained from expanding their activities (Treasury, 24 October 1995, 
Efficiency and innovation in the public sector, FM7/4, Treasury files). A variable 
funding pilot project with the Customs department stalled when fractious 
relationships developed and, although other variable funding projects were 
recommended, it is not clear that any proceeded (Treasury, 1999, Output 
pricing/baseline reviews, Treasury files; Discussion Treasury June/August 2001).  
The Treasury (1996) advised the incoming government of that year that lack of 
competition facing departments, and information imbalances between departments 
and Ministers, impeded price and quality comparisons with other providers. It 
proposed for inclusion within the budget cycle specific processes with a value-for-
money focus. These would require departments to demonstrate improvements in 
the quality of spending, examine "opportunities for contracting out, benchmarking 
prices or costs, and [evaluate the] effectiveness and continued need for additional 
resources provided in earlier Budgets" (Treasury, 1996, p. 126, 132). The 1999 
briefing, however, noted concerns about capability and hardly mentioned such 
matters. 
The Treasury’s role and the commercialised model 
Gorringe (1995a and 1995b), a Treasury staff member and a key reformer in 
the early stages, had thought that the objective of the financial management 
reforms was the achievement of allocative and productive efficiency. He regarded 
the Treasury's role as one of resource allocation and demonstrated, using 
mathematical models, that attention to "the big allocation questions" is far more 
effective for achieving allocative and productive efficiency than attention to fine 
detail (1995a, p. 5-7, 16). 
Gorringe believed that a rhetoric had been built around output purchasing and 
argued that when the purchasing model was devised and applied to all 
departments, the output specification and measurement problems, and the adverse 
consequences of adopting such a model, had been underestimated. Many outputs 
Chapter 8 Commercialisation and purchasing 195
 
 
 
may be "definable, homogeneous and measurable to a degree sufficient to allow 
some comparison with similar services" elsewhere, but such comparisons merely 
provide rough checks which are unsuitable for "profit centre governance" (1995a, 
p. 21). These specification and measurement problems also meant that the idea of 
surplus retention then under reconsideration was inappropriate because it offered 
“outrageous incentives for shading the quantity and quality of outputs, with the 
likelihood of damaging the Crown's purchase interest in both the short and the 
long term” (Gorringe, 1995b, p. 12). 
According to Gorringe, the reality of budgeting was that it consisted of 
allocations "for ill-specified groups or classes of idiosyncratic, heterogeneous 
outputs that do not lend themselves to 'pricing' individually, and much less so as a 
group". In the private sector this would result in employment of staff rather 
piecework contracting arrangements, vertical integration rather than arms-length 
contracting, cost centres rather than profit centres, quality control via specification 
of some key inputs or product guarantees, and cost measurement (1995a, p. 11). 
He viewed as inappropriate the attempt to devise detailed output specifications 
and costs for use in an arms-length purchasing process as suggested by the 
contracting rhetoric. Further, even if arms-length contracting were appropriate, 
mode B appropriations for costs, together with the dubious conceptual basis of the 
capital charge, is inappropriate for use with such a process. 
Gorringe questioned the "resources devoted to a contracting regime", arguing 
that attempts to "improve the translation of politicians' preferences into outputs 
are likely to have a low yield in terms of allocative efficiency" (1995a, p. 5-7, 16). 
He believed that "the gains from a fine specification of contracts may not be so 
great in the [budget] sector, and a broader specification may be more cost-
effective" (1995a, p. 5-7, 14, 18, 21). Stressing "one chief message", Gorringe 
argued that the continued emphasis on competitive market ideas was 
inappropriate:  
We are on the wrong track if we put more and more emphasis on trying to make our 
system resemble as closely as possible contracting arrangements which are found in 
environments where measurement is easy. (1995a, p. 12). 
The financial management system developments then occurring within 
Treasury required departments to provide increasingly detailed information and 
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Gorringe believed that these developments risked repeating the "excesses of the 
old input control regime". Arguing that a group within the Treasury had gone "off 
the rails", Gorringe observed that the previous onerous input controls had been 
replaced with a growing "information and accountability Leviathan":  
The danger is that the new accountability regimes may grow and grow until the 
deadweight and dynamic losses they impose become the impetus for a new set of public 
sector reforms. The new regime's costs are not met by the regulators, and the usual set 
of dynamics that gives rise to this is operating. (Gorringe, 1995a, p. 21).  
Gorringe did propose an alternative to those developments but it required 
revisiting both the State Sector Act 1988 to reconsider the employment security of 
chief executives, and the Public Finance Act 1989 to allow some reversion to 
input controls (1995a, p. 9, 12; 1995b). He argued for recognition of the "more 
subtle efficiency properties" required for incomplete contracting, such as the 
hierarchy of organisational routines that comprise a department's capabilities. 
These are ignored by the private sector-oriented principal-agent model, and 
Gorringe proposed replacing that model with a commitment model for "long-term, 
incomplete, 'relational' contracts" which would require shared understandings, the 
development of such cultural factors as morals, ethics and staff commitment, and 
trusting chief executives.  
Chapter summary 
This chapter explained the commercialising developments applied to all 
aspects of departmental operations. The developments commenced as the creation 
of an output purchase model which would allow cross sector comparisons, but the 
commercialisation of departments’ outputs was obviously contentious, with the 
specification of outputs and output classes resulting in some friction between 
departments and the Treasury. The Logan report had noted that there seemed to be 
no common or clear idea of the intent or eventual endpoint of the financial 
management reforms (see Chapter 5), and the dual reporting process adopted with 
the technical review of purchase agreements seems rather furtive, suggesting that 
the intent was not widely known. The report to the Secretary for Justice implied a 
concentration on technical matters, while the report to the Minister demonstrated a 
much more obvious privatising intent. Departmental management obviously were 
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aware of privatising developments but, perhaps, unaware of the extent of the 
privatising agenda. 
The other key aspect of the commercialising development required 
determination of full costs which, supposedly, would allow valid comparisons 
between departments’ output costs and competitors’ output prices. Departments’ 
costs were knowingly biased high, with much of that high biasing caused by asset 
revaluation requirements which feed through to a capital charge based on a rate 
that is also biased high, and to depreciation expense recognition requirements. 
High costs of compliance with the increasingly detailed accounting requirements 
required for the “information and accountability Leviathan” (Gorringe, 1995a, p. 
21) would also have increased departments’ costs, especially given the ideas from 
1994 onwards that the accountability developments should require departments to 
do the monitoring work. While the published pricing guidelines suggest that these 
commercialising developments created a competitively neutral environment, 
clearly they did not. The commercialisation strategy created a contracting regime 
biased against public sector providers. Comparisons of departments’ full costs 
with private sector providers may suggest that contracts should be awarded to the 
private sector providers when, in fact, the result will be more expensive for the 
Crown.  
The idea that this output contracting regime did not generate the competitive 
environment expected coincided with recognition that under a new MMP electoral 
system, highly unpopular developments, such as privatisation, would be difficult 
to sustain. The lack of competition and information imbalances at the output level 
provided the rationale for driving the commercialised approach to a more detailed 
level. The proposals for in-depth reviews conducted by central agencies as a 
means of relieving ministers of day-to-day detail suggests that the comparative 
processes would be conducted by those central agencies at a less visible level, 
while allowing ministers to ignore such matters and focus on more strategic 
matters. The nature of the monitoring and review processes developed is the 
subject of the next chapter. Gorringe’s arguments over these developments, 
however, made two important points. First, having thought that the financial 
management reforms aimed for productive and allocative efficiency, Gorringe’s 
comments suggest that some other goal had taken precedence. Second, if 
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productive and allocative efficiency were to be the goal, Gorringe suggested that 
both the model and the legislation required change. 
This chapter has focused on the conditions created for the purchasing model 
and, in effect, that model provides a means of determining the resources to be 
supplied to a department and how those resources will be used. Another rule 
constrains departments’ ability to retain resources and this, together with the 
development of monitoring and review processes, is considered in the next 
chapter.  
  
 
9 Resource retention, monitoring and review 
The two-step budget process uses rules to determine the amount of resources 
departments will receive. A separate rule has developed to determine the extent to 
which departments may retain resources. Section 14 of the Public Finance Act 
requires that any operating surplus be returned to the Crown and,  like the budget 
baselines and commercialisation processes, this rule has developed over the years. 
This chapter commences by explaining development of the rule and its effect, 
before considering the broader monitoring and review processes anticipated and 
developed. Finally it examines the detailed baseline review processes developed 
as a central agency task. Examples from the Department of Statistics and the 
Inland Revenue Department illustrate various aspects of these processes. 
Resource retention and repayment of operating surplus 
Departments receive resources as a result of the budgeting process outlined in 
Chapters 7 and 8, but their annual financial reports are used to determine the 
extent to which they may retain resources. A department's reported operating 
result will either increase or decrease its level of net assets but the Public Finance 
Act refers only to surpluses, interpreting an operating surplus as "the amount by 
which departmental revenue exceeds the expenses of a department" (s. 2).46 The 
act requires that: 
except as agreed between the Minister and the Responsible Minister, no operating 
surplus resulting from the activities of that department shall be retained by the 
department. (Public Finance Act, 1989, s. 14). 
Evidently, this requirement is based on the view that all profits of a department 
belong to the owner, and that it is the owner's prerogative to decide whether to re-
invest such profits in a department (Treasury, March 1991, FMRP3, p. 4). 
                                                 
46 The interpretation of departmental revenue is "revenue generated by a department . . . resulting from the 
supply by the department  . . . of goods, services, rights, or money to other parties, including the Crown" 
and expenses is "expenses measured in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice; and 
includes costs" (s.2). Between 1989 and 1992 operating surplus was interpreted to include abnormal and 
extraordinary items. This changed in 1992 to remove reference to those abnormal and extraordinary items. 
The change was related to anticipated accounting developments intended to abolish extraordinary items. 
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Although the Act is silent, earlier comment on operating losses views them as "a 
measure of poor performance" and rejects any idea that departments might receive 
a capital contribution to offset such losses (Treasury, November 1989, FMPG7, p. 
1).  
Early Treasury documents referred to the reported operating result simply, as 
the 'bottom line' of the operating statement. They were, therefore, consistent with 
the interpretation of operating surplus in the Public Finance Act 1989 (Treasury, 
November 1989, FMPG7, p. 1). Subsequent Treasury instructions, however, 
although issued subject to the provisions of the Public Finance Act (s. 80), modify 
that interpretation. The Treasury instructions contain conflicting statements. On 
one hand, all Treasury instructions should be read in conjunction with the Act, 
and "all terms [in the Treasury instructions] have the same meaning as in section 2 
of the  . . .  Act". On the other hand, the instructions state "the Treasury will from 
time to time issue a Treasury Circular to define the operating surplus and how to 
calculate it", thus ignoring the interpretation in the Act (Treasury instruction 3.5). 
In 1991 the Treasury advised the Minister of Finance that the Act's 
interpretation of operating surplus, although appropriate under most 
circumstances, requires adjustment for the purpose of calculating the amount of 
surplus for repayment to the Crown (T91/3722, 23 August 1991, Richardson files 
727). At the time, the Treasury proposed adjustments to the operating surplus 
based on an interpretation of operating surplus that is "tighter than that in the Act 
and is therefore not inconsistent with the legal requirements" (T91/3722, 23 
August 1991, Richardson files 727). One adjustment related to the speed of 
implementation of accrual accounting and the need subsequently to adjust the 
amounts at which assets and liabilities were reported. These were considered 
merely corrections of the opening position which should be excluded from the 
operating surplus for repayment. Another related to the interest earned on 
departments' bank accounts. Cabinet had decided that the "interest earned from 
departmental bank accounts  . . . is returned to the Crown as part of a department's 
operating surplus", but, with effect from the 1990/1991 financial year, this 
                                                                                                                                     
Although extraordinary items were not abolished, they were restricted to such an extent that they are 
expected to be very rare events (see FRS7). 
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decision was extended to require that "the full amount of interest earned should be 
returned to the Crown irrespective of any losses that a department incurs". This 
was stated to be an interim position awaiting further policy development as part of 
the incentives project (CAB(91)M8/13; 4 March 1991, Richardson files 867; 
T91/3722, 23 August 1991, Richardson files 727; Treasury, TC1994/15, 13 
September 1994, Treasury files). (see Chapter 6 for the introduction of interest in 
conjunction with the capital charge regime). 
Since 1991 when this first reinterpretation of operating surplus occurred, the 
rule for determining the operating surplus for repayment to the Crown has evolved 
into a complicated three-step process. The philosophy underlying this process is 
that any operating surplus belongs to the owner, but any operating deficit reflects 
poor departmental performance and must be borne by the department. For the 
purpose of applying this philosophy, the reported operating result is viewed as 
comprised of several distinct parts, each of which must be considered 
separately.47 Each part of the operating result that represents a surplus 
automatically returns to the owner, while each part that represents a deficit is 
borne by the department. 
The evolution of the three-step rule is complex and occurred over a period of 
five years. Today, the process to determine the amount of surplus for repayment 
involves a first step which applies adjustments to the operating result reported in 
the financial reports; a second step which identifies and totals four figures 
included in the financial report; and a third step which compares the results of the 
first two steps and requires payment to the Crown of the higher positive figure.  
The first step requires reversing out of the reported operating result the effect 
of: adjustments arising from the implementation of accrual accounting; all other 
expenses; and any deficits on Mode B net outputs (deficits from the sale of 
outputs on a competitive basis to third parties). Then, any realised revaluation 
reserves, which, under GAAP requirements are excluded from the reported 
                                                 
47 The operating surplus for which departmental retention might, eventually, be considered is restricted to the 
supply of outputs to the Crown. To date, retention has not been allowed and, as suggested in chapter 6, 
retention seems unlikely until competitive pricing and payment in arrears has been achieved. 
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operating result, must be added. With the possible exception of the adjustments 
arising from the implementation of accrual accounting which are no longer an 
issue, the effect of all of these adjustments is to increase the reported operating 
surplus or to reduce any reported deficit, possibly with the result that the adjusted 
figure is a surplus.  
As these repayment of surplus requirements evolved reasons were stated for 
the adjustments. The reason for reversing other expenses out of the reported result 
was that when a department received an other expense appropriation without 
specific funding, the expectation was that the department would absorb the 
expense and therefore "you would expect that, all other things being equal, the 
Taxpayers' Funds would decrease" (Treasury, TC1994/15, 13 September 1994, p. 
1). This, however, contrasts with the early explanation to the Minister of other 
expenses which stated that "in cases where the operating surplus achieved by a 
department in the supply of outputs is large enough, ownership costs will reduce 
but not eliminate the operating surplus and thus will not reduce taxpayers' funds" 
(T91/4462, 8 October 1991, Richardson files 750). The adjustment for Mode B 
net deficits was required to ensure that departments should not be allowed to 
offset third party output costs against "revenue Crown from Mode B gross 
outputs; interest earned; [or] other ownership gains from departmental operations" 
(STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, Richardson files 963; CAB(92)M38/7f, 21 
September 1992, Richardson files 843; T92/3246, 4 November 1992, Richardson 
files 800). The adjustment for the realised revaluation surpluses was because 
under GAAP such surpluses are excluded from the reported operating result. After 
adding back to the reported operating result each of these items, the adjusted 
result must be compared with the result of the second step which is outlined below 
(Treasury, T91/3722, 23 August 1991; Richardson files 727; Treasury, 
TC1994/15, 13 September 1994, p. 1; STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, 
Richardson files 963; CAB(92)M38/7f, 21 September 1992, Richardson files 843; 
T92/3246, 4 November 1992, Richardson files 800).48 
                                                 
48 It was recognised that the sale of an asset and the use of the proceeds to purchase another merely 
exchanges one asset for another. “For example, suppose a building is purchased for $20m, building prices 
increase, and the building is then sold for $30m and replaced by an identical building for the same price but 
in a different location. There is no obvious reason why the $10m gain should be called income rather than 
Chapter 9 Resource retention, monitoring and review 203 
 
 
 
The second step to this repayment of operating surplus rule ignores the 
reported operating result, which may be a deficit, and requires selection of certain 
figures from the operating statement to determine the minimum amount for 
repayment. These are the total of interest revenue, any net gain on sale of fixed 
assets, and any realised net revaluation reserve transfers where these are positive. 
The aggregated deficits from Mode B net outputs must also be added, thus forcing 
a reduction in taxpayers' funds in the event that a department incurs a loss on 
those outputs. (STA(92)190, 8 September 1992, Richardson files 963; 
CAB(92)M38/7f, 21 September 1992, Richardson files 843; T92/3246, 4 
November 1992, Richardson files 800; ECC(92) 375, 9 November 1992, 
Richardson files 955; ECC(92)M50/11, 10 November 1992, Richardson files 955; 
ECR(94)M34/1, 27 September 1994, Treasury files; Treasury, TC1994/15, 13 
September 1994, p. 4; Treasury, TC1996/2, 22 September 1997). 
The final step for application of the repayment of surplus rule is comparison of 
the figures resulting from the two prior steps and repayment of the higher of the 
two figures. The effect of the rule is that departments will always repay to the 
Crown at least the amount of any reported operating surplus as that term is 
interpreted in the Act, but they may be required to repay considerably more than 
that, thus eroding taxpayers’ funds while reported deficits cause further erosion 
(Table 9.1).  
                                                                                                                                     
capital solely to prevent its retention by the department. If the department could not retain the $10m it would 
have to reduce its physical capital” (Treasury, 1992, Lally: the base for calculating the capital charge, p. 9, 
Treasury files, emphasis in original). 
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Table 9.1 Repayment of operating surplus 
 Department of Statistics Inland Revenue Department  
Y/e Reported 
operating 
result 
 
$'000  
Surplus 
repaid 
 
 
$'000 
Total 
effect on 
taxpayers' 
funds 
$'000 
Reported 
operating 
result 
 
$'000  
Surplus 
repaid 
 
 
$'000 
Total 
effect on 
taxpayers' 
funds 
$'000 
30/6/90 -383 0 -383 N/a N/a N/a 
30/6/91 -10 0 -10 -143 0 -143 
30/6/92 204 -204 0 11,400 -11,400 0 
30/6/93 -3,657 -175 -3,832 6,471 -6,471 0 
30/6/94 -2,779 -61 -2,840 -1,020 -4,989 -6,009 
30/6/95 -2,166 -420 -2,586 4402 -9,825 -5,423 
30/6/96 -2,362 -792 -3,154 -35,041 -7,897 -42,938 
30/6/97 -5,713 -306 -6,019 3234 -3,234 0 
30/6/98 81 -81 0 4,320 -4,320 0 
30/6/99 -1,982  -1,982 6,470 -7,060 -590 
30/6/00 -187  -187 7,650 -7,650 0 
Total -18,954 -2,039 -20,993 7,743 -62,846 -55,103 
Monitoring and review processes 
From the outset of the financial management reforms, much was made of the 
need for monitoring the government’s purchase and ownership interests in 
departments to offset the increased freedom allowed to chief executives. 
Apparently less important was the monitoring of the delivery and suitability of 
outputs, which was considered the consumers’ responsibility (Treasury, 1984; 
Treasury, 1990; T90/N12, 7 November 1990, Richardson files 758). 
The central agencies intended to focus their attention on financial performance 
assessment techniques which would impose "strong incentives and pressures for 
efficiency through better management of balance sheets" (Scott, 1996, p. 65; see 
also, Dale, 1992; Ball, 1995; Scott et al. 1997, p. 376). Chief executives were 
considered crucial to the reformed financial management system because 
departments’ performance was their responsibility. A chief executive’s continued 
employment and part of their remuneration would, therefore, depend on their 
department’s achievement of specified results (Scott and Gorringe, 1989; Scott et 
al, 1990, p. 17; Ball, 1993a; Scott et al., 1997).  
The State Services Commissioner is responsible on behalf of the government 
for chief executive performance assessments (State Sector Act 1988). According 
to advice to the incoming Minister of Finance in 1990, the relationship between a 
responsible minister and departmental chief executive should be formalised in a 
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written performance agreement which states the performance expected of the 
chief executive and the basis for assessment of that performance (T90/N14, 7 
November 1990, Richardson files 758). Three features should be incorporated in 
those agreements: the government’s output purchases from the department 
(representing the government’s purchase interest); the department’s financial 
performance (representing the government’s ownership interest); and the 
management practices to be observed. Since 1991 written performance 
agreements, which include those features, have been required. Following the 
Logan review, a fourth feature consistent with the government’s stated fiscal 
strategy at the time, expenditure constraints, was incorporated as representative of 
the government’s collective interests (Treasury, 1990; Briefing to the Incoming 
Government; CSC(91)2, 12 February 1991, Richardson files 989; T91/1737, 1 
May 1991, Richardson files 670; CSC, 9 May 1991, Richardson files 989; 
CSC(91)29, 14 May 1991, Richardson files 989; Logan, 1991, Recommendation 
6, p. 64; Recommendation 8; CAB(92)M3/3d, 3 February 1992, Richardson files 
837; STA(92)20, 10 February 1992, Richardson files 958; CAB(92)M6/12, 24 
February 1992, Richardson files 837; STA(92)95, 18 May 1992, Richardson files 
960, p. 2; STA(92)M15/1, 20 May 1992, Richardson files 840; CAB(92)M20/43, 
25 May 1992, Richardson files 840; CAB(92)M28/18, 20 July 1992, Richardson 
files 841). Similar requirements have also been written into corporate plans, 
appropriations, budgets, and the financial reporting system (Scott and Gorringe, 
1989, p. 81-89; Scott and Ball, 1993, p. 8; Ball, 1995, p. 5; Scott, 1996, p. 63; 
Scott et al, 1997, p. 360).  
The Treasury explained the government’s interests in departments in more 
detail. The government’s purchase interest required knowledge of the manner in 
which outputs contribute to outcomes and ensuring that the agreed outputs are 
delivered and comply with specifications, although much of that monitoring 
function would be the consumer’s responsibility. The government’s ownership 
interest covered four dimensions: “financial performance, capitalisation, area of 
business, and managerial practices”, each of which was explained in more detail 
(T90/N13, 8 November 1990, p. 1, Richardson files 758). 
Financial performance could be compared with that of private sector operations 
or SOEs, and so it could be assessed by return on taxpayers’ funds, with good 
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financial performance considered to result from good management and financial 
management practices. The level of a department’s capital (taxpayers’ funds) 
represented the investment by its owners, and would “have a major impact on how 
it operates”. The nature and volume of the outputs produced by a department 
would help to determine the level of capital to be invested in that department. The 
area of business in which a department is involved was important because it is up 
to the owner to “determine  the type(s) of outputs it wishes an organisation to 
produce and therefore the type of business it wishes to be in”, while “owners also 
have the right to dictate management practices they want applied” (p. 2). Some 
departments had commenced operation under the accrual accounting regime in 
weak financial positions and with negative working capital, suggesting that for 
some departments, the asset base was inadequate (Table 9.2). 
Table 9.2 Financial position on commencement of accrual accounting 
 Department of Statistics
1 July 1989
$'000 
Inland Revenue Department  
1 July 1990 
$'000 
Current assets 910 3,185 
Current liabilities 4,180 33,144 
Working capital -3,270 -29,959 
Fixed assets 6,978 66,532 
Taxpayers funds 3,708 36,573 
Six features of good ownership monitoring were identified and explained 
(T90/N13, 8 November 1990, p. 1, Richardson files 758). The first two features 
required control over a department’s capital, and a public statement of the 
department’s business area. The financial management system established already 
imposed some controls over capital by prohibiting departments from borrowing 
and by requiring the return of operating surpluses to the Crown. Increases in a 
department’s capital required a capital contribution and departments seeking such 
a contribution would be required to show that they could generate an adequate 
return. Decreases in a department’s capital would result from Ministerial review 
and decisions about capital withdrawal, and from the capital charge regime which 
would encourage departments to return capital to the owners (p. 3). Area of 
business decisions had, until that time, been ad hoc, resulting from the State 
Services Commission’s machinery of government reviews and output purchasing 
decisions, but “a more deliberate approach” was suggested (p. 4). 
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Three features of good ownership monitoring related to reporting: the public 
reporting of financial performance targets at the beginning of the reporting period; 
the public reporting of actual performance compared with those targets after the 
end of the period, together with reporting of business areas; and ongoing reporting 
and monitoring of both financial performance and business area (p. 3). Most of the 
public reporting features had been captured by the Public Finance Act reporting 
requirements but more detailed requirements should be incorporated in chief 
executives’ performance agreements. For ongoing monitoring and review, 
departments were required to produce monthly monitoring reports for their 
Responsible minister, with these reports forwarded to the Minister for Treasury 
analysis. 
The sixth feature of good ownership monitoring was the imposition of controls 
over managerial practices, but these should be minimised: 
Any stipulation of management practices by the owner is effectively an input control 
which limits the discretion of the chief executive. While this might be desirable in some 
cases, it should be treated with caution to ensure that detailed input controls don’t result. 
Not only may input controls actually hinder efficiency, they also reduce the 
accountability of chief executives. (p. 3). 
A formal ownership monitoring cycle was proposed. It consisted of four 
elements, the first of which was a strategic review prepared by each department 
before the commencement of the financial year, and covering the nature of the 
department’s business, its asset base and the efficiency of asset use. The second 
element required capital investment reports to assess capital contribution requests 
and any investments that exceeded a chief executive’s authority49; while the third 
was progress reviews which would focus on the department’s performance in 
relation to the ownership targets established for it. The fourth element was in-
depth efficiency reviews, which would be required in the absence of external 
comparators or independent checks of output pricing. Examples of such reviews 
were conducted by the State Services Commission and external parties (T90/N13, 
8 November 1990, p. 1, Richardson files 758; T91/763, 6 March 1991, 
                                                 
49 This ambiguous meaning of the term capital, as investment by the government in a department, and as a 
department’s investment in fixed assets is a consistent feature of the financial management system.    
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Richardson files 638, p. 3). Arguably, responsibility for ownership monitoring 
was not clear because the legislation was not explicit:  
The Treasury’s interest has been subsumed within its overall responsibility for 
providing advice to the Minister of Finance on economic and financial matters. In 
addition, the State Services Commission has statutory backing through the State Sector 
Act, namely the function of “… review(ing) the performance of each department, 
including the discharge by the chief executive of his or her functions.” Clearly both 
organisations have a role to play. At this stage, we see no immediate reason to further 
clarify (eg through legislation) the roles of Treasury and the State Services Commission 
in this area. While the potential for some duplication exists, we would want to discuss 
our work with the Commission to ensure that departments were not being “over-
reviewed”. We would envisage that the Treasury focus will be more directly linked to 
the budgetary process than that of the Commission, which is likely to conduct less 
frequent reviews.  (T91/763, 6 March 1991, Richardson files 638, p. 2).  
The ownership monitoring cycle was proposed for inclusion within the annual 
budget cycle and a pilot exercise of ownership monitoring was proposed which 
would focus on the strategic overview report. This strategic overview would 
include an assessment of each department’s asset base. These early intentions for 
the Treasury’s role in monitoring and review required analytically-skilled 
Treasury staff with specific industry and business knowledge, financial analysis 
skills, documentation, communication and marketing skills, legal knowledge and 
internal auditing skills. Those staff would engage in "senior level professional 
working relationships", work alongside departmental management, and advise the 
Minister about strategic, economic and financial issues related to departments 
(Treasury, T90/N13, 8 November 1990, Ownership monitoring). Lack of skilled 
staff meant that this monitoring regime did not eventuate (Treasury, 12 December 
1995, Vote analysis: a strategy for lifting our game, Treasury files). 
The State Services Commission was instructed to develop an approach to 
performance assessment in consultation with the other central agencies, the 
Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. There was some 
friction between the central agencies over the Treasury's role in performance 
assessment and the Treasury was, initially, largely excluded. Eventually, in mid-
1992, a process for completing and assessing performance agreements, which 
included the department's corporate plan in the agreement and included the 
Treasury, was agreed (STA(91)46, 30 April 1991, Richardson files; 
STA(91)M13/8, 8 May 1991, Richardson files 934; T91,2343, 6 June 1991, 
Richardson files 688; STA(91)M22/5, 17 July 1991, Richardson files 934; 
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CAB(91)M34/9, 19 August 1991, Richardson files 871; T92/1149, 14 April 1992, 
Richardson files 786; CO(92)11, 13 May 1992, Richardson files 1005).  
The 1993 proposal for the Treasury to adopt a more sophisticated approach to 
advice on expenditure and departmental performance implied that the Treasury 
was extending its monitoring and review role, possibly without the State Services 
Commission’s knowledge or involvement. The Treasury defended this monitoring 
development as within its mandate because the Treasury supplies second opinion 
advice to the Minister (see Chapter 6, Financial management initiatives). The 
Treasury acknowledged that it was “not clear about ‘ownership’, why it matters 
and the relationship between the purchase and ownership interests that the Crown 
has in departments”. With a common vocabulary suggested at that time, the 
Treasury’s ownership vocabulary increasingly referred to risk management 
(T93/233, 10 February 1993, Richardson files 1093, p. 4). Although reference to 
the government’s different interests in departments has continued, there is little 
evidence to suggest those different interests affect the annual reporting function 
(Box 9.1).  
Box 9.1 The inter-connection of the purchase and ownership interests 
Published financial reports contain information about departments' alignment with the 
government's objectives but there is no specific ownership focus. The Department of Corrections 
exemplifies this lack of a specific focus in its most recently published annual report by classifying 
as Purchaser/Owner Interest the statement of responsibility; statement of objectives and service 
performance; the financial summary; and the report of the Audit Office. It classifies for 
Management Interest information about capital projects, information technology, human resource 
management, public service ethics and integrity, and statutory and advisory board reports. 
(Department of Corrections, Annual report 1 July 1999 - 30 June 2000). 
The 1994 and 1995 internal Treasury proposals for more focused monitoring, 
including ownership monitoring, brought acknowledgment that the Treasury 
lacked sufficient skilled analytical staff. Monitoring and analysis fell to relatively 
junior and unskilled vote analysis staff who were difficult to retain. The effective 
use of the information already available was in doubt in the absence of skilled 
staff, and it was, therefore, unlikely that Treasury could perform this monitoring 
function (Treasury, 12 December 1995, Vote analysis: a strategy for lifting our 
game, Treasury files). Discussion with Treasury staff suggests that the same lack 
of skills exists today (Interviews Treasury, June 2001).  
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The clear specification and monitoring of the ownership interest had been 
recommended, with effect from the 1995/96 financial year (12 October 1994, 
Report of the Working Party to the Advisory Group: review of accountability 
requirements, p. 1, Treasury files; Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus 
retention, p. 5, Treasury files). A working group on ownership, which included 
representatives from the State Services Commission and departments, devised 
proposals, discussion points and suggested ownership interest specifications 
which were circulated to chief executives. Following consultation, four ownership 
dimensions, intended to "provide chief executives with a framework within which 
to develop their departmental ownership strategies" were devised: departments' 
strategic alignment with the government's objectives; the integrity of the public 
service; ensuring that the public sector has the capability to meet demands to be 
imposed on it in the future; and ensuring that departments' production of outputs 
is cost effective over the long run. 
The cost-effectiveness dimension had received little discussion in the 
consultative sessions (State Services Commission, 1998, The ownership interest: a 
composite record of the discussion sessions among chief executives and senior 
managers – July 1995). That dimension, however, is linked with the capability 
dimension because it implies that “the price paid allow[s] appropriate investment 
in long-run capability, so as to avoid unnecessary costs in the future” (State 
Services Commission, 1998, Taking Care of Tomorrow Today). 
The Treasury had proposed extracting maximum leverage by shifting the 
burden of proof onto departments, and the expenditure constraints requirement in 
chief executives’ performance agreements was replaced with the responsibility for 
ensuring management of the ownership interest, with each of the four ownership 
dimensions annexed to the chief executives' performance agreements. These 
ownership dimensions included self-review prompts for the chief executive to 
incorporate when reporting to the responsible minister. Chief executives are 
expected to apply pressure to departmental costs through benchmarking, co-
operative cost reductions, and consideration of contracting out a department’s 
non-core functions (Treasury, 30 November 1994, Surplus retention, Treasury 
files; Treasury, 21 November 1995, Vote analysis priorities over the next two 
years, p. 3-4, Treasury files; State Services Commission, 1998, Taking Care of 
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Tomorrow Today; State Services Commission, Proforma for the 2000/2001 chief 
executive performance agreement). 
From 1995, departments' budgets were required to identify the links between 
departmental activities and the government's strategy as developed into SRAs, 
KRAs and milestones. The KRAs and milestones were then drawn into chief 
executives' performance agreements. With the subsequent change in terminology, 
identification of the way in which a department will contribute to key government 
goals is now required (Proforma for the 2000/2001 chief executive performance 
agreement, www.ssc.govt.nz/siteset/htm).  
In 1996, the Treasury proposed incentives for chief executives to improve 
departmental information systems, with those incentives intended to avoid over-
reliance on the central agencies. In addition it proposed an increased range of 
sanctions for poor performance, and improved incentives for good performance 
including a higher proportion of chief executives' pay at risk (The Treasury, 1996, 
p. 111). From 1997, the proportion of chief executives' remuneration made subject 
to performance assessment increased from 10% of the total remuneration package 
to 15% (Gregory, 2001, p. 224). 
The Treasury's financial performance assessments of departments are included 
as part of the State Services Commission's chief executive performance 
assessment process (Treasury's 2000/01 Core Performance Expectations, 
www.treasury.govt.nz/publicsector/corexp/2001); Proforma for the 2000/2001 
chief executive performance agreement, www.ssc.govt.nz/siteset/htm). 
Assessment of chief executive performance, however, covers all of the 
requirements imposed on those chief executives and so is not confined to the 
financial aspects of departmental performance. Instead, a chief executive's 
performance is viewed as a combination of personal and departmental factors. 
Particularly significant in the personal contribution is the chief executive's 
relationship with the Minister and key stakeholders. Consequently, information 
used to assess chief executives' performance is drawn from a variety of sources, 
just one of which is financial performance assessments (State Services 
Commission, Interview June 2001). 
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Clearly the effect of financial rules developed has been diluted in the 
assessment process. Other more detailed review processes have developed, 
however, in which financial information derived from the financial management 
system is likely to be applied more strictly. These are the baseline review 
processes.  
Baseline reviews 
Chapters 7 and 8 noted that departments must bid for increased resources and 
that the budgeting process erodes departments’ resources with the intention of 
forcing such bids. At that time an output price review (OPR) will be conducted. 
Another more recent development is a value-for-money review (VFM) which 
examines spending within a department’s baseline. The names of both forms of 
baseline review imply little more than revisiting the amounts paid to a department 
to produce its outputs, but they involve considerably more than that. They require 
assessment of the extent to which a department's outputs contribute to the 
government's desired outcomes, reconsideration of whether the department is the 
appropriate agency to supply those outputs, and then assessment of the output 
prices (State Services Commission, 26 April 1999, Output pricing reviews - a 
guide (draft), State Services Commission; Treasury, 8 March 2001, Value Wheel, 
Treasury files). 
Output price review (OPR) 
Output price reviews (OPR) were introduced in late 1996. An OPR will result 
if Cabinet accepts the recommendation of the Treasury and the State Services 
Commission that the sustainable delivery of a department's "core organisational 
outputs" is at risk either because the level of output appropriations provided to the 
department is inadequate, there is an increasing level of demand for the outputs 
concerned, or the department's financial condition, including its ability to maintain 
its core organisational infrastructure, is at risk. Even if the outcome of an OPR is 
acknowledgment of inadequate output prices, decisions about increased resources 
must be made during the new initiatives phase of the budget cycle when all 
resource proposals are prioritised. The decision "on the volumes to be purchased, 
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and the source of outputs, in order to determine the changes in baselines" is a 
separate one (State Services Commission, 26 April 1999, citing CSC(96)M17/2). 
A chief executive seeking increased resources for departmental outputs must 
first prove that a price increase is justified while also knowing that additional 
resources might not follow. The Cabinet minute establishing the requirements for 
OPRs did not specify the level of proof required but draft guidelines for OPRs 
indicate both the level of proof required and the likely OPR process (Treasury, 
1999, Output pricing/baseline reviews, Treasury files; State Services Commission, 
26 April, 1999, Output pricing reviews - a guide (draft), p. 6-8). This draft was 
prepared following State Services Commission concern over the output price 
review process, and its CAP project seemed at least, in part, to represent an 
attempt to adopt an alternative approach (State Services Commission, 13 January 
1999, "Future application of output pricing reviews: incentives, options and 
strategies", Treasury files (see chapter 6)). The draft represents the OPR as a joint 
process between the State Services Commission, the Treasury and the department 
concerned, although more recent documentation suggests that Treasury will 
conduct the review, involving the Commission only if the government's 
ownership interest is affected (CO(00)12, 23 November 2000). 
Proof of the need for an output price review 
The chief executive must prove the need for an OPR by producing evidence 
which makes readily apparent that "a substantial receivership or resource capacity 
risk" exists. This evidence must show either "serious erosion, or risk of erosion, in 
the quality of outputs"; or serious core staff retention problems and resource 
maintenance problems; or a prior argument for "a substantial need for bolstering 
ownership capacity through other investment" (Treasury, Output pricing/baseline 
reviews, Treasury files; State Services Commission, 26 April, 1999, Output 
pricing reviews - a guide (draft), p. 6-8). 
An OPR request must also be supported with information about the 
circumstances leading to the request, the operation of the department's cost 
allocation and reprioritisation processes, an analysis of the relative worth and 
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appropriateness of the department's interventions, and a quantified proposal to 
remedy the risks identified (State Services Commission, 1999, p. 7).  
Benchmarking information must be produced to demonstrate "that there are no 
further efficiencies to be obtained from current operations of the department". 
That demonstration requires proof that the department's management systems 
function well and that the department complies with best practice with respect to 
both the government's purchase interest and its ownership interest (State Services 
Commission, 26 April 1999, citing CSC(96)M17/2). This, in turn, requires "well-
framed" output specifications; adequate cost allocation systems; competitive 
prices supported by evidence from external sources; previous efficiency gains 
reflected in lower prices; good strategic planning processes; "good performance 
management systems and human resources policies"; evidence that known 
efficiency gains have been identified and achieved, including unbundling the 
outputs, market testing the intermediate outputs, and "consideration of substitution 
of inputs"; and an appropriate balance sheet structure (State Services Commission, 
26 April 1999, citing CSC(96)M17/2).  
The scope of an OPR must be sufficiently broad to allow targeting of 
inefficiencies and low priority outputs. It must cover most of the department's 
output classes and have a potential impact of no less than $10 million in annual 
baseline changes or in capital contributions, and the chief executive must accept 
that "the review will include examination of the appropriateness of agency 
activities requiring investigation of potential: business process re-engineering 
solutions; outsourcing solutions; minor organisational redesign solutions." These 
requirements mean that a chief executive must prove circumstances that the 
central agencies should already be aware of (Box 9.2). 
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An OPR seems to involve an adversarial process. The applicant chief executive 
must bear the burden of proof by producing substantial information while, from 
the Treasury's perspective at least, the aim to maintain that burden of proof 
implies that little, if any, helpful information will be provided to the chief 
executive (Treasury, 1999, Output pricing/baseline reviews, Treasury files). 
Ideally an OPR would assess the appropriateness of all of a department's output 
classes, conduct a "full management audit of departmental management systems 
and resourcing using industry comparators", and benchmark a broad set of a 
department's outputs. An OPR might not achieve that ideal, but it does consist of 
the three processes suggested by the ideal: an output mix examination to 
determine the particular mix of outcomes required to allow the government to 
achieve its objectives; a resource analysis to confirm the existence of serious 
capacity risks and to assess the proposed remedies; and a price efficiency 
evaluation to assess the department's comparative efficiency (State Services 
Commission, 26 April 1999). 
Box 9.2 Proof of the need for an output price review 
Between 1992 and 1996, the Department of Statistics' annual reports explained how funding 
reductions and the department's inability to meet the required third party revenue targets impaired the 
department's ability to function. As early as 1993 the Treasury advised the ECC of the department's 
lack of resources and the resulting fiscal risks to the Crown.  
In 1996, the Government Statistician commented on the hurdles to be jumped before additional 
resources would be provided (see Box 8.1). The Department of Statistics was the first government 
department to undergo an OPR and this was conducted between September 1996 and February 1997. 
The bibliography of resources used during that OPR includes eleven separate reports prepared by the 
department during 1996: Adjustments to State Sector Reforms; Annual report of the Government 
Statistician for the year ended 30 June 1996; Diversity of Markets for Official Statistics; New 
Directions in Statistical Publishing; Marketing and Sales Division Business Plan: 1996/97; Official 
Statistics: Cost and Price Issues and Trends; Paying for Official Statistics: an Analysis of the 
Funding and Contracting Arrangements for Today's World and Tomorrow's Challenges; Towards a 
new Segmentation Schema; Statistics New Zealand Asset Base and Impact on Economic Value; 
Statistics New Zealand Corporate Plan 96/97; and SNZ Output Costs Review: Summary of Analysis 
and Conclusions.  
The OPR report acknowledged prior awareness of financial difficulties, commenting that "during 
the last few years it has become apparent that Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) faces a number of 
significant problems", and referred to "recent Annual Reports of the Government Statistician" for 
information about those problems which included: "funding difficulties, in particular the inability to 
meet the third party revenue targets . . . ; wider trends such as globalisation  . . . [which challenge] 
SNZ's ability to maintain the quality and relevance of existing statistics; increasing user demand for 
more timely statistics and a greater range of economic and social statistics; and shortages of skilled 
and experienced staff" (ECC(93)329, 20 September 1993, Richardson files 911; ECC(93)M35/4, 21 
September 1993, Richardson files 912; CAB(93)M36/10c, 27 September 1993, Richardson files 
1018; Report of the Government Statistician, years ended 30 June 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996; The 
Statistics New Zealand Output Price Review, March 1997).  
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Output mix examination 
An output mix examination considers the government's desired objectives, the 
appropriate mix of purchases required to achieve those objectives, and alternative 
purchase options available to the government. This examination has three 
components: outcome analysis, output-outcome analysis, and development of 
output mix options. 
The outcome analysis identifies the outcomes sought by the government by 
considering its strategic priorities, as well as various statutory obligations and 
requirements imposed on the department. It therefore requires identification of the 
contributions to those outcomes, the "appropriate role of Government" in relation 
to those outcomes, and the "strategic fit" between those outcomes and the 
department's outputs (State Services Commission, 26 April 1999, Output pricing 
reviews - a guide (draft), p. 16). Determination of the appropriate role of 
government uses general "machinery of government principles" which propose 
that government should intervene only if market forces or community provision 
will not achieve the desired outcomes, a cost-benefit analysis shows that the 
benefits exceed the costs, (with the costs of not intervening or of intervening 
inappropriately also identified), there is no duplication of other agencies' 
operations, and contestability is not possible or transaction costs are excessive 
(State Services Commission, 1999, p. 17). These machinery of government 
principles also require consideration of the department's role, including whether 
other output providers exist. Evidently these machinery of government principles 
have changed since the 1989 machinery of government review of the Department 
of Statistics which required it to generate sufficient third party revenue to cover 25 
per cent of its gross expenses (Box 9.3).  
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The output-outcome analysis attempts to assess the contribution of the 
department's outputs to the government's desired outcomes, and this was 
acknowledged as a difficult task. The development of output mix options relies, to 
some extent, on the result of the output-outcome analysis which, presumably, 
would allow consideration of alternative outputs to achieve the outcomes. It is, 
however, intended to provide ministers with output mix alternatives intended to 
meet the government's medium to longer term objectives. 
Resource analysis 
The resource analysis process is determined by the Cabinet's agreed strategy 
for the particular OPR, but it is intended to assess the department's ability to 
produce its outputs over the medium term. The resource analysis examines the 
human, financial and physical resource gaps identified by the chief executive. 
Given the burden of proof requirements, it is not clear whether an OPR would 
consider the adequacy of resources not already identified by the chief executive. 
Box 9.3 OPR and output mix examination: machinery of government principles 
The 1996 output mix examination of the Department of Statistics required development of 
criteria to decide which outputs the government should purchase and the department's scope of 
business beyond that. It was based on a "public policy framework which draws a distinction 
between public and private goods", with the requirement that Ministerial purchases relate to public 
goods, leaving those outputs with private good characteristics to be funded by groups of users. 
Potential funding sources were classified as Minister pays, club funding, and 3rd party funding. 
The public good statistics were those that provide "a central measure of New Zealand's economic 
and social performance" and were "strongly market and/or politically sensitive, or central for 
forecasting and policy design, with a large number of users and a high need for 
independent/technical specification and long-term continuity of supply, or critical to the 
production of such statistics." Application of the criteria involved considerable subjectivity and 
circularity, and the need for refinement of the assessment criteria was noted.  
This output mix examination identified as clearly public goods statistics which included Gross 
Domestic Product, Balance of Payments, the Consumer Price Index and the Census of Population 
and Dwellings. Beyond the public good statistics, the department's scope of business should be 
confined to “outputs with synergy to core official statistics that: can be produced profitably, do not 
put the core business at risk, do not exploit Statistics New Zealand's statutory powers and 
monopoly position, or crowd out possible private sector providers." Noting that the department 
must retain custody of confidential information, the possibility of franchising was raised.  
According to the Government Statistician, the OPR concluded that a national statistical office 
should attend to its core business instead of attempting to act as "a market research or information 
analysis house to reduce its government funding base. Rather, funding from sources other than 
directly from the taxpayer may expand the range of official statistics, to the extent that insufficient 
priority is given to national objectives on health, education or justice." Commenting on the trend 
away from "some traditional areas of statistics . . . and measurements less critical to the national 
accounts" he noted the "understandable reluctance" of various sector groups to "accept that 
previously publicly funded measures for their industry are becoming, in the government's eyes, a 
partial private-good-type service" (The Statistics New Zealand Output Price Review, March 1997; 
Report of the Government Statistician, years ended 30 June 1997, 1998). 
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The resource analysis involves two steps: resource assessment and systems 
assessment. The resource assessment requires prior identification of the 
department's expected future core competencies so that the nature of the resources 
required to sustain those competencies may be determined. The systems 
assessment compares the department's management systems against the technical 
standards of good practice and devises an appropriate programme to bring those 
systems into line if necessary. As revealed in the resource analysis for the 
Department of Statistics, some disagreement may arise (Box 9.4). 
Box 9.4 OPR and resource analysis 
According to the report of the OPR, the resource analysis was "required to ensure that any 
proposed price adjustment would be effective in sustaining SNZ's core business". Assessments 
were conducted of human resources, financial management, financial condition, information 
technology and strategic management. 
Human resources: High staff turnover and skill shortages were attributed primarily to 
uncompetitive salaries. Staff lacked career development opportunities, adequate technical training, 
and adequate management development. "Generally, SNZ will have real difficulty in maintaining 
an adequate succession pool and the appropriate skill set for specialist and managerial staff unless 
a substantial ongoing additional investment is made." 
Financial management: The department's financial management was assessed as having both 
strengths and weaknesses. Development priorities identified included an internal audit capability, 
budgeting improvements, an improved output management focus and improved output costing 
systems, and long-term planning for asset replacement. The good practice standards sought for the 
output costing systems required output component costing. Long-term planning for asset 
replacement was lacking and the department had no resources for long term asset replacement: 
"Because SNZ has been spending all of its depreciation as it goes it is likely that SNZ's long-term 
capital replacement needs will be greater than its current internal financing capability. This means 
that either the Crown will have to fund the shortfall (something it is unlikely to favour given that it 
has already funded it once), or SNZ will have to run cash surpluses until such time as an adequate 
reserve is established."  
Financial condition: this assessment focused on operating profitability and the balance sheet 
structure. The department's operating deficits, which "have been supported by Treasury as a way 
of managing the adjustment to a higher third party activity" had resulted in an "ongoing 'structural 
deficit' problem" which meant "the Crown is funding output delivery through the back door of 
deficit funding. This understates the true cost of outputs . . . SNZ should move to a fully funded 
output basis and away from deficit funding." The balance sheet structure was "unsustainable" 
because "SNZ has insufficient cash reserves to meet its current operating commitments (let alone 
its capital commitments). This problem is the direct result of the owner's agreement to allow SNZ 
to produce more outputs than the funding allowed."  
According to the Government Statistician, "The strategic planning, financial management, 
human resources and information technology management systems were all judged to exhibit 
many aspects of good practice . . .  There were some areas where capability improvements were 
assessed as desirable, and these are being followed up with provision made during the budget 
process. A major issue arising several times during the review was the issue of cost allocation. It 
was concluded that costs should be allocated to a finer level of detail, so that the cost drivers of 
individual production processes for the core statistics and third party revenue statistics are more 
transparent." The OPR recommended "SNZ should consider using allocation of direct and indirect 
cost to each database and output on the basis of specific cost drivers for each production function" 
(Report of the Government Statistician for the year ending 30 June 1997; The Statistics New 
Zealand Output Price Review, March 1997). 
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Price efficiency evaluation 
The price efficiency evaluation attempts to determine minimum output prices 
that are sustainable over the medium to long term. Evidently such prices provide 
some assurance that departments are paid a competitive and fair price for their 
outputs. The price efficiency evaluation relies on benchmarking, and requires 
clear output specifications, a clear model of the department's output production 
functions, and sound cost allocation systems. It involves two steps: an input 
efficiency assessment and price/cost benchmarking.  
The input efficiency assessment compares the department's key input costs 
with other norms. Typical key input costs relate to staffing and pay rates, property 
management, and other major expenditure items such as information technology. 
Contracted specialists may conduct this step. 
The price/cost benchmarking draws on three possible approaches to 
benchmarking. Price benchmarking for output provision requires selection of a 
representative output and checking the department's price either through 
competitive tendering or by obtaining a shadow price. This requires alternative 
suppliers or potential alternative suppliers for an output or output class. If price 
benchmarking is not possible, the cost benchmarking of representative outputs is 
considered the next best alternative. For this to occur the production process 
function must be formulated and "appropriate external benchmarking partners" 
engaged to benchmark both the business process and the costs. When 
representative outputs cannot be cost benchmarked, the next alternative is to 
analyse the department's output production into production functions so that fully-
costed shadow tenders may be obtained for similar production functions 
performed by others. 
Because the price efficiency evaluation is resource intensive, generally only 
two or three pilot benchmarking exercises are conducted. Ideally, these exercises 
should be representative of a department's outputs, but the reduced focus of this 
evaluation process allows the targeting of areas where savings may be possible 
(State Services Commission, 26 April 1999, Output pricing reviews - a guide 
(draft); Treasury, 1999, Output pricing/baseline reviews, Treasury files). The 
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price/efficiency evaluation process is also expected, over time, to allow decisions 
on the future, more systematic, application of benchmarking in the department 
concerned. Apparently, a cost benchmarking exercise requires finely detailed 
costing systems to enable benchmarking of individual production functions, thus 
explaining the dispute during the Department of Statistics' OPR about the costing 
systems and the recommendation that benchmarking processes be continued with 
proposed completion by 31 December 1998 (Box 9.5). 
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Value-for-money (VFM) review  
The VFM review was trialled in 2000. With recognition that resources for new 
budget initiatives were limited, a search commenced for resource re-allocation 
from within existing budget allocations. The objectives of the first VFM review 
were to: 
improve the effectiveness of public spending and ensure consistency with the 
Government's policy objectives and priorities; 
increase funding for new initiatives in future budgets through re-prioritisation and 
management of fiscal risks. (POL (00) M15/1, 28 February 2000, Treasury files). 
Box 9.5 OPR and price efficiency evaluation 
The price efficiency evaluation of the Department of Statistics involved two pilot 
benchmarking studies of the department's production functions but the review concluded that the 
department should improve its cost allocation processes and "reduce the data information gaps 
from the external benchmarking partners" before continuing to apply benchmarking to all of its 
outputs. The "pilot surveys have not produced any conclusive evidence that the prices for these 
two databases are 'unfair' to either party, the purchaser or the service provider." The Government 
Statistician described the process adopted: "As Statistics New Zealand does not operate in a 
commercial market place, it is difficult to determine prices that are 'fair' to both the purchaser and 
the department. The approach adopted is to benchmark the department's costs of producing 
statistical outputs against those of equivalent activities that do operate in competitive markets. This 
is a process that will take time to implement across the large number of different statistics 
produced, but it will ultimately provide assurances that the department's prices are such that the 
government is getting value-for-money".  
Recommendations of Output Price Review: Department of Statistics 
The recommendations of the output price review sought changes to: 
• output definitions: more detailed output specifications and costings in purchase agreements; 
• the cost allocation system: to allocate costs for each production function 
• price benchmarking: ongoing joint work with Treasury and the State Services Commission to 
benchmark the cost of each production function; 
• scope of business: to apply the machinery of government criteria to all future decisions on 
changing outputs, and to make alternative arrangements with other suppliers for those third party 
outputs that could be supplied efficiently by them 
• planning: extend planning to include all assets and develop corporate strategies 
• financial position: provide additional financial resources for adequate staffing, restructure the 
balance sheet; agreement between the department and Treasury on third party sales figures; 
• financial management: that the department develop internal audit capability, that Treasury and 
the department work on "accounting for statistical databases as assets" and payment on delivery of 
outputs 
The department received a capital contribution of $4 million and improved output prices. The 
Government Statistician commented that, "We are well placed to meet the challenges and take up 
the opportunities likely to arise over the next five years", and that "many of the issues detracting 
from the potential of the department in earlier years had been addressed". In 1999, however, 
following the ongoing benchmarking project, he argued "In essence, we should not judge the 
efficiency of the Government's official statistical business by the least cost of a series of individual 
survey transactions. Rather, we should compare the total long-run costs and benefits of the whole 
official statistical system in creating knowledge bases that have the integrity necessary for 
government and the community" (The Statistics New Zealand Output Price Review, March 1997; 
Report of the Government Statistician, years ended 30 June 1997, 1998, 1999). 
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This review process, conducted outside the budget cycle, attempted to develop 
a "sound process for testing existing baselines" with those vote areas unable to 
demonstrate such a process considered low priority for the purposes of 
distributing additional resources. In accordance with the resource re-allocation 
intent of the process, the baseline testing does not extend to baseline increases 
which must be considered as part of the normal budget process. Resources found 
from the VFM reviews were to be re-allocated, with the finance ministers 
recommending the re-allocation either within the vote, within a group of votes or 
according to budget priorities determined by the finance ministers (POL (00) 
M15/1, 28 February 2000, Treasury files). 
In 2001, the VFM review process remains the same but is now viewed as 
contributing to the first stage of the budget process and therefore as integrated into 
that budget process. The Minister of Finance and the relevant vote minister, on the 
basis of Treasury and departmental advice, decide on particular reviews. Reviews 
are targeted to those areas where there is likely to be the greatest scope for VFM 
gains. Typical steps involved commence with ministers identifying an area for 
review, and the department conducting a review in consultation with Treasury, the 
State Services Commission, and other appropriate departments. The department 
then reports to the ministers, the Treasury provides second-opinion advice, and the 
ministers decide the outcome which may, if policy changes are involved, require 
Cabinet consideration (email Treasury to S. Newberry, 12 November 2001). 
The nature of the techniques used in a VFM review is suggested by Treasury's 
value wheel which is intended as a simple analytical device to assist vote analysts. 
It requires answering a set of questions in order (Box 9.6): 
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Box 9.6 Value wheel: techniques for spending assessments 
 
Value wheel (Treasury, 8 March 2001) 
1. Direction: Outcome performance 
measurement and alignment to government 
goals 
1.1 Is the outcome(s) clearly specified? 
1.2 Is the outcome(s) aligned to the 
government's key goals? 
1.3 If information can be collected, are there 
clear performance measures and reporting? 
⇓ 
8 Economy: input monitoring and control 
8.1 Are input costs appropriate given the 
required outputs? 
8.2 Are all services that should be bought rather 
than made contracted-out? 
8.3 Is the mix of inputs appropriate to provide 
the contracted outputs? 
 
⇑ 
2. Effectiveness: Ex-ante intervention 
analysis 
2.1 Is there a clear rationale for government to 
intervene? 
2.2 Is it the best possible intervention? 
2.3 Is the level of intervention appropriate? 
2.4 Is there a process to evaluate achievement 
of outcomes? 
⇓ 
7 Efficiency: production and processes 
7.1 Are production costs reasonable? 
7.2 Processes are not duplicated or replicated? 
7.3 Is production efficient? 
 
 
 
 
⇑ 
3 Effectiveness: Ex-post policy evaluation 
3.1 Has the intervention achieved the desired 
outcome(s)? 
3.2 Has the intervention been effective? 
3.3 Would evaluation justify continuation of 
current policy programmes? 
3.4 Is the mix of outputs appropriate to meet the 
desired outcome(s)? 
⇓ 
6. Efficiency: output measurement and 
delivery 
6.1 Have the contracted outputs been delivered? 
6.2 Have the contracted milestones been 
achieved? 
6.3 Are the outputs of the required quality? 
 
⇑ 
4. Delivery (current and future = capability): 
governance and accountability arrangements 
4.1 Is it the right organisational design? 
4.2 Is the corporate strategy aligned and 
appropriate? 
4.3 Are accountability documents contractible? 
4.4 Does management have incentives to 
disclose under-performance?       
⇒ 
5. Delivery (current and future = capability): 
output pricing and funding arrangements 
5.1 Is the right output price being paid? 
5.2 Is 3rd party pricing appropriate? 
5.3 Is government funding sufficient to 
maintain future production capability? 
5.4 Are the financial management information 
systems robust? 
The presentation of this set of questions as a wheel requires drawing a link 
between the first set of questions, those considering the direction and alignment 
with the government's goals, and the last set of questions, those requiring 
economy, input monitoring and control. In the wheel, the link between these two 
sets of questions is represented as value-for-money. According to the Treasury, 
this link might be viewed as the relationship between inputs and outcomes, with 
VFM improving if more outcomes may be achieved from the same inputs. The 
relationship between inputs and outcomes therefore implies all of the four key 
dimensions of VFM identified in 1999: efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and 
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innovation (T99/61, 20 December 1999, Treasury files; email Treasury to 
S.Newberry 12 November 2001).  
The process stated for applying the value wheel is to ask each of the questions 
in order. If following a negative answer to any question, "further analysis would 
add value for money, and the work cannot be delegated to another agency, then 
public expenditure analysis by Treasury is indicated" (Treasury, Value wheel, 8 
March 2001, emphasis in original). The process suggested is acknowledged as 
resource intensive and in reality is likely to be more selective. Further, the 
statement on the value wheel that "public expenditure analysis by Treasury is 
indicated" is misleading and a better description would be "Treasury analysis may 
be indicated". The VFM process may, therefore, be less formal than suggested in 
the value wheel while its logic is acknowledged as similar to that of an output 
price review (OPR) (emails Treasury to S. Newberry, 2 November 2001, 12 
November 2001). 
Chapter summary 
This chapter has considered departments’ ability to retain resources and 
explained the repayment of surplus rule. Even if applied according to the Act’s 
interpretation of operating surplus this rule would still add yet another resource-
eroding force to those already affecting departments. This is because it is based on 
the artificial distinction between the Crown and departments, and a philosophy 
that surpluses belong to the owner and deficits belong to the department. The 
development of the rule, although consistent with the philosophy, has resulted in 
the operating result being analysed into components with each component treated 
separately. The effect is that each component that is a surplus must be repaid 
while each component that is a deficit belongs to the department. Depending on 
the transactions incurred during a financial year, a department may be required to 
pay considerably more than any reported operating surplus, thus increasing the 
eroding effect on taxpayers' funds.  
The State Sector Act, the Public Finance Act and comment from the time all 
suggest that the Treasury’s role is to develop the financial management system 
which provides the criteria for review of chief executives and departments and, 
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therefore, that the Treasury’s role in review processes is, at best, minor. This may 
derive from the early idea that a department’s performance is the chief executive’s 
performance. Whether the legislative split between roles is appropriate is not 
clear, but the relative roles of the central agencies in the review processes, 
especially the State Services Commission and the Treasury have been contested. 
Although the Treasury has perceived a review role for itself, with those reviews 
relying on financial information produced from the financial management system, 
given its lack of staff with the high level analytical skills required for review, 
there seems to have been some attempt to convert review processes to rules-based 
processes for application by relatively unskilled staff. The value wheel and its 
development as a simple analytical device exemplifies this simplification process 
for application within Treasury, while the ownership monitoring dimensions and 
the prompts for chief executive self review exemplify the same simplification 
process for application by chief executives. The value wheel also reveals that the 
earlier intention to allow chief executives to determine the appropriate mix of 
inputs required to produce outputs has been abandoned. The re-instatement of 
input controls commenced with a focus on intermediate outputs and a denial that 
this was tantamount to input controls. Neither the OPR nor the VFM review 
processes, however, attempt to conceal their examination of inputs. 
The validity of the individual rules developed for use in monitoring processes 
is, at best, dubious. But the rules are devised for application in combination and 
some rules contradict others, thus negating the extent to which they could 
reasonably be applied even as a rough guide. With these rules presented as 
appropriate for simple application, they seem likely to be applied as if they are 
valid, and without recognition that the effect they are supposed to create is 
negated by other rules. Presumably, fairly senior staff conducted the OPR on the 
Department of Statistics but, even having acknowledged various resource eroding-
effects operating on the Department, the report of the review still suggested that 
one of the department’s weaknesses was that it had spent “all of its depreciation as 
it goes”. With resource-eroding processes intentionally built into the financial 
management system, the OPR report’s proposal that the department run “cash 
surpluses until such time as an adequate reserve is established” must surely seem 
unreasonable, especially in light of the revelation in the department’s annual 
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report the following year which showed just one of those resource-eroding 
processes at work (Box 9.7).   
Box 9.7 Requirement to use depreciation content of output prices 
The 1998 annual report for the Department of Statistics stated that, "In 1996, a proposal to 
extend the [information technology] programme for a further two years (to December 1998) was 
endorsed in an independent analysis commissioned by the Treasury. This extension has enabled 
technological advancements that have occurred since work commenced to be adopted. The 
programme was funded by a direct injection of $18.0 million of capital funds and the subsequent 
depreciation generated from the early years of the programme. The final cost of the programme is 
expected to be $24.2 million."  
Clearly, the financial management system does erode departments’ resources, 
the next chapter considers the debate over the financial management system and 
the nature of the system created. 
  
 
10 The financial management system and 
erosion of resources 
The previous chapters have shown that the financial management system 
erodes departments’ financial resources through three major processes, each of 
which has been developed over time to increase the eroding effect. First, as 
explained in Chapter 7, budget baselines are held at fixed nominal amounts with 
the intention that inflation gradually will erode the real resources available to 
departments, thus forcing them eventually to bid for additional resources. While 
fixed and nominal baselines cause less erosion than the earlier efficiency dividend 
extractions, other features added to the budget baselines system now help to 
accelerate the resource-erosion process. Secondly, and as explained in Chapter 8, 
the full costing requirements are stacked against public sector providers and imply 
that full costs are variable. A sophisticated user of financial information might 
understand the shortcomings of full costs but the evidence suggests that much of 
this financial information is intended for use by those without such sophisticated 
understanding. The treatment of fully costed outputs (and output components) as 
if they are variable adds to resource-eroding processes, a point noted when the 
extraction of efficiency dividends from budget baselines ceased. The application 
of increased pressure to contract out output components seemed to be viewed as 
an effective alternative to efficiency dividends (Chapter 6). Thirdly, as explained 
in Chapter 9, the requirement for departments to repay any reported operating 
surplus would have a resource-eroding effect anyway, but the re-interpretation of 
operating surplus increased the resource-eroding effect. All of these financial 
resource-eroding processes operate in combination to create, as described by one 
departmental source, a perception of creeping death. At the same time, the early 
idea that managers would have increased discretion with monitoring confined to 
output monitoring changed first to output component monitoring and 
requirements for increased detail and now, as evidenced by the value wheel, input 
controls are being reinstated on top of the other accountability requirements 
associated with the output controls. Gorringe’s “information and accountability 
Leviathan” has indeed continued to grow (1995a, p. 21).  
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This chapter does not question the need for New Zealand’s financial 
management reforms, and neither does it challenge the introduction of accrual 
accounting or deny that benefits have been achieved. Other commentary which 
discusses such issues may be divided, roughly, into highly informed key 
reformers promoting their success (Scott et al, 1990; McCulloch and Ball, 1992; 
Scott, 1996; Scott et al, 1997) and more independent commentators, possibly with 
limited time in which to conduct their review (Schick, 1996), or without access to 
the hidden and constantly changing technical details of the system (Boston et al, 
1991; 1996; Pallot, 2001). As the financial management system has developed the 
more independent commentators, while acknowledging benefits, have expressed 
disquiet with aspects of it. The concerns raised by the State Services Commission 
(1998) and the Controller and Auditor-General (1999) suggest that this disquiet 
should not be overlooked. This thesis reports on research which focused on 
aspects of that disquiet by conducting a more detailed examination to determine 
what New Zealand’s financial management reforms really are achieving and how 
they do that (Hopwood, 1984). Specifically, it has attempted to identify whether 
and, if so, how and why, the financial management system erodes departments’ 
resources in an attempt to assess the apparently differing views of the Controller 
and Auditor-General (1999) and the Treasury (1999).  
Moe (1990a; 1990b) believed that NEO theorists’ obsessive focus on 
legislation designed to benefit powerful interest groups may result in technically 
dysfunctional or even subversive legislation. This chapter begins by identifying 
several dysfunctional and/or subversive features of the legislation and the 
financial management system that has developed from that legislation which 
cause financial resource erosion. It then assesses the views expressed by those on 
each side of the debate leading to this research: whether the financial resource 
erosion and losses of capability provide evidence that parliamentary scrutiny and 
control have been neglected (State Services Commission, 1998; Controller and 
Auditor-General, 1999); or whether the system is based on a sound legislative 
foundation and further progress on that foundation will improve performance and 
value-for-money (T99/61, 20 December 1999, p. 7, Treasury files). Conclusions 
are then drawn, followed by acknowledgment of research limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
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Features of the legislation and financial management system that 
contribute to resource erosion 
Most comment on the financial management system as it affects the core public 
sector focuses on the Public Finance Act 1989 and on its companion State Sector 
Act 1988. The links between these two acts are acknowledged, but the full suite of 
reforming legislation and its inter-connectedness should not be ignored. All of this 
legislation was discussed in Chapter 4 and is not re-considered here other than in 
relation to specific points of interest. Typically, the financial resource-eroding 
features of the financial management system have been rationalised using 
technical accounting terminology but those rationalisations are contradictory and 
of dubious validity. Features of the legislation underpinning the financial 
management system and which help to rationalise the system's financial resource-
eroding tendencies include an ambiguous interpretation of the Crown and its 
components, and the selective use made of this interpretation; the powers 
delegated by the legislation and the use made of those delegated powers; 
ambivalence over accrual accounting; and the nature and focus of appropriations. 
The interpretation of the Crown 
The Public Finance Act interprets the Crown as "Her Majesty the Queen in 
right of New Zealand; and includes all Ministers of the Crown and all 
departments", but the Act also distinguishes between the Crown, Ministers, and 
departments (s.2). This ambiguous interpretation implies that departments and 
ministers are at the same time both part of, and separate from, the Crown. To the 
extent that they are separate, the Act presents the relationship between the Crown 
and its departments as if the Crown is merely a purchaser from, and an investor in, 
departments. Even at first bill stage of the Public Finance Act 1989, the 
Legislative Advisory Committee advised that this interpretation misrepresents the 
relationship. This ambiguous interpretation flows into the financial management 
system as inconsistencies. Sometimes the system views the Crown, its 
departments and ministers as if they are separate entities, but at other times it 
views them as one. The selective application of this interpretation is important in 
the other features of the legislation which have helped to rationalise resource 
erosion and in the development of the financial management system.  
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Delegated powers to regulate 
The ability to regulate is an important source of executive power but Palmer 
(1987, p. 165) noted the long-standing tendency of New Zealand parliaments to 
erode their own role by delegating the power to regulate "matters of the most 
fundamental policy". Delegation of powers may be advantageous for 
administration of details or technical matters that parliament cannot scrutinise 
effectively, but matters of detail may conceal significant policy matters, while 
policy matters easily may be re-cast as technical issues (see for example, Boxes 
5.2 and 8.5). Delegation of the power to regulate allows regulations to be devised 
and implemented without either public scrutiny or debate and, possibly, without 
adequate attention to their effect. 
The Public Finance Act delegates regulatory powers to the Governor-General, 
the Minister, the Treasury, and, via the Financial Reporting Act, to the 
Accounting Standards Review Board. Provided those parties use their delegated 
powers lawfully, departmental chief executives must comply with the regulations 
devised. The regulatory powers delegated to the Minister and the Treasury, 
particularly the power to direct the use of money and the power to regulate "the 
accounting and financial management and control procedures relating to contracts 
of the Crown" (s. 79-81), allow them considerable scope for the exercise of 
discretion. Given the subjectivity of accrual accounting, the ability to create 
notional costs, the ability to determine the treatment of those notional costs, and 
the ability to require particular financial management control procedures allows 
the Treasury to determine such matters as what costs, including notional costs, 
must be included in the full costs of outputs, the asset valuation base on which 
those notional costs must be levied, and how the capital charge is calculated. It 
has even re-interpreted the Act's interpretation of operating surplus. 
Public money 
The Public Finance Act requires that all public money be lodged in either a 
Crown bank account or a departmental bank account (s. 20). The Controller and 
Auditor-General's controller function applies to any public money paid out of the 
Crown bank account. Such payments require prior Audit Office certification and 
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the Governor-General's signature. For the purposes of this controller function, the 
Crown and its departments are viewed as separate entities. Although all of the 
money in bank accounts is public money, the interpretation applied to the Crown 
bank account excludes the departments' bank accounts from application of the 
controller function (Treasury, November 1989, FMPG7, The controller function, 
Treasury files; Treasury, 1994, A guide to appropriations).  
Appropriations generally involve spending public money, and appropriations 
are subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. The appropriations legislation, however, 
is silent on which bank account or accounts should be used. Parliament approves 
the appropriations, but the Act allows the Minister and the Treasury to issue 
instructions regarding the money held in bank accounts other than the Crown 
account and to transfer money between accounts (s. 18-19, 21). The Minister and 
the Treasury may decide exactly which public money is spent. In effect, the use of 
all public money is subject to appropriations legislation but by interpreting the 
Crown as separate from the departments, the public money passed to departments 
is subject to the controller function, while the departments’ subsequent use of that 
public money, although subject to compliance with appropriations is not subject to 
the controller function. 
For the purposes of the Treasury's centralised cash management system, a 
different interpretation of the Crown is applied. All public money in all bank 
accounts is regarded as the Crown's money, suggesting either that the Crown and 
its departments are viewed as one entity, or that the Crown and its departments are 
viewed as separate entities but that the public money held by departments is the 
Crown's money (see Chapter 6). Arguably, the establishment of separate 
departmental bank accounts has reduced the powers of the controller and 
increased the Treasury's and the Minister's power and discretion over the use of 
public money. 
Ambivalence over the adoption of accrual accounting 
Early proposals to adopt accrual accounting in the public sector argued that 
accrual accounting would overcome the faults of the previous cash accounting 
system. The adoption of accrual accounting under the Public Finance Act was 
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accompanied by both accrual and cash appropriations. Consistent with the move 
to release controls over inputs and shift controls to outputs, the usefulness of the 
controller function was questioned but some form of ex ante parliamentary control 
was required. The controller retained direct control over cash appropriations, but 
direct controls were not possible for accrual appropriations.50 Indirect proxy 
controls were devised, using cash as the proxy, thus potentially reducing the 
effectiveness of the controller function (Treasury, FMPG8, October 1989, 
Treasury files).51 
Proposals for fiscal policy began with cash accounting ideas, but underwent a 
problematic conversion to accrual accounting ideas (Treasury, 1984, p. 183-184; 
Treasury, 1987, p. 235; see Chapter 4). While accrual accounting is presented as 
appropriate for monitoring departments, it is partially rejected for the purpose of 
monitoring the government’s activities. A recently developed measure, the 
operating balance excluding revaluations and accounting policy changes 
(OBERAC), suggests that the operating result derived from accrual accounting 
does not provide an appropriate measure for assessment of government financial 
operations. It adjusts out of the operating result the revaluation effects of net 
present valued assets and liabilities, market-valued financial assets and liabilities, 
gains or losses on sale (because "selling an asset for greater (or less) than its book 
value is a terminal revaluation"), and "changes in accounting policy around the 
recognition of assets and liabilities" (Cullen, 2001, p. 76).52 The explanation of 
OBERAC states that it was introduced because some factors, which are beyond 
the government's control, "flow from highly technical and inherently subjective 
assumptions. The valuation change does not involve hard cash, is based on 
essentially theoretical assumptions, and usually reverses out over time". OBERAC 
is described as "the fiscal equivalent of the underlying rate of inflation" and "may 
be regarded as the measure of the underlying surplus". Supposedly, this 
                                                 
50 According to the Treasury, this is because it is not "possible to prevent a department obtaining credit or to 
stop an asset depreciating" (Treasury, November 1989, FMPG8, p. 1, Treasury files). See also Chapter 4 
and the Legislative Advisory Committee's comments. 
51 The appropriations legislation allows for cash to be released up to the full amount of the accrual 
appropriations (see Chapter 4). 
52 OBERAC is not adjusted for any revaluations that result from a policy decision (p. 76). 
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underlying surplus allows assessment of the government’s underlying stewardship 
"without abandoning basic accounting principles" (Cullen, 2001, p. 4). 
This ambivalence over accrual accounting and the selective use of either 
accrual accounting or cash accounting ideas has also affected both resource 
provision and judgement of performance. 
Resource provision 
Evidently, accrual accounting is essential for the good management of 
departments but, even though accrual appropriations have been adopted, the 
budget baseline guidelines aim to restrict departments’ access to cash and they use 
whichever form of accounting is necessary to do so. The underlying intention is 
that departments should not receive any real increase in resources unless they bid 
for it (Barnes and Leith, 2000), but that is not acknowledged in the budget 
baselines guidelines. Instead, the budget baselines guidelines selectively apply the 
ambiguous entity ideas of the Crown as either including departments or separate 
from them, and either accrual or cash-based accounting ideas. For those budget 
baseline changes categorised as technical changes, the Crown and its departments 
are regarded as a single entity. Some of the technical changes allowed in the 
budget baselines guidelines ignore accrual accounting and assume that no cash 
effect on a department in the current financial year implies no cash effect at all. 
Others ignore cash issues to assume that departmental costs arising from third 
party revenue shortfalls, forecasting changes, recognition of pre-existing 
liabilities, incurrence of other expenses, and other technical accounting 
adjustments may be absorbed by those departments in order to prevent any effect 
on the whole Crown entity.  
The Cabinet always has the discretion to increase budget baselines but, within 
the general operation of the financial management system, budget baseline 
changes to increase the amount provided to departments for output production, 
require an output price review. Such a review casts the Crown as a purchaser of 
outputs engaged in contractual arrangements with separate providers and ignores 
any effect on the Crown as a whole. It focuses on departments' full costs of 
outputs and output components as compared with the prices from any other 
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provider (Box 9.5). A value-for-money review implies a similar approach (Box 
9.6). Despite the use of euphemistic terminology, such as value-for-money, by 
ignoring the effect on the Crown as a whole, this review process has the potential 
to increase costs to the Crown as a whole. 
The recently announced change to the capital charge regime highlights the 
inconsistencies applied to resource provision decisions. Should the capital charge 
rate increase, it seems likely that the Crown and its departments will be viewed as 
separate entities, and departments required to absorb any increase in the charge or 
undergo the equivalent of an output price review. Should the charge decrease, 
however, the Treasury may seek a baseline change through the normal budget 
process and, given earlier experience with decreased capital charge rates, the 
Crown and its departments may well be viewed as one entity, and departmental 
baselines reduced accordingly (see Chapter 7 commentary on fiscally neutral 
adjustments). 
Judgement of performance 
If accrual accounting provides an inappropriate basis for assessing whole of 
government operations, and if underlying stewardship can be assessed only by 
excluding some factors, such as revaluations, which “flow from highly technical 
and inherently subjective assumptions”, it must be recognised that the Crown 
financial statements incorporate those of departments and exactly the same 
revaluations rejected in the Crown financial statements are used to assess 
departmental performance. Asset revaluations have been required since 1992 
when the officials group monitoring the capital charge recommended that it be 
based on revalued assets, and these revaluation requirements include intangible 
assets (see Chapter 8). This contradiction over the validity of revaluations and 
their effect on performance assessment is even more puzzling because these 
subjective revaluations flow into other accrual accounting figures which include 
depreciation and, for departments, but not the Crown, the capital charge.53 Both of 
these affect departments’ reported performance and output costs but, according to 
                                                 
53 The capital charge would be eliminated in the consolidation process. 
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the Treasury (1999, p. 47), they “have helped tell us how much the public sector 
really costs”. Apart from the contradiction of requiring revaluations at 
departmental level and rejecting them at whole of government level, on one hand 
the idea promoted is that recognising these costs allows cost checks against 
competitors, while on the other hand, the idea promoted is that if departments 
receive these prices they will be able to replace their assets. Neither idea is valid, a 
point discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Nature and focus of appropriations 
All of the features mentioned so far, the ambiguous interpretation of the 
Crown, the delegated powers, and the ambivalence over accrual accounting, flow 
through into the Estimates and appropriations requirements. Democratic control 
over the use of public money is a recognised feature of public sector financial 
management (Pallot, 1992), but neither the Public Finance Act nor Appropriations 
Acts provide any interpretation of the meaning of appropriations, the most 
fundamental means by which parliament may exert control over the executive 
government. The Public Finance Act allows appropriations for the expenditure of 
public money, suggesting cash-based appropriations, and allows appropriations 
for incurring expenses and liabilities, suggesting accrual appropriations. The 
effect on the controller function of the accrual appropriations has already been 
noted, but it is not clear whether these two undefined forms of appropriation are 
mutually exclusive or whether they allow double-dipping (s. 4).  
 (1) No expenditure of public money shall be made other than in accordance with an 
appropriation by an Act of Parliament. 
(2) No expense or liability shall be incurred by the Crown in relation to any 
transaction for which expenses or liabilities are required to be appropriated under 
subsection (3) of this section other than in accordance with an appropriation by an Act 
of Parliament. 
(3) A separate appropriation shall be made for (a) each class of outputs. . . (b) each 
category of benefits or other unrequited expenses . . . (c) each category of borrowing 
expenses . . . (d) each category of other expenses . . . (e) each capital contribution. . . . 
(f) each purchase or development of capital assets contained in the Estimates . . . and (g) 
each repayment of debt . . .   
One point that is clear from these appropriations requirements is that the use of 
accrual appropriations has not closed the long-existing loophole in parliamentary 
scrutiny and control created by the omission of all forms of securities from the 
estimates presented to parliament and, therefore, from prior parliamentary 
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scrutiny. Prior to the financial management reforms, the Treasury identified this 
major loophole as a problem: "Liabilities, commitments and guarantees are 
included in the Estimates only in the year that a cash payment is expected" 
(Treasury, 1987, p. 81; see also, Longdin-Prisk, 1986). The implication was that 
the adoption of accrual accounting would allow closure the loophole but it has 
been kept open, enlarged, and promoted. The loophole has been kept open by 
selectively applying the interpretation of the Crown. The Crown itself cannot raise 
loans, issue guarantees or other forms of security without an act of parliament, but 
the Minister, who for this purpose is not the Crown but acts on behalf of the 
Crown, may issue all forms of security without an act of parliament. Early in the 
financial management reforms, this power was explained as the Treasury's 
responsibility, although the Act states that the Minister may not delegate this 
power (Treasury, November 1989, FMPG11 Operating and Financing leases, 
Treasury files; see Chapter 4).  
The loophole has been enlarged by the Act’s inclusion within the interpretation 
of securities of arrangements to purchase goods and services, but the exclusion of 
those arrangements from the interpretation of raising a loan. These arrangements 
give rise to commitments, which the Act omits from subsection (3). Departments 
may enter such arrangements and, although for annual financial reporting 
purposes, a separate statement of commitments is tabled in parliament, the 
information that must be tabled with the estimates excludes any statement of 
commitments (s. 49; see Chapter 4). Arguably, departments should be able to 
enter contracts for the purchase of goods and services but, with the increasing 
popularity of financing arrangements constructed as contracts for the purchase of 
goods or services, very large amounts and long terms may be involved. For 
example, even the major financing packages for the provision of infrastructure 
(known as private finance initiatives or public private partnerships) may be 
packaged as contracts for the purchase of goods or services (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2000; Savas, 2000; see Chapter 3). In New Zealand there are no specific 
requirements under GAAP for the commitments represented by contracts for 
goods and services to be recognised in financial reports as liabilities, but their 
non-recognition does not change the fact that payments have been committed into 
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the future without prior parliamentary scrutiny and that the Crown has a liability 
to pay.  
Use of the loophole is promoted through recent developments related, 
ironically, to the monitoring and demonstration of compliance with the adopted 
principles of fiscal responsibility. Commitments constitute debt in everything but 
name, yet they are excluded from the counting framework provisions, both the 
expenditure provisions and debt provisions. At best, only a single year's reported 
expense would be noted. Having earlier expressed disapproval that commitments 
are omitted from the estimates, the Treasury now encourages the Crown and its 
departments to enter into such arrangements and promotes these private financing 
arrangements as reducing "the borrowing requirements of the Crown" (T99C/213, 
11 February 1999, Treasury files).  
Appropriations for the operation of departments  
Three key appropriations are relevant for the operation of departments: output 
appropriations, capital contribution appropriations, and other expense 
appropriations. As noted earlier, the controller function applies to these 
appropriations only if money is paid from the Crown bank account to 
departments. 
The very idea of output appropriations suggests that all public sector activities 
are outputs which may be contracted out and yet Gorringe (1995a; 1995b) pointed 
out that in the private sector many activities would not be contracted out and that 
vertical integration would be more sensible. Further, the mode B output 
appropriations are appropriations for costs and are inappropriate for a contracting 
regime. 
Output appropriations must be reported at their full cost, including depreciation 
and a capital charge. The Treasury (1984, p. 183-184; 1987, p. 235) had suggested 
that if resources are provided to department for these full costs, departments 
should be able to replace their assets and Crown borrowing may be confined to 
the initial cost of additional assets (see also, Chapter 3, Chapter 6, and Box 9.4), 
but this idea is theoretically dubious. Even if it were intended initially that 
departments should be able to replace their assets, other rules have been devised 
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to prevent departments from doing so and the thinking underpinning the 
replacement cost idea has been flouted (see Chapter 3, Box 9.1; 9.5): 
The provision of depreciation and pricing to cover this charge will generate free cash 
which may be used to finance other capital expenditure . . . GAAP does not require that 
accumulated cash be attached to specific assets or accumulated in sinking funds. 
(Treasury, 1998, Capital Contributions, FM/2/4 Vol4, p. 10, Treasury files).  
This research suggests that both the capital charge and depreciation expense, 
especially in conjunction with revaluation requirements, function as little more 
than cost-inflating mechanisms intended to disadvantage departments in any price 
comparison between departments and private sector providers (see Chapter 8). 
Other cost-inflating mechanisms include the compliance costs required of 
departments by, for example, expectations that they should apply good costing 
practices at very detailed levels. 
Appropriations legislation shows the expense to the Crown of departments' 
output costs but ignores the clawback from departments of the inflated capital 
charges, and ignores the book entry nature of depreciation. Comparisons between 
departments' output costs and the prices of other potential providers ignore the 
effect on the Crown as a whole. With departments' assets and capital charges 
inflated and output costs treated as variable, decisions announced on this basis 
may appear justified but potentially they increase costs to the Crown as a whole 
(see Box 8.4).  
In contrast to the attention paid to appropriations for outputs, appropriations for 
other expenses and capital contributions have received comparatively little 
attention. Departments do not receive Crown funding for other expense 
appropriations but must use their own resources (Table 7.1). A capital 
contribution is always the last resort of finance and, before a department will 
receive a capital contribution appropriation, it must first attempt to finance its own 
needs by using its free cash, selling any surplus assets, and considering 
arrangements that create commitments but will not be reported as debt, such as 
sale and leaseback or other executory commitments. Capital contribution 
appropriations for parliamentary scrutiny are not necessarily sufficiently specific 
to show that the purpose for which those contributions have been obtained can be 
achieved only by further consuming departmental resources.  
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One early argument against accrual appropriations, was that they would 
increase the management's and the executive government's discretion while 
reducing parliamentary scrutiny and control. This was because the release of cash 
to match the accrual appropriations for the full costs of outputs would allow the 
accumulation of cash beyond the reach of the Controller, and that cash could, 
feasibly, be applied to other purposes (Pallot, 1991). This research suggests that 
those early concerns under-estimated the level of discretion transferred. In effect 
the Treasury and the Minister have usurped a considerable part of the controller's 
powers as those powers relate to the exercise of financial controls over the 
operation of government departments. This has occurred because with accrual 
appropriations there is now a separation between appropriations, the amount of 
cash involved, and which bank account is used to meet any cash costs. This 
separation forces the controller to use only a proxy control, and that control is 
restricted to movement from the Crown’s bank account to departments. It has also 
transferred discretion with the cash appropriations because capital contribution 
appropriations achieve a different separation. Although the controller function 
applies to the cash transferred from the Crown bank account to the departments’ 
accounts, that control relates to the money paid to departments to increase their 
net assets. The use to which that money is put by departments is covered by the 
section 11 permanent appropriations which allow discretion. It seems ironic that 
whereas the legislation requires the controller function to apply to accrual 
appropriations, the Treasury’s controls over departments are cash-oriented.  
Consideration and reconciliation of different views 
The previous section outlined several features of the legislation and the 
financial management system that has evolved from it that contribute to 
departmental resource erosion. The list is not exhaustive. This section assesses the 
Controller and Auditor-General’s views that legislative change is required to 
overcome the flaws he identified before assessing the Treasury’s views that the 
legislation is soundly based and should be retained. 
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Financial resource erosion without effective parliamentary scrutiny and 
control 
The effectiveness of Parliamentary scrutiny must be affected by both the 
volume and complexity of the financial information tabled in parliament and the 
gradual reductions in time allowed for such scrutiny following changes made to 
parliament's standing orders in 1992, 1996 and 1999 (CAB(91)357, 17 May 1991, 
Richardson files 877; Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1986; 
1992; 1996; 1999). Debating time allowed was changed from days to a specified 
number of hours in 1992. The time available to debate the Estimates was reduced 
from 13 days to twenty hours but, by 1999, had been reduced to eight hours. 
Similarly the time for financial review was set in 1992 to ten hours but by 1999 
had been reduced to four hours. Earlier comment in Chapter 4, however, noted 
that the Controller and Auditor-General’s controller function was reduced to a 
proxy control over accrual appropriations and, with the establishment of 
departmental bank accounts, was confined to control of funds from the Crown 
bank account. The implications of these developments are that both parliamentary 
scrutiny and the controller functions have been weakened. 
The three major processes of the financial management system consist of the 
budgeting and expenditure control stage which precedes the preparation of 
estimates and appropriations; the purchasing stage which results in the preparation 
and tabling in parliament of estimates of appropriations; and the monitoring and 
review stage which also involves tabling in parliament audited annual financial 
reports. The budgeting and expenditure control stage is not subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny and is, therefore, largely invisible, while the two later 
stages are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and control.  
Expenditure control stage 
Chapter 7 showed that, after initial reviews and budget cuts, the budget 
baselines have been maintained at fixed and nominal amounts and that the intent 
of the budget baselines regime is that departments should receive no real increase 
in resources. To the extent that budget baseline increases are allowed, the 
selective interpretation of the Crown as including, or distinct from, its 
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departments, and the selective use of either cash or accrual accounting ideas, 
mean that departments may increase their budgeted expenditure, but by 
consuming pre-existing departmental resources. Other expense appropriations 
require similar absorption of departmental resources while capital contribution 
appropriations require prior consumption to have occurred. This expenditure 
control stage which precedes parliamentary scrutiny involves considerable 
financial resource erosion and provides incentives for particular privatising 
arrangements, classed as commitments, which neither count against any fiscal 
targets, nor are subjected to prior parliamentary scrutiny (Treasury, 1984, Public 
Finance Act 1989, s. 2, 4, 9, 34A, 35, 38, 39, 49; Treasury, T99C/213, 11 
February 1999, Treasury files).  
Parliamentary scrutiny of appropriations 
Parliamentary scrutiny of appropriations affecting government departments 
focuses on the purchase of outputs in the current year and appropriations for other 
expenses and capital contributions. As explained earlier, for output purchases, the 
financial management system views the Crown as distinct from its departments 
and any other parties the Crown is purchasing outputs from.54 Parliament may be 
deceived by decisions which appear efficient. Although appropriations allow the 
expenditure of public money on up to the appropriated amount, the power 
delegated to the Minister and the Treasury allows them to decide from which bank 
account any such expenditure must be made. Parliament may think that 
appropriations always involve the transfer of money from the Crown to 
departments. Capital contribution appropriations increase a department’s net 
assets, but the permanent appropriation in section 11 of the Public Finance Act 
allows discretion in the use of such money. This discretion was evident with the 
Department of Statistics and the use of capital contributions to supplement 
inadequate funding for its operations (see Box 7.2). 
                                                 
54 Output appropriations are appropriations which allow departments to incur costs, they are not purchases.  
242 The financial management system and erosion of 
resources 
Chapter 10 
 
 
 
Parliamentary scrutiny of annual reports 
Examination of departments' published financial reports reveals both erosion of 
departments' financial resources and financial distress, thus raising questions 
about the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny of those reports. In 1989 the 
Public Finance Bill proposed that any increase or decrease in a department's 
equity would require an appropriation thus ensuring attention to changes in 
departments' reported equity. This was removed prior to enactment (see Chapter 
4). In the time allowed for parliamentary scrutiny of annual reports, even the 
obvious erosion of departmental financial resources may be overlooked. This 
erosion is caused by operating deficits, by a repayment of operating surplus rule 
that ignores any deficits and, in many instances, requires repayment of far more 
than the reported operating surplus (Table 10.1), and by other requirements which 
prevent departments from building up sufficient financial resources to replace 
assets. The obvious flow-on effect is that suggested by the SSC (1998) and the 
Controller and Auditor-General (1999), that the erosion prevents departments 
from maintaining capability.   
Table 10.1 Operating results, repayment of surplus and effect on taxpayers' funds 
Explanation  Department 
of Statistics 
$'000 
IRD 
 
$'000 
Total effect on taxpayer's funds  (statement of 
movements in equity) 
  
Taxpayer's funds on commencement of accrual 
accounting  
3,708 36,573 
   
Reported operating results  -18,954 7,743 
Less: repayment of surplus to the Crown  -2,039 -62,846 
Net effect of operations on taxpayers' funds -20,993 -55,103 
Financial resource erosion in a soundly-based system  
According to the Treasury, the financial management system is built on a 
sound legislative framework, but the dysfunctional and financial resource-eroding 
features of the financial management system outlined above raise questions about 
how that framework could be considered sound.  The following comments 
represent my interpretation of the nature of the financial management system in an 
attempt to explain how the system might be considered soundly based. This 
research involved no attempt to determine who, if anyone, understands and is 
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responsible for the nature of the system that has developed and neither did it 
consider the roles or activities of any particular people. The research focus is on 
the system, not on identifying exactly who is responsible for creating it.   
New Zealand's public sector financial management reforms are remarkable for 
their legislative foundation which created four modules, each of which is 
consistent with the ideas and privatisation objectives in the theoretical and 
practical literature reviewed in Chapters 1 and 3. The theoretical consistency of 
the legislation suggests a sound legislative framework, but the soundness seems to 
relate to the reformers' aims to "profoundly alter the role of the state" by shrinking 
the government's role and privatising functions (Scott et al, 1997; see Chapter 3). 
Over time the financial management system has linked these modules so that now 
all are a part of the financial management system (Figure 10.1). 
Figure 10.1 Financial management system: modules and links 
Module 1 
Meaningful constitutional norm: principles of fiscal responsibility 
(Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994)   
Links 
Counting framework and budget baselines 
Module 2 
Contractual approach to purchasing services: distinction between the Crown 
as purchaser, and departments as producers of outputs, outputs fully costed  
(Public Finance Act 1989) 
Links 
Mimic potential private sector arrangements 
Cause financial crisis in departments  
Module 3 
Machinery of government review 
Institutionalised routines to reduce the government's role  
(State Sector Act 1988) 
Links 
Re-structuring of government departments to mimic private sector structures 
Module 4 
Commercial operations 
(State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986) 
(Public Finance Act 1989 (1992 amendments)) 
Module 1: meaningful constitutional norm 
The first module, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, provides a meaningful 
constitutional norm intended to constrain the government's access to resources and 
thus force load-shedding (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978; Buchanan, 1989; Jones 
1992a; Savas, 1982, see Chapter 2). This legislated requirement to observe 
principles of fiscal responsibility and to adopt fiscal targets operates at whole of 
government level and is drawn from cash accounting.  
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Despite the dubious claims about what those principles of fiscal responsibility 
will achieve in an accrual accounting environment, the establishment of 
provisions determines the amounts available for additional expense and debt, and 
allows the fiscal targets to impose top-down resource restrictions on vote 
ministers and departments. The effectiveness of such targets is evident in the 
recent development of the value-for-money review process which was established 
to re-prioritise resources in order to fund new initiatives (see Chapter 9).  
The counting framework links the provisions to the next module. The exclusion 
of commitments, that is, arrangements for the purchase of goods or services, from 
counting against either the expenditure or debt provisions makes advantageous for 
financial reporting purposes the disposal of assets and reported debt, and their 
replacement with private finance forms of arrangements (commitments). In the 
context of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, the philosophy behind the disposal 
of public sector assets and engagement in commitments is that by maximising the 
property held in the private sector, the government's coercive powers may be 
restrained (Rowley, 1993). Savas's definition of privatisation includes reducing 
the government's role in owning property. He promotes arrangements such as 
these because they advance privatisation, while both he and the Treasury promote 
them because they project the appearance of reducing debt (T99C/213, 11 
February 1999, Treasury files; Savas, 2000, p. 237-240). According to the 
Treasury, disposing of assets reduces the risks of government ownership, but 
whether the risks of the alternatives receive adequate consideration is not clear 
(Treasury, 21 November 1995, Vote analysis priorities over the next two years, 
Treasury files, see Chapter 6).55 The incentives developed in the financial 
management system make advantageous entry into these off-balance sheet 
arrangements.  
The load-shedding pressure on departments is increased by holding the budget 
baselines at a nominal dollar amount, thus allowing inflation to erode the 
purchasing power of the budget involved (Savas, 1982; Barnes and Leith, 2000). 
                                                 
55 The Treasury's 1999-2004 strategic plan includes a programme of asset divestments (www. 
treasury.govt.New Zealand.strategicplan/functions). 
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The baselines regime also forces departments to consume their financial and other 
resources through the selective interpretation of the Crown and its departments. 
These resource-eroding requirements help to impose on departments the financial 
stress that both Savas (1987) and Osborne and Plaistrick (1997) consider essential 
to make feasible additional privatising initiatives that might otherwise be resisted 
(see Chapter 3).  
Module 2: Contractual approach to purchasing outputs 
The second module, the Public Finance Act 1989, is constructed around New 
Zealand's novel application of the idea that all of a government's activities may be 
viewed as the purchase of outputs, a contractual approach which is at "the heart of 
the entire concept of privatization" (Savas, 2000, p. 65; see also Scott et al, 1997). 
That novel application is constructed around the ambiguous interpretation of the 
Crown and the misrepresentation of the relationship between the Crown and its 
departments as an investor/purchaser relationship. This module requires making 
government-produced goods and services to look like those available in the 
private sector; and it requires full costing, including a capital charge and 
depreciation, to allow price efficiency comparisons between departmental and 
alternative providers (Niskanen, 1975; Savas, 1982, 1987; Miller and Moe, 1983). 
Chapter 8 explained the development of this module and showed how, despite talk 
of competitive neutrality, it contains biases against government operations, biases 
that were noted at the time (see also Chapter 3, and Robinson, 1998b; Carlin, 
2000). Privatisation of prison operations was intended and planned for, but the 
financial management system allowed that privatisation to be rationalised as if it 
were less expensive (Box 8.5). As this financial management system becomes 
embedded, decisions may be made without awareness of these biases. Williamson 
(1996) calls such biases natural opportunism, or tilting at the margins. 
Over time, it seems that the margins have required further tilting and this seems 
to have occurred when the unpopularity of the privatising agenda and the pending 
change in the electoral system meant that the relatively open approach to 
privatisation could not be sustained. Arguably, the privatising intent continued, 
but surreptitiously, at a lower level away from public notice, and through the 
application of financial rules and procedures. Additional means to pursue this 
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intent were provided by the dual reporting process used in technical reviews of 
purchase agreements and revisions to output specifications, the development of 
good costing practices to allow the costing and benchmarking of output 
components, the modification of chief executives' performance agreements to 
demonstrate cost-efficiency and increase in chief executives' performance 
incentives. These increased efforts were recognised as likely to cause financial 
stress for departments and some were controversial within Treasury when they 
were developed (Treasury, 24 October 1995, Efficiency and innovation in the 
public sector; Gorringe, 1995a; 1995b).  
This contractual purchasing structure has been linked to the next module by 
additional means of causing financial distress in departments. The contracting 
process itself is likely to cause distress by treating as variable costs the costs of 
departments’ fully-costed outputs and output components. That financial distress 
is exacerbated by the initial neglect of the ownership interest with no apparent 
effort to check  departments’ financial stability under the accrual accounting 
regime, and the repayment of surplus rule. This financial stress provides the 
opportunity to impose further privatising pressures through the operation of the 
next module (Savas, 1987; Osborne and Plaistrik, 1997). 
Module 3: Machinery of government review 
The State Sector Act 1988 requires the State Services Commissioner to 
conduct reviews, and this review function seems to be the link between the State 
Sector Act and the Public Finance Act. That the legislation assigned review 
functions to the State Services Commission, omitting the Treasury, may have 
been an oversight but Chapter 9 shows the review function that the Treasury has 
carved out for itself. Gradually these review functions have been incorporated in 
the financial management system as a technical means of clearing the decks of 
both assets and functions and, significantly, incorporated into the budgeting 
process, thus placing these reviews within the Treasury’s domain. Arguably, clear 
the decks routines should be conducted as small periodic processes which 
"gradually and continuously" reduce the government's role, preferably with strong 
advocates (Savas, 1982, 1987; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; World Bank, 1995; 
Osborne and Plaistrik, 1997, see Chapter 3).  
Chapter 10 The financial management system and erosion of 
resources 
247 
 
 
 
Three clear the decks routines have been institutionalised, one to clear the 
decks of assets, the requirements for a capital contribution; and the other two to 
clear the decks of output provision functions, the output price review (OPR) and 
the value-for-money (VFM) review. The OPR began as a joint process between 
the Treasury and the State Services Commission but the State Services 
Commission was unhappy with the outcome of such reviews — recommendations 
limited to clearing the decks by reducing business scope, reducing low priority 
outputs, and divesting physical assets. The current budget baselines guidelines and 
the Treasury's value wheel suggest that the State Services Commission is now 
largely excluded from these functions and that the Treasury's role has expanded to 
include them (State Services Commission, 13 January 1999, "Future application 
of output pricing reviews: incentives, options and strategies" Treasury files; see 
Chapter 8; CO(00)12, para 22). The OPR and capital contribution requirements 
are less regular forms of clear the decks routines than the VFM review but their 
requirement for dire financial circumstances to exist means that the other parties 
brought into the process occupy comparatively strong positions. This, in turn, 
allows for the imposition of load-shedding arrangements which may have been 
unacceptable under less difficult financial circumstances (Savas, 1987; Osborne 
and Plaistrik, 1997).  
The machinery of government principles adopted for these routines use some 
of the ideas Savas (2000) presents as pragmatic ways ideas to rationalise 
privatisation. Departments have been required make their outputs look like those 
available in the private sector and, as shown in Chapter 8, the output definitions 
seem to be devised from within the Treasury. Similarly, departments have been 
encouraged to adopt the good costing techniques which analyse their outputs into 
output components and commentary about the Department of Statistics’ output 
price review suggest that that encouragement is very strong. The crowding-out 
rationalisation for privatisation suggests that if public sector outputs or output 
components can be made to look like those available in the private sector then 
public sector production should cease, especially if the private sector providers 
offer more efficient prices (see for example, Chapter 3, 8 and the Guidelines for 
setting charges in the public sector; Box 9.3).  
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The types of privatising arrangements that may result from clear the decks 
routines may involve decisions to stop producing particular outputs, to contract 
out the production of particular outputs or output components, or to dispose of 
assets, either completely, or legally, but not substantively, by engaging in sale and 
leaseback arrangements, or sale and other purchasing arrangements which allow 
continued use of the assets but without legal ownership. These forms of 
privatisation may be achieved within the system modules as outlined to this point. 
Other forms of privatisation, however, require restructuring the department or 
parts of a department into commercial operations and therefore involve the next 
module. These restructuring forms are also indicated in step 4 of the Treasury's 
value wheel (Box 9.6). 
Module 4: Commercial operations 
The fourth module of the financial management system provides a means of 
privatisation by which specific governmental operations, once commercialised 
and re-structured, may be privatised. The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
provided the first of these structures while the 1992 amendment to the Public 
Finance Act 1989 provided an alternative, a company structure called the Crown-
owned entity. Both involve company structures and share equity, leading to 
obvious pressure to privatise these operations by selling them on the basis that the 
government should not run commercial operations (Williamson, 19940; World 
Bank 1995).  
Conclusions 
The debate which gave rise to this research was whether legislative change is 
required because the financial management system erodes departments’ financial 
resources and escapes parliamentary scrutiny in the process, or whether the 
system is based on solid legislative foundations and further progress within the 
current framework will help it to improve performance and value-for-money.  
The aims stated in the Public Finance Act, such as providing a framework for 
parliamentary scrutiny, effective and efficient use of financial resources, and the 
safeguarding of public assets, are aims that might be expected of any public sector 
financial management system. Given these stated aims, the system’s ability to 
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escape parliamentary scrutiny while eroding departments’ financial resources 
suggests that the Public Finance Act is weak and, as the Controller and Auditor-
General proposed, that legislative change is required. This in turn would result in 
significant financial management system changes. 
The financial management system is not confined to one piece of legislation 
but encompasses several, and the Public Finance Act’s stated objectives are, at 
best, secondary to the financial management system’s aim. That aim, which seems 
to be privatisation, transcends all of the legislation and has tended to be expressed 
in symbolic terms likely to appeal to the particular political climate. Stated aims 
of performance improvement and value-for-money might be viewed in this light. 
Privatisation as a political objective is well-recognised as lacking public support, 
both in New Zealand and elsewhere, while privatisation for pragmatic reasons, 
such as poor and deteriorating public services, superior private sector efficiency, 
financial crises which present sudden, supposedly unanticipated needs for 
additional investment, and crowding out apparently receives easier acceptance 
(Richardson, 1995 and see Chapter 3). New Zealand’s public sector financial 
management system is indeed built on solid and consistent legislative foundations, 
as the Treasury suggested, but those foundations are foundations for privatisation, 
they are not foundations intended to meet the objectives usually attributed to 
public sector financial management. Further progress within the system’s current 
framework will help to achieve the system’s aim, and the nature of the current 
incentives developments under the value for money theme support that view.  
The debate between the Controller and Auditor General and the Treasury 
seemed to suggest opposing views and a decision resulting from this research that 
the views of either one or the other may be supported. The difference between the 
Public Finance Act’s stated objectives and the financial management system’s 
aim, however, raises the possibility that the views of both may be supported. From 
the Controller and Auditor-General’s perspective the system is not achieving the 
Public Finance Act’s stated objectives. From the Treasury's perspective, the suite 
of reforming legislation is theoretically consistent and, therefore, might be 
considered sound. That suite of legislation has supported development of a 
financial management system which seeks an aim concealed in symbolic and 
euphemistic terms — that aim is privatisation.  
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New Zealand’s financial management system operates surreptitiously to 
fabricate the circumstances likely to make privatisation acceptable and, arguably, 
both resource erosion and avoidance of parliamentary scrutiny are necessary to do 
this. The problem arising, however, is that the means by which privatisation is 
being pursued is contrary to the stated aims of the Public Finance Act. 
NEO implies a secretive and subversive approach in pursuit of enacting 
legislators’ objectives to provide ongoing benefits to their powerful interest group 
supporters (Moe, 1990a; 1990b; Horn, 1995). Events in the development of the 
financial management system suggest that subversion and stealth became essential 
to enable continued pursuit of the privatisation objective in the face of public 
opposition. Democratic notions suggest that important matters such as the role and 
size of government should be debated openly, but through the operation of the 
financial management system the role and size of government may be shrunk 
while avoiding any public debate. Democratic control over the use of public 
money is a recognised feature of public sector financial management (Pallot, 
1992), but the gradual reduction of parliamentary scrutiny time during the 1990s 
has reduced the ability to apply such controls over the executive government, 
while reductions in the Controller function seem to have removed the Controller 
and Auditor-General’s ability to see clearly how the financial resource-eroding 
features of the financial management system operate. 
Institutional theorists have observed the ease with which institutional changes 
may be achieved even without agreement or full understanding of the intended or 
likely effects of those changes. Such lack of understanding has already been 
suggested in New Zealand (Steering Group, 1991, p. 11). Today, the financial 
management system is complex and operates though all three central agencies — 
the Treasury, the State Services Commission, and the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. The recent report to the government by the advisory 
committee which included the chief executive of each central agency reassured 
the government that the public management system provides a “reasonable base” 
from which the government may pursue its objective to “maintain and strengthen 
the public sector” (Advisory Group, 2001, p. 10). That reassurance is 
demonstrably wrong, but whether members of the Advisory Group know that is 
not clear. It is at this point that the subversive nature of NEO becomes most 
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apparent. The current government has, ostensibly, distanced itself from 
privatisation but, given the reassurance about the suitability of the system, the 
question arises as to the level at which the nature of the financial management 
system is known. There is a range of possibilities. At one end of the range, if the 
system’s nature is known at all levels, the current government’s distancing from 
privatisation might not be genuine. At the other end of the range, if the system’s 
nature has not been recognised, then the reassurance issued may represent 
opinions honestly held and unintentionally mislead the government. In between 
those two extremes exists various possibilities which include knowledge at some 
level or levels of the system’s nature, and misleading statements issued either 
intentionally or unintentionally. Irrespective of where knowledge of the system’s 
nature is located, what is clear is that New Zealand’s financial management 
system is not designed to support the ongoing management or maintenance of the 
public sector as implied by the Advisory Group (2001); it is designed to erode 
departments’ resources and to provide support for privatising developments which 
project the appearance of occurring for technical and pragmatic reasons, rather 
than ideological or political reasons.  
International commentary about NPFM techniques, many of which have been 
adopted in New Zealand, has challenged their validity and appropriateness. This 
research shows the manner in which some of those techniques have been applied 
and notes further points of concern that have received less international comment, 
especially the links to other initiatives, the level of discretion exercised by the 
Minister and the Treasury, the Treasury’s expanding role, and the selective use of 
accounting to rationalise changes which advance the privatising intent. On the 
surface, accounting aspects of these NPFM developments appear puzzling and 
somewhat incoherent, but the selective interpretation of the Crown and its 
departments, and the selective application of accrual or cash accounting 
techniques regain some coherence if considered from a privatisation perspective.  
According to Scott (2001) New Zealand’s system of public sector financial 
management is no longer unique. To the extent that New Zealand's public sector 
financial management system is consistent with NPFM developments elsewhere, 
it should be recognised that it contains an underlying privatisation agenda and that 
"privatization is the New Public [Financial] Management" (Savas, 2000, p. 319). 
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The supposedly unintended consequences of NPFM for which the remedy is more 
of the same might be reconsidered in light of an unstated privatisation objective. 
Limitations of this research 
This research has focused on documentation that explains the first two layers of 
the financial management system, the conceptual instruments layer and the 
technical instruments layer. It has attempted, using numerous fragments of 
documented information, to reconstruct and explain the nature of the financial 
management system. The system is complex, and some important features may 
have been overlooked. Occasionally the existence or significance of some parts of 
the system was recognised only following chance comment. Not all features of the 
system are evident in published financial reports, and cross-checking to published 
financial reports could be performed only for those parts of the system that were 
evident. 
To the extent possible, the research findings have been checked but the 
constraints of the Official Information Act make a more full check difficult. 
Treasury staff kindly reviewed and commented on my representation of facts in an 
early draft of each of chapters 5-9, and at final draft stage. State Services 
Commission staff did the same for those parts that related to the State Services 
Commission. As my understanding emerged, however, the earlier versions of 
those chapters changed significantly. Departmental staff have been unfailingly 
helpful and constructive. Any errors in the system as described in this thesis are 
my errors and should not be attributed to either department as a failure to 
comment. Arguably, the complete system's consistency is such that correction of 
any remaining errors would not change the conclusions drawn about its 
underlying nature and aim. 
This research has revealed that at the conceptual instruments and technical 
instruments levels the system is designed in a manner which erodes departments' 
resources. It has confirmed some of this erosion through the examination and 
analysis of departments' financial reports. Ways may have been found through the 
informal situated interpretation layer of this system to modify some of its eroding 
effects, but those ways are not necessarily revealed by the research method 
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adopted. Evidently, some ongoing system developments have been devised to 
overcome earlier methods of escaping the system's intent. For example, the 
system would have greatest effect if performance assessment were confined to 
assessment of financial performance and chief executives' performance but the 
State Services Commission resisted such a narrow interpretation of performance. 
Arguably, the recent development in which the Treasury has taken over a part of 
the State Services Commission's machinery of government review function and 
designed that function into the financial management system as highly technical-
looking clear the decks routines under Treasury influence and control represents 
the latest attempt to prevent defeat of the system's intent.  
One remarkable finding from this research is the consistency of both the 
legislation and the system developed on the legislative base with the theoretical 
and practical literature reviewed in Chapters 1 and 3. This differs from Rhodes 
(1997) who proposes that institutions grow by accretion and not necessarily 
logically or consistently. In some ways, the consistency found should not be 
surprising given acknowledgment that the literature was influential, that even 
though developments occurred at different times, those developments were 
consistent, and recognition of New Zealand's small size and concentrated political 
environment (Hood, 1991; Scott et al, 1997; Goldfinch, 1998b). At the same time, 
it must be recognised that New Zealand’s leading role in developing NPFM has, 
to some extent, provided a model for others, including some authors reviewed. 
For example, New Zealand may have provided a model for Osborne and Plaistrik 
(1997) with some developments but they may also have helped to provide a model 
for New Zealand.  
This research has focused on the financial management system and not the 
identification of particular knowledgeable people who developed this system. A 
different research method would be required to do this. It might be tempting to 
attribute a level of intention to particular agencies, such as the Treasury, or to 
particular people within the Treasury. Much of the archival information used in 
this research derives from the Treasury and this may project a biased impression 
of the Treasury's role in development of the financial management system. 
Certainly Treasury staff are very closely associated with the system and its 
development, but some aspects of the system as described imply limited 
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understanding within the Treasury of, for example, accrual accounting and the 
differences between accrual and cash-based accounting. Whether the system has 
been designed from within the Treasury, and whether current Treasury staff are 
aware of the system's effect and consistency are not questions that were raised in 
this research. Similarly, it might be tempting to attribute intention to all three 
central agencies, given that the system operates through all three and the recent 
endorsement of the financial management system as suitable for pursuit of an 
objective that it is designed to thwart (Advisory Group, 2001). Recognition is 
essential that the financial management system is complex and that it has received 
considerable positive and influential commentary (see Chapter 1), albeit that much 
of the commentary is promotional. This thesis should be read as explaining the 
financial management system developed and system's objective. It does not 
extend to comment on the behavioural or political intent of particular people.  
Directions for future research 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 considers essential the placement within 
key government agencies of econocrats to plan, develop and oversee the reforms 
(Williamson, J, 1994; Williamson, O, 1996). Such placement was a feature of 
New Zealand's reforms (Kelsey, 1995; 1999; Goldfinch, 1998b). In contrast, NEO 
views bureaucrats as the non-political agents of elected politicians. Moe 
questioned NEO's conceptualisation of bureaucrats, suggesting that all three sets 
of actors identified in NEO, interest groups, legislators and bureaucrats should be 
considered in their own right and in light of the way in which they operate to 
achieve their own ends. In some ways, this direction for future research follows 
from the preceding acknowledgment of the research limitations. Future research 
could look more closely at those involved in the financial management reforms to 
understand their role, both at the time of those reforms and subsequently. The 
research method adopted by Goldfinch (1998b) may help to identify those most 
closely involved. Alternatively, the activities, commitment and close connections 
of known prominent individuals, such as those who have published on the 
financial management reforms, and acknowledged their involvement, could be 
traced.  
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Legislation reforming the financial management of New Zealand’s public 
sector has not been confined to central government. Additional legislation has 
affected city and regional councils, while more recent system reform has been 
applied to Crown entities. The timing, controversy, and the nature of these 
developments suggest that they may conceal similar biased privatising intent. 
Financial management legislation and system developments to crown entities, and 
to city and regional councils could be examined more closely to assess whether 
they too relate more to surreptitious privatisation intent than to effective and 
appropriate ongoing financial management of government operations.  
New Zealand’s financial management system is no longer unique (Scott, 2001). 
One noted feature of financial management system reforms in New Zealand and 
elsewhere is the role played by the transnational accounting firms. In this 
research, the development of good costing techniques, following an ostensibly-
independent review of departments' costing systems by one transnational 
accounting firm, helped to justify requirements for costing output components and 
increasing financial pressure on departments. Evidently, a variety of technical 
good practice guidelines have been devised, both in New Zealand and 
internationally. This research has suggested that any descriptor attached to 
particular financial management practices and routines should not be taken at face 
value. Just as this research has attempted to interrogate the technical achievements 
of New Zealand's financial management system, these technical good practice 
developments could also be interrogated to develop understanding of exactly what 
is meant by good, whether those good practices are designed to contribute to the 
system’s privatising aim, and whether those good practices have spread 
internationally.  
Among the good practice guidelines issued to government departments in New 
Zealand is one advising on internal controls and separation of powers. While, for 
departmental management purposes, separation of functions is advised, the 
Treasury’s expansion of functions to take over some of the controller function and 
the State Services Commission’s review functions, combined with its extensive 
delegated powers, raise questions about the wisdom of allowing such a 
concentration of power to develop within one department. At the same time, 
technical processes have been embedded in other central agencies: the budget 
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baselines guidelines in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; and 
the ownership interest requirements, including the requirements to demonstrate 
cost  effectiveness, in the State Services Commission’s chief executive 
performance agreements. Questions arise whether those other central agencies 
appreciate the nature of those technical processes and their role in the overall 
system, or whether these routines represent the proposed increased co-ordination 
among the central agencies that was proposed in 1993 when it was recognised that 
pursuit of the “greater objective”  would require increased sophistication. Future 
research might examine the issue of internal control at government management 
level, the need for separation of central agency powers as an internal control 
mechanism, and the migration of staff among central agencies. 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms are acclaimed for their theoretical 
coherence and consistency. This research highlights the consistency between the 
privatising intent of NPE and the related practical literature, and the specific 
accounting rules and techniques adopted in New Zealand’s reformed financial 
management system. That consistency and coherence contrasts with the 
inconsistencies and incoherence evident in the accounting developments when 
considered from an accounting theory perspective. At the secondary level of rule 
development, the selective use of accounting techniques such as cash or accrual 
accounting suggests confusion over accounting concepts within the Treasury, but 
it must be noted that the selective use of those techniques helps to rationalise the 
privatising developments. At another level, however, where confusion over 
accounting ideas should not be a problem, the activities of the accounting 
profession, including consultants and accounting standard-setters raise questions 
about the legitimacy of a supposedly neutral professional group in the regulation 
process. In New Zealand, some of the financial reporting standards developed 
appear more consistent with the financial management system’s privatising intent 
than with the dubious theoretical rationale claimed for them (Poskitt and 
Newberry, 1998). For accountants examining NPFM at a broader level, the links 
between accounting standard-setters, the means by which their accounting 
standards attain the force of law, and public sector reformers require investigation. 
Such investigation is especially warranted in New Zealand where those links are 
extremely close.  
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For all of the accounting profession’s claims that accounting is a set of neutral 
techniques intended for use in the production of representationally financial 
reports, this research shows the folly of accepting such claims without question. In 
New Zealand’s reformed financial management system, accounting is simply a 
tool for use to advance privatisation. The pursuit of privatisation through these 
technical accounting means avoids open political debate, and this may be useful 
from the perspective of NEO theorists seeking regulatory processes intended to 
benefit particular interest groups while concealing the identity of the beneficiaries 
and the nature of the benefits to them. The inherently political nature of NEO 
suggests that technical developments should not be allowed to act as barriers to 
researchers from other disciplines. Just as the group of NPE theories represents a 
combination of economics and politics, and trace through to NPM, this research 
suggests that the development of NPFM adds accounting to this mixture of 
disciplines. Further studies of NPFM would, therefore, benefit from cross-
disciplinary research which analyses particular technical developments for 
consideration through the lens of other disciplines, thus allowing, for example, 
consideration from both a technical and political perspective. 
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